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Kristin A. Collins

Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the
Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation
abstract. The citizenship status of children born to American parents outside the United States is
governed by a complex set of statutes. When the parents of such children are not married, these statutes
encumber the transmission of citizenship between father and child while readily recognizing the child of
an American mother as a citizen. Much of the debate concerning the propriety and constitutionality of
those laws has centered on the extent to which they reflect gender-traditional understandings of fathers’
and mothers’ respective parental roles, or instead reflect “real difference.” Based on extensive archival
research, this Article demonstrates that an important yet overlooked reason for the development of
gender- and marriage-based derivative citizenship law—jus sanguinis citizenship—was officials’ felt need
to enforce the racially nativist policies that were a core component of American nationality law for over
150 years. The complex interaction of gender, race, family law, and nationality law charted here
demonstrates that gender-based jus sanguinis citizenship is not a biologically inevitable feature of
American nationality law, as has been argued, but is in important respects the product of choices made by
officials engaged in a racially nativist nation-building project. This history also suggests that what is at
stake in modern challenges to gender-based citizenship laws is not only the constitutionality of those
statutes, but a mode of reasoning about citizenship, family, gender, and race that continues to shape the
practice and politics of citizenship in ways that are often obscured in modern citizenship debates.

author. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Sidley Austin-Robert D. McLean ’70
Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 2013-2014. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at
Yale Law School, the University of Minnesota, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston
University, Iowa University, the University of California at Irvine, Chicago-Kent, and the annual
meetings of the American Society for Legal History and the American Association of Law Schools. I am
grateful for the thoughtful comments I received during those presentations, as well as input from
numerous colleagues, including Kerry Abrams, Kathy Baker, Angela Banks, Susanna Blumenthal, Khiara
Bridges, Janet Calvo, Sam Erman, Bill Eskridge, Ariela Gross, Harold Koh, Gary Lawson, Carol Lee,
Stephen Lee, Gerry Leonard, Serena Mayeri, Hiroshi Motomura, Melissa Murray, Claire Priest, Judith
Resnik, Cristina Rodríguez, David Seipp, Dan Sharfstein, Reva Siegel, Norman Spaulding, Emma Teng,
Patrick Weil, Barbara Welke, John Witt, and especially Linda Kerber. Archivists William Creech, David
Langbart, and Rodney Ross, of the National Archives, and Zachary Wilske, of the Historical Research
Branch of the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, provided expert assistance during my research trips
to Washington and went beyond the call of duty on several occasions. Fabulous research assistants helped
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introduction
[I]t seems clear that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries
of American fathers and native women are not American citizens.
–Edwin Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915)
Children born in the United States are citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, but the citizenship status of children born to
Americans living outside the United States is governed by a complex set of
statutes.1 When the parents of such children are unmarried, those laws
encumber citizenship transmission between the father and his child, while
providing nearly automatic citizenship transmission between an American
mother and her child.2 In three constitutional challenges to the gender-based
regulation of parent-child citizenship transmission—Miller v. Albright, Nguyen
v. INS, and Flores-Villar v. United States—the Supreme Court upheld these
distinctions while laboring to explain why Congress has drawn such sharp
lines between the nonmarital children of American mothers and fathers.3

1.
2.

3.

Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012).
In order to secure citizenship for his nonmarital foreign-born child born on or after
November 14, 1968, the father must provide proof of paternity or legitimation before the
child turns eighteen and proof of provision of financial support. In addition, a blood
relationship between the child and the father must be established by “clear and convincing
evidence,” and the father must satisfy an age-calibrated residency requirement. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1401(g), 1409(a). By contrast, the mother of a nonmarital foreign-born child need only
have lived in the United States for one year at any point in her life. See id. § 1409(c). The
requirements for father-child citizenship transmission outside marriage have varied since
they were first codified in 1940, while the liberal standards for mother-child citizenship
transmission outside marriage have remained essentially the same. Compare Nationality Act
of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201-205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40, with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c). Because
Congress generally has not made retroactive changes to the requirements that apply to
nonmarital children of American fathers, the older standards remain governing law for
children who achieve majority prior to the effective date of a subsequent change.
See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally
divided court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56-57 (2001); Miller
v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998). Nguyen and Miller involved challenges to the fatheronly legitimation and proof-of-paternity requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) and 8
U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(b), while Flores-Villar challenged the disparate parental residency
requirements that apply to fathers and mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children.
Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409(a), 1401(a)(7) (1970), with id. § 1409(c). Although Congress
reduced the duration of the parental residency requirement prospectively in 1986, the
statute continues to hold mothers and fathers of nonmarital foreign-born children to
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Historians and legal scholars have also addressed this issue, and the resulting
scholarship has largely focused on the origin of the gender-based regulation of
jus sanguinis citizenship in the traditional cultural and legal norms that
governed mothers’ and fathers’ respective parental rights and responsibilities
outside marriage, and the perpetuation of those norms in what is now called
derivative citizenship law.4
In this Article, I argue that a primary and overlooked explanation for the
development and durability of gender-asymmetrical jus sanguinis citizenship
law was the felt need of judges, administrators, and legislators to further the
racially nativist policies5 that were central to American nationality law until
1965.6 At formative moments in the development of American nationality law,

4.

5.

6.

different standards. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a) (2012), with id. § 1409(c).
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the gender-asymmetrical principles governing birth
status (i.e., bastardy law) were incorporated into citizenship law, limiting citizenship
transmission between American fathers and their nonmarital children while readily allowing
for citizenship transmission between American mothers and their nonmarital children. See
Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus Brief in
Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1485 (2011) [hereinafter Collins, A Short
History]; see also Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure
of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000) [hereinafter Collins,
Fathers’ Rights]. A number of legal scholars have considered the perpetuation of gendered
norms in modern citizenship law, focusing on the gender-discriminatory dimension of the
distinctions drawn between mothers and fathers of nonmarital children. For a small sample
of this literature, see Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 83 (2003); Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding
Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1281-82 (2005); and Laura Weinrib,
Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v. INS, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222, 245-50 (2003). For an account offering a different assessment of
the statutes’ consistency with modern constitutional gender equality principles, see Jennifer
S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429 (2006).
The term “nativism,” coined in the 1840s, was defined by one of the first historians of
American immigration to mean “intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of
its foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections.” JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 4 (1955). “Racial nativism” refers to the
ways that opponents of immigration by certain groups constructed their opposition using
rhetoric and systems of classification that categorized some races as inherently un-American
and unfit for American citizenship. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE
LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 20-21 (2006);
ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(1997).
See infra Section II.A. The role of gender-asymmetrical domestic relations laws in the
enforcement and development of race-based and race-salient rules governing the status of
children has largely escaped the attention of legal historians and other scholars. There are
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gender- and marriage-based domestic relations laws7 were enlisted by
administrators, judges, and legislators to deny the citizenship claims of
nonwhite children, especially those who were excludable under the race-based
immigration and naturalization laws.
Although the statutes governing parent-child citizenship transmission were
facially race neutral, the practices and legal regulation of family formation and
recognition were not. Once incorporated into jus sanguinis citizenship law by
judges, administrators, and legislators these racialized domestic relations law
principles could be, and regularly were, used to exclude nonwhite children
from citizenship. In some instances, these racialized practices were explicit as
administrators and legislators incorporated race-based domestic relations laws

7.

some exceptions. Historian Linda Kerber has provided rich and textured examinations of
the history of gender-based regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship, noting the law’s racial
implications. See Linda K. Kerber, Birthright Citizenship: The Vulnerability and Resilience of an
American Constitutional Principle, in CHILDREN WITHOUT A STATE: A GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
CHALLENGE 255 (Jacqueline Bhabha ed., 2011) [hereinafter Kerber, Birthright Citizenship];
Linda K. Kerber, The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States, 112 AM.
HIST. REV. 1, 6 (2007) [hereinafter Kerber, The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other]. Historians of
American immigration law and policy have studied the ways in which immigration officials
attempted to limit jus sanguinis citizenship for the foreign-born children of Chinese
American fathers, but not with attention to the role that domestic relations law played in
that process. See, e.g., ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE
EXCLUSION ERA, 1882-1943 (2003); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). In addition, a
handful of legal scholars have noted that gender-based regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship
has racial implications today, but it has not been a focal point of their work. See, e.g.,
Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial
and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 24 n.92
(observing in a footnote the “ugly class and race implications” of “[a]llowing U.S. fathers to
elect not to convey citizenship on their foreign-born children”); Rose Cuison Villazor, The
Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1361, 1429, 1434 n.451 (2011) (examining military restrictions on interracial marriage
during World War II and briefly noting in a footnote that these laws interacted with the
gender-asymmetrical derivative citizenship laws).
Through Part III of this Article, I use the term “domestic relations law” in describing the
body of law that encompassed legal regulations governing marriage and the relationship of
parent and child in and out of marriage. Prior to the second half of the twentieth century,
that is the phrase that was used by lawyers to describe what we would call “family law.”
Consistent with the switch in contemporary usage, when I discuss modern regulation of
parent-child relations in Part IV, I switch to the modern phrase “family law.” For an
important discussion of the genealogy of family law as a field, including a careful historical
reconstruction of the terms “domestic relations law” and “family law,” see Janet Halley,
What Is Family Law? A Genealogy (pts. 1 & 2), 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 189 (2011).

2138

illegitimate borders

governing marriage and legitimacy into jus sanguinis citizenship law.8 In other
instances the practices were race salient, in that officials used restrictive
conceptions of marriage and legitimacy in cases involving jus sanguinis
citizenship claims of nonwhite children.9 Regardless of the particular means by
which citizenship transmission between American fathers and their nonmarital
foreign-born children was restricted, it is clear that gender-based domestic
relations law principles incorporated into jus sanguinis citizenship law served a
larger racially nativist nation-building project.10 And they did so in a very
literal way: by determining which citizens’ children would be recognized as
citizens, they helped regulate the actual reproduction11—and racial
composition—of the citizenry. By focusing on the citizenship status of
children,12 this history makes visible, in granular detail, the means by which

8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

See, e.g., infra Section III.B.
See, e.g., infra Sections II.B-C. I use the term “race salient” to describe the ways that officials
deployed facially race-neutral domestic relations laws and interpretations of jus sanguinis
citizenship principles with the effect of limiting recognition of nonwhite foreign-born
children of American parents as citizens. For a discussion of the use of the term “race
salient” to refer to facially race-neutral regulatory regimes that nevertheless operate to
perpetuate racially subordinating social practices, see Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the
Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 77 (2000). On the related concept of colorblindness in immigration law,
see IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. ed. 2006).
See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING
OF AMERICA (2006) (developing the thesis that immigration law has served an important
nation-building function in American political development). The secondary literature on
the social and legal construction of race in the context of nationality law is vast. For a small
sampling, see ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN
AMERICA (2008); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 9; MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); and Patrick Weil, Races at the Gate: A
Century of Racial Distinctions in American Immigration Policy (1865-1965), 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
625 (2001). In calling attention to the racial dimension of jus sanguinis citizenship, I do not
mean to imply that “race” is a static, transhistorical concept. To the contrary, the very
notions of race and racial difference are part of an evolving body of social knowledge, and
certainly racial taxonomies and the social meanings and hierarchies they generate are also
born of historically specific political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances. This
Article contributes to our understanding of the nationality law as an important site of
production of racial knowledge by showing how laws governing jus sanguinis citizenship—
including domestic relations principles used to interpret those laws—have been enlisted in
the production of racial categories and racial difference in different ways at different
historical moments.
For a critical analysis of this phenomenon, see JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE
STATE (1999).
Other legal scholars and historians have given important attention to the ways that race-
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laws regulating birth status—long used to create and maintain racial social and
legal hierarchies within the American polity13—were regularly used to shape the
racial composition of the polity as well.
My account begins in Part I with a little-studied but influential case decided
by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1864, Guyer v. Smith.14 In Guyer the court
denied the citizenship claims of two brothers born in St. Barthélemy. The
Guyer brothers’ American father was white, but their mother was reportedly
“of African descent.” The jus sanguinis citizenship statute then in effect
recognized as citizens foreign-born “children of persons who . . . are . . .
citizens of the United States.”15 The statute was silent regarding the marital
status of the parents, but the Guyer court declared that foreign-born
illegitimate children of American fathers were not citizens under the statute.

13.

14.
15.

and gender-based belief systems, operating independently and in conjunction, have shaped
the formal citizenship rights of women and men, often with attention to the racial
dimensions of the laws that regulated women’s citizenship. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER,
A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998);
NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000)
[hereinafter COTT, PUBLIC VOWS]; MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN:
WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2009); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy,
Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005); Nancy
F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV.
1440, 1465 (1998) [hereinafter Cott, Marriage]; Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and
Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13 POL. & SOC’Y 1
(1984); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 (2005). Legal scholars and historians
have given far less attention to the ways that gender- and race-based citizenship laws were
used in the past to determine the citizenship status of children. Linda Kerber’s powerful
essay, Birthright Citizenship: The Vulnerability and Resilience of an American Constitutional
Principle, is a significant exception to the tendency to overlook the legal history of children’s
citizenship. Kerber, Birthright Citizenship, supra note 6. Legal scholars have given significant
attention to the immigration status of children in American law and in a forthcoming article
Kerry Abrams and R. Kent Piacenti provide an illuminating and detailed comparison of the
rules governing recognition of the parent-child relationship in the immigration and
derivative citizenship contexts. See Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family
Values, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
See, e.g., CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 264-65 (1940);
ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 41-42 (2009); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private
Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999).
22 Md. 239 (1864).
Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155. The Guyer court applied the 1802 version of
the federal jus sanguinis citizenship statute, rather than the 1855 version of the statute, but in
relevant part the statutes were identical. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604.
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The Guyer court said very little about race, but even as the legal substructure of
slavery was crumbling, it silently incorporated into citizenship law a set of
domestic relations law principles that had been instrumental to the
maintenance of slavery and the denial of citizenship for persons of African
descent: laws that recognized the unmarried mother as the source of status for
her children, including slave status.16
The Guyer case is a crucial starting point for any thorough examination of
the evolution of jus sanguinis principles as applied to the citizenship claims of
nonmarital foreign-born children of American fathers.17 As shown in Part II,
Guyer’s legacy was long and impressive, as the opinion became part of the legal
lexicon of American citizenship and empire over the course of the nineteenth
and into the early twentieth century. The interpretive rule that nonmarital
foreign-born children of American fathers were not citizens figured
prominently in administrative decisions concerning the citizenship status of
Samoan-born children of American fathers18 and was also deployed in efforts
to enforce race-based exclusion statutes—the laws that barred the entry of
Chinese, and eventually all Asians, into the United States.19 The Guyer rule20
thus served as an important resource for judges and administrators, who were
regularly called on to interpret the jus sanguinis citizenship statute in the course
of administering racially restrictive immigration laws.
The jus sanguinis citizenship statute, although modified several times,
remained silent on the question of nonmarital children’s citizenship21 until
1940, when Congress codified a modernized version of the Guyer rule by

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.

See infra Section I.B.
To my knowledge, the Guyer opinion has been completely omitted from modern histories of
American citizenship law, except for my far briefer analysis in Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra
note 4, at 1689-90. In addition, although Guyer was regularly cited in legal documents and
commentary on jus sanguinis citizenship through the 1930s, the case’s racial content and
context are not mentioned.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
By using this term, I do not mean to imply that formalist adherence to the Guyer court’s
holding was a significant cause of the rule’s longevity. Rather, the Guyer opinion’s resilience
as a precedent and a resource is symptomatic of the phenomenon I describe herein. See infra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
See Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797, 797; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10
Stat. 604, 604; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104; see also infra Section
III.A.
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continuing the default exclusion of nonmarital foreign-born children of
American fathers.22 Part III tells the story of how and why pre-1940 judicial
and administrative rulings concerning the citizenship of nonmarital children
became the basis of the Nationality Act’s jus sanguinis provision—a provision
that, in its basic contours, survives to this day. It then turns to the
implementation of the jus sanguinis statute during the U.S. military’s multidecade tour of duty in Europe and Asia. In these theaters of war, the jus
sanguinis citizenship laws operated in tandem with race-based immigration
laws and race-based military marriage policies to exclude Amerasian children
from citizenship.23 In sum, well into the twentieth century, officials charged
with policing membership in the American polity consistently relied on the
gender- and marriage-based regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship to help
enforce racially nativist nationality policies.
The fact that, during significant periods of American history, nationality
law was designed and implemented in ways that served racially nativist
objectives is not news, nor is the fact that many of the laws used to achieve
those objectives were facially race neutral.24 What is distinctive about the
account of jus sanguinis citizenship provided here is the particular legal
technology that was enlisted in the service of a nativist agenda: durable but
pliable gender-based domestic relations law principles.25 In this regard, this
detailed history of jus sanguinis citizenship contributes to a growing body of
literature that examines the important roles nationality law played in nationbuilding and in the development of the administrative state by examining the
central role that family law played in those processes. As others have
demonstrated, much of the administrative apparatus developed to implement
the increasingly elaborate body of federal nationality law in the late nineteenth

22.
23.
24.

25.

See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201-205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40 (establishing existing
citizenship, immigration, and naturalization laws).
See infra Section III.B.
See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 9; MOTOMURA, supra note 5; Son-Thierry Ly & Patrick Weil,
The Anti-racist Origins of the American Immigration Quota System, 77 SOC. RES. 45, 48-52
(2010).
This tendency of government officials who serve as gatekeepers for social goods allocated
based on marital status to use a more restrictive conception of family status relationships is
not limited to administration of nationality laws. As I have shown elsewhere, it was also
characteristic of early nineteenth-century federal widows’ military pension determinations.
See Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and
the Legal Construction of the Family, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1809 (2009).
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and early twentieth century was built up in the service of a nativist agenda.26
The history of jus sanguinis citizenship law demonstrates that laws governing
marriage and birth status served this agenda as well, and they did so by
providing officials with an exclusionary tool that appeared both natural and
race neutral in the lines it drew between citizen and noncitizen.27
For some students of American nationality law, the importance of this
account lies not in its historiographical significance, but in what it may mean
for how we reason about the continued vitality of gender-asymmetrical jus
sanguinis citizenship law today. Standing alone, history cannot resolve modern
citizenship debates, but it can provide critical perspective on those debates, a
project I undertake in Part IV. It can do so, first, by alerting us to the ways that
gender- and marriage-based jus sanguinis principles continue to function in a
race-salient manner in the practice and politics of American citizenship law.28
Second, it challenges the view that gender-asymmetrical jus sanguinis
citizenship laws reflect natural and “biologically inevitable”29 means of

26.

27.

28.
29.

See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 10; SALYER, supra note 6; DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES:
THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA (2002); ZOLBERG, supra note 10;
Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (2002); Desmond S. King & Rogers M. Smith, Racial Orders in American
Political Development, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75 (2005); Weil, supra note 10. The history of jus
sanguinis citizenship, and its development in the hands of administrators charted in this
Article, is a prime example of “administrative constitutionalism.” Federal administrators
crafted rules and policies that quite literally constituted the polity by determining the
membership status of individuals. Based on those rules and policies, they then drafted the
jus sanguinis provisions found in the Nationality Act of 1940. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
For foundational discussions of administrative constitutionalism in other regulatory
contexts, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799
(2010); and Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013).
I thank Bill Eskridge for highlighting this point.
See infra notes 202-209, 331-334 and accompanying text. I do not argue that race was the only
factor that informed officials’ interpretation of the jus sanguinis citizenship rule. See infra
notes 147, 324-325 and accompanying text. Rather, I argue that racial nativism was one of
several factors that informed the way administrators and legislators reasoned about the
citizenship rights of foreign-born nonmarital children of American parents, and that it was
an important factor at formative moments in the law’s application and development.
See infra Section IV.A.
See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (“The mother knows that the child is in being and
is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity for
mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship. The same opportunity does not
result from the event of birth, as a matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed
father.”).
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regulating parent-child derivative citizenship—an understanding that has been
developed and embraced by government attorneys and the Supreme Court in
litigation challenging the constitutionality of gender-based regulation of
derivative citizenship today.30 The genealogy of jus sanguinis citizenship
provided here reveals, instead, that those laws are the product of choices made
by legal actors at formative moments in the development of American
nationality law, and acting under various institutional and ideological
pressures. Far from “inevitable,” those choices were shaped by contemporary
norms and mores concerning gender, parental roles, sexuality, and—as I
demonstrate in great detail—the official imperative to enforce race-based
nationality laws. To speak of these laws as inevitable thus obscures their
origins and elides the ways that they continue to play an illiberal role in the
practices and politics of citizenship today.
i. personal status laws, citizenship, and the civil war
The Nationality Act of 1940 was the first statute to explicitly regulate the
citizenship of nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers or
fathers. But the differential treatment of foreign-born children based on the
gender of their citizen-parent predated the Nationality Act by at least a century
and a half.31 For children born outside of marriage, that gender-asymmetrical

30.

31.

See infra Section IV.B. In suggesting that this history can provide a critical perspective on
the role that gender and marriage continue to play in American nationality law, I am
mindful that political scientists have long observed what they call the “boundary
problem”—the difficulty of establishing a legitimate method of determining who should be
counted as members of the polity that does not itself violate basic democratic principles. See
Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (NOMOS XXV) 13 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983). I am
also mindful that the “plenary power doctrine” is often invoked as a limitation on the federal
courts’ power to determine the constitutionality of gender-based jus sanguinis citizenship
laws. See Kristin A. Collins, Fiallo v. Bell in Congress: Plenary Power, Coordinate Branches, and
Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in EN/GENDERING GOVERNANCE (Kim Rubenstein &
Katharine Young eds., forthcoming 2014) (on file with author); cf. Nina Pillard, Plenary
Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835,
836 (2002) (noting that Nguyen “complicates the picture for equal protection cases that do
not touch on the immigration and naturalization field”). Regardless of one’s views on the
scope of the plenary power doctrine, one need not turn to the courts to remedy deficiencies
in modern jus sanguinis citizenship laws. See Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 6 (arguing that
the commitment to constitutional gender equality principles should guide Congress’s
regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship); see also infra Section IV.B.
Starting in 1790, citizen fathers had the right to transmit citizenship to their marital foreign-
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system can be traced to Guyer v. Smith, an 1864 Maryland Court of Appeals
decision.32 Guyer established the centrality of marriage as a requirement for
patrilineal citizenship transmission. But the Guyer case was also about racial
limitations on father-child citizenship transmission. The Guyer opinion—
written during the Civil War by judges sitting in Maryland, the “middle
ground” of slavery—incorporated a set of gendered and racialized domestic
relations law principles concerning the status of nonmarital children. The
Guyer opinion then served as an important and long-lasting resource for
jurists, administrators, and lawmakers who interpreted, enforced, and enacted
America’s racially nativist nationality laws.
A. Guyer v. Smith
At first blush, Guyer appears to be an unlikely precedent for the
interpretation of federal citizenship law, as it was a state court case and did not
involve anyone’s right to enter or remain in the United States. Rather, Guyer
was a legal dispute over the ownership of a fifty-acre parcel of property in
Allegany County, Maryland. John Guyer, an American citizen, had purchased
the property in 1792. Approximately eight years later Guyer left Maryland and
the United States, and eventually took up residence in St. Barthélemy.33 John
Guyer died in 1841, devising the property to his two sons, Benjamin and
James.34 In the 1850s, the sons’ ownership was called into question in an
ejectment proceeding: George Smith and Israel Thompson asserted ownership
over the parcel after they secured an escheat patent—a legal document that
allowed Maryland to expropriate the property and sell it, in this case to Smith
and Thompson.35

32.
33.
34.
35.

born children, as long as the father had at some point resided in the United States. Act of
Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104. Married citizen mothers did not have that right
until 1934. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797. As discussed below,
notwithstanding a complete lack of statutory authority, starting in the 1910s (if not earlier)
administrators began recognizing the foreign-born nonmarital children of unwed mothers
as citizens, thus creating a matrilineal citizenship regime for foreign-born nonmarital
children of American mothers. See infra Section II.A; see also Collins, A Short History, supra
note 4, at 1506-12.
22 Md. 239 (1864).
Id. at 246.
Id.
Appellants’ Statement and Points at 2, Guyer, 22 Md. 239 (No. 45); Allegany Cnty., Md., Plat
& Certificate for Yamland 50 Acres, MD. STATE ARCHIVES (Mar. 28, 1862), http://plato
.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/stagser/s1500/s1529/cfm/dsp_unit.cfm?county=al&qualifier=S
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The problem, as Guyer’s lessee either knew or soon learned, and as Smith
and Thompson may very well have known, was that John Guyer’s sons had
fragile claims to American citizenship and hence to the property itself. In the
nineteenth century, in many states—including Maryland—one’s property
rights were partially contingent on one’s citizenship status.36 Under Maryland
law, non-citizens could own land, but they could take land only as
“purchasers,” a term of art that meant that their land was always subject to
escheat.37
Thus, a central question in Guyer v. Smith was whether the Guyer brothers
were American citizens. They were born in St. Barthélemy, at the time a
Swedish colony; hence, no argument was made that they were citizens via the
doctrine of jus soli. No one suggested that they had been naturalized.38 Rather,
they claimed to be citizens by virtue of an 1802 federal statute that provided
that
the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the
United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of
the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States:
Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons
whose fathers have never resided within the United States.39
On the face of it, the assertion that the Guyer brothers were American citizens
looked probable. After all, their father, John Guyer, had been a citizen and had,
in fact, resided in the United States, as required by the 1802 Act. No one denied
that James and Benjamin were his children. Thus, the attorney for the Guyer
brothers’ lessee, Thomas McKaig—a respected Maryland attorney and former
state senator—argued that the Guyer brothers were citizens under the 1802
statute, and that the state had no right to escheat their property, by then called

36.
37.

38.
39.

&series=1188&unit=3129. Note that the escheat patent was not obtained until four years
after Guyer’s lessee filed suit—a procedural irregularity that the Court of Appeals ignored.
See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative
Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 160 (1999).
See Guyer, 22 Md. at 247. The alien’s ownership interest in real property was not secure
against escheat and was called a “defeasible estate” precisely because of this. See Price, supra
note 36, at 160. This common law rule was widely followed in the nineteenth century. See id.
They likely could not have been naturalized, as the relevant statutes limited naturalization to
“free white person[s].” Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103.
Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; see Guyer, 22 Md. at 244.
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Yamland.40 But McKaig did not argue the point forcefully, perhaps for good
reason. Testimony offered into evidence revealed that Benjamin’s and James’s
mother, Margaret, was of “African descent.”41
With this fact in mind, it is notable that the Guyer brothers or their lessee
chose to pursue the matter for six years and bear the expense of an appeal.
After all, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, decided just one year before the Guyer case
was filed, Chief Justice Taney made clear that persons of African descent could
not be citizens of the national polity by any means.42 Dred Scott had not been
overruled by 1864, when the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Guyer, and it
would seem that the appellees had a strong argument that the Guyer brothers
were ineligible for citizenship simply because of their race. That argument was
undoubtedly cognizable, as other officials confronted with similar claims
around the same time had reasoned along similar lines when interpreting the
jus sanguinis statute. For example, in the 1860s, an American consul in China
had relied on Dred Scott to resolve the citizenship claim of the son of an
American “negro” father. The son was born in Amoy, China before the Civil
War. When the American consul was asked to determine the son’s citizenship,
he concluded that “as the Dred Scott decision before the war had deprived
negroes of their rights as citizens, . . . the ban of that decree” barred the son’s
claim to American citizenship under the jus sanguinis statute.43 But in the Guyer
appeal, that argument was not made.
Even more curious than the plaintiffs’ persistence in pursuing Yamland is
the relatively minor role that race played in the defendants’ arguments.
Attorneys for Smith and Thompson—Oliver Miller and Thomas Devecmon—
certainly did not hesitate to bring the matter to the attention of the Court of
Appeals, noting that “[s]he, (their mother[]) . . . is not of pure white blood,

40.
41.
42.
43.

Appellants’ Statement and Points, supra note 35, at 3-4.
Appellees’ Statement and Points at 4, Guyer, 22 Md. 239 (No. 45).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419-20 (1857).
Letter from John Russell Young, U.S. Legation, Peking, China, to Charles Seymour, U.S.
Consul, Canton, China (Feb. 23, 1885), in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1885, at 159 (1886) (recalling a case from the
1860s). Note that the consul’s reliance on Dred Scott was eventually rejected by Young, a
Republican serving as a diplomatic representative of the United States in China in the Grant
administration. Id. In the 1860s, Young had been the managing editor of Horace Greeley’s
abolitionist-oriented New York Tribune. See John C. Broderick, John Russell Young: The
Internationalist as Librarian, 33 Q.J. LIBR. CONG. 116, 123-24 (1976). Perhaps because of his
views on slavery, then, Young lamented the consul’s reliance on “the Dred Scott decision.”
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but partly of African blood or descent.”44 They also contended that under
Maryland property law, the Guyer brothers’ racial status should have weighed
in the defendants’ favor:
These plaintiffs are not only aliens, but are proved to be of African
descent, and it is against the policy of our laws that such persons should
hold real estate in Maryland, and the rule, therefore, that an alien
cannot bring an action to recover this land, should be rigidly enforced
against these parties.45
But the available documents suggest that Miller and Devecmon did not argue
that the Guyer brothers’ claim to citizenship under the federal statute was
categorically barred because of their race.46 They also said nothing about Dred
Scott, which was still technically good law, even though it would seem to have
provided extremely powerful precedent, and a possibly winning argument.
Court of Appeals Judge James Bartol, the author of the opinion, appears to
have been equally hesitant to make much of the Guyer brothers’ race. He does
not mention Dred Scott in the opinion, even though he might have been able to
resolve the entire case in short order by doing so. Instead, in dealing with the
question of the Guyer brothers’ citizenship, he simply declared that illegitimate
children did not have the benefit of the 1802 federal law:
These appellants claim the benefit of that section, as the children of
John Guyer, who was a citizen of the United States. But the proof
shows that they were not born in lawful wedlock, they are therefore
illegitimate; under our law nullius filii, and clearly therefore not within
the provisions of the Act of 1802.47
The “proof” to which Judge Bartol referred was the sole witness’s statement
that “[h]e cannot say whether the father and mother of the plaintiffs were

44.
45.

46.
47.

Appellees’ Statement and Points, supra note 41, at 2.
Id. at 4. Attorneys for the appellees could not reasonably argue that the Guyer brothers
could not own real property simply because they were allegedly black, as under Maryland
law free blacks could inherit and own property throughout this period. See JAMES M.
WRIGHT, THE FREE NEGRO IN MARYLAND, 1634-1860, at 174-97 (1921).
Sensibly, the appellees did not argue that a father could not devise real property to his
illegitimate children. See Pratt’s Lessee v. Flamer, 5 H. & J. 10 (Md. 1820).
Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239, 249 (1864).
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lawfully man and wife, or whether the said children were born in lawful
wedlock. To the best of my belief it was not so.”48
It is impossible to establish with certainty why the Maryland Court of
Appeals did not also, or simply, rely on Dred Scott to determine the Guyer
brothers’ citizenship, but one can engage in informed speculation based on the
specific circumstances surrounding the Guyer litigation. Dred Scott was not
formally overruled until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. But
in November 1864, fifteen days before the court issued its opinion in Guyer,
Maryland adopted a new state constitution that abolished slavery and declared
that “all men are created equally free”49—a proclamation that may have offered
a symbolic challenge to the validity of the Dred Scott opinion.50 This is not to
suggest that the many questions regarding black people’s status in the United
States—or in Maryland—had been resolved by the time Guyer was decided; far
from it. The Civil War was not yet over, and even if Union forces prevailed it
was not clear what that victory would mean for black people. However, it is
quite possible that, because of these uncertainties and the violent, nationrending upheaval that questions concerning black people’s citizenship had
precipitated, the Guyer court turned to domestic relations laws—laws that were
facially race neutral but palpably race salient in their operation—to determine
the Guyer brothers’ claims to citizenship.
B. Domestic Relations Law and the Legal Construction of Race
Judge Bartol’s reference to the domestic relations law principles governing
the status and rights of nonmarital children was summary in nature, possibly
because his readers would have been familiar with the rudimentary legal
principles on which he relied. In the nineteenth century, the common law of
domestic relations differentiated sharply between marital and nonmarital
children. Within marriage, the father had custodial rights over his children, as
well as rights to their labor. In return, so to speak, the father was required to
support his marital children, and they inherited his name, status, property, and

48.
49.
50.

Appellees’ Statement and Points, supra note 41, at 2.
See BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: MARYLAND
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 131 (1985).
This point should not be overstated. As Jamal Greene has demonstrated, even after Dred
Scott’s holding on citizenship was overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause, while “the wounds of the war remained fresh, it would be difficult to use Dred Scott
as a shared symbol of constitutional error.” Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV.
379, 437 (2011).
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domicile.51 Mothers had no, or very few, legal rights vis-à-vis their marital
children.52 But outside marriage, the opposite pattern prevailed. The putative
father’s estate and status did not pass to his “natural child” unless he adopted
the child as his own—a measure that was left to the father’s discretion and in
the nineteenth century was generally limited to situations where the father
married the child’s mother after the birth of the child.53 By contrast, although
the strict common law originally prevented the nonmarital child from
inheriting property or status from or through his mother, by the early
nineteenth century many states had moderated this rule by statute, so that
nonmarital children could often inherit from their mothers, and mothers had a
duty to support such children.54 As it developed in America, then, domestic
relations law established default rules that enabled patrilineal property and
status transmission in marriage and matrilineal property and status
transmission outside marriage. The Guyer court incorporated these wellknown principles of nineteenth-century domestic relations law into federal
citizenship law.
The system of sexual ethics and racial status that these domestic relations
law principles reproduced was also well known. Under these principles,
women of all races bore responsibility for, and the social stigma of, children
born out of wedlock.55 In addition—and crucial to understanding the Guyer
case—the gender-based bastardy laws on which Judge Bartol drew had long
shaped and sustained the practice of slavery in slave states like Maryland.
Although the line between slavery and freedom was demarcated in different
ways at different times, the principle that the bastard child’s status was

51.

52.

53.
54.

55.

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *436-38; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 161 (Legal Classics Library 1986) (1827) (“The father is bound to support
his minor children, if he be of ability, even though they have property of their own; but this
obligation in such a case does not extend to the mother.”).
The emerging “tender years” doctrine, under which mothers were frequently awarded legal
custody of children under the age of seven upon the father’s death or upon separation, was
softening this aspect of the common law. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 248-49 (1985).
Id. at 222-23, 376 n.53.
2 KENT, supra note 51, at 175; see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *447; GROSSBERG, supra
note 52, at 224-25. In the words of the chronicler of the American common law, James Kent,
the mother was “bound to maintain [the child] as its natural guardian.” 2 KENT, supra note
51, at 178.
Under “bastardy statutes,” a putative father could be sued by the state for financial support
for his child, but the child was not recognized as legitimate with a claim on the father’s
estate or domicile, or any other status-based rights. See GROSSBERG, supra note 52, at 217.
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determined by the condition of the mother frequently functioned to
differentiate blacks from whites and free blacks from slaves, and it effectively
ensured that the children of slave mothers and white fathers (often masters)
were slaves.56 Moreover, given the prohibitions—both legal and social—on
slave marriage,57 a rule that recognized the maternal line as the source of
personal status for nonmarital children meant that children of female slaves
were almost always born slaves, regardless of their father’s status, and, in most
cases, his race. Even in states that determined racial status based on a drop or
percentage of “African blood,” that rule was often based on the maternal line.
For example, in Daniel v. Guy, an Arkansas case, a woman sued for her
freedom claiming that she was white, and hence not a slave. The Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted a maternal descent rule for determining blackness: “a
one-drop-of-blood rule,” as long as that drop passed through the maternal
line.58 Similarly, in the canonical slave law case Hudgins v. Wrights, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia explained that “by the uniform
declaration of our laws, the descendants of the females remain slaves, to this
day, unless they can prove a right to freedom, by actual emancipation, or by
descent in the maternal line from an emancipated female.”59 Maryland was no
exception to this rule, which jurists traced to both common law and Roman
law principles.60 Given the ubiquity of this rule, it is unsurprising that when
son-of-Maryland Chief Justice Taney set out slavery’s long pedigree in his Dred
Scott opinion, he explained that in the Roman Empire slave status “was decided
by the condition of the mother,” and quoted the Institutes of Justinian to show
that slaves had long been “born such of bondwomen.”61

56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

61.

THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 44-48 (1996).
CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON II, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND LOVE IN THE SEGREGATED
SOUTH 11 (2003).
Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121, 131-32 (1857). For a searching analysis of Daniel v. Guy and the
maternal line rule, see Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in
the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 136 (1998).
Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 137 (1806). For important discussions of
Hudgins, see Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 695, 704 (1996); Gross, supra note 58, at 130; and Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the
Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 621-27
(2007).
Chew v. Gary, 6 H. & J. 526 (Md. 1825). For discussions of how common law and civil law
doctrines supported the maternal line rule, see MORRIS, supra note 56, at 44-48; and
Sharfstein, supra note 59, at 605 n.43.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 478-79 (1856) (quoting J. INST. 1.3.4); see
also id. (“A freeman is one who is born free by being born in matrimony, of parents who
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These basic principles of domestic relations law—that within marriage the
status of children followed that of the father, while outside marriage the status
of children followed that of the mother—were deeply embedded in the logic
and practice of slavery and were a fundamental component of the laws that
constructed race as a sociolegal category in the antebellum South. They were
frequently used to help determine the racial status of mixed-ancestry
individuals—that is, whether that individual would be classified by law as black
or white or some other race.62 Importantly for present purposes, these
principles were also instrumental to how nineteenth-century jurists reasoned
about black people’s exclusion from citizenship. When Chief Justice Taney
wrote in Dred Scott that slave status was “decided by the condition of the
mother,” he was explaining not only why black people were enslaved, but also
why they were not citizens.63 And when the Maryland Court of Appeals was
asked to determine the citizenship of Benjamin and James Guyer, it drew on
the very same domestic relations law principles to provide an interpretation of
the statute governing jus sanguinis citizenship, and to explain why the Guyer
brothers were not citizens. Thus, although the opinion does not rely on the
Guyer brothers’ race as justification for their exclusion from citizenship, the
laws governing racial identity and status operated just below the surface of the
opinion. By turning to domestic relations laws, the Maryland Court of Appeals
was able to determine the Guyer brothers’ citizenship without more than
passing reference to their race, with no mention of Dred Scott, with no mention
of the violent unwinding of slavery that served as the backdrop of the Guyer
appeal, and with no mention of the promises of racial equality that Union
victory would have signaled at least to some people. However present the race

62.

63.
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both are free, or both freed; or of parents one free and the other freed. But one born of a free
mother, although the father be a slave or unknown, is free.”). Jack Balkin and Sanford
Levinson have demonstrated the important ways that “Dred Scott connected four ideas: race,
status, citizenship, and community.” Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of
Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 53 (2007). Based on these passages from
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, one can productively add “family” to that list. For a careful
reconstruction of the possibly stronger legal claims that could have been asserted by Dred
Scott’s wife, Harriet Robinson Scott, see Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs.
Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997).
Of course the maternal line rule was not the only legal tool used to determine race and slave
status. It often functioned in tandem, and sometimes in tension, with other means or modes
of racial designation—including evidence of racial appearance, performance, and
reputation—which gradually prevailed as the primary means of ascertaining racial status.
See GROSS, supra note 10, at 23-26; Davis, supra note 59, at 704-07; Sharfstein, supra note 59,
at 622-23.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 478.
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question—and, in particular, the question of black people’s citizenship—was in
the everyday lives of those involved in the Guyer case, to those reading the
opinion today, the racial content and context of the case barely register.
ii. guyer’s legacy
But who reads Guyer v. Smith today? Who, other than the parties affected,
ever read Guyer? After all, less than a year after the Maryland Court of Appeals
decided Guyer, the Civil War was over, and in short order Congress enacted the
1866 Civil Rights Act, which provided that “all persons born in the United
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
. . . citizens of the United States.”64 Two years after that, the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalized jus soli citizenship (“the right of the place”),
which largely put an end to the struggle over freedmen’s formal citizenship
status—although contests over freedmen’s rights as citizens surely continued.65
And in 1870, Congress made naturalization available to people of “African
nativity.”66 Seen in this light, Guyer would seem to be a relic of a bygone
moment, and of a repudiated understanding of American citizenship.
But Guyer lived on and continued to function as a tool of racial exclusion in
the practice of American jus sanguinis citizenship. The opinion was relied on by
government attorneys, cited in judicial opinions, debated in intra- and interdepartmental administrative memoranda, and enforced by various government
agencies.67 It was discussed in treaties, in articles, and in an important Attorney
General Opinion issued in 1920.68 In these sundry sources and contexts,

64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Even freedmen’s formal citizenship status was contested. See
Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686-90 (2006).
See Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870).
See, e.g., Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588, 589 (1st Cir. 1928) (citing
Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864)); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927)
(citing 11 C.J. Citizens § 9, at 780 (1917) (citing Guyer)); In re Leah Skousen O’Donnell (Bd.
of Review, Bureau of Immigration, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Sept. 2, 1938) (on file with NARA,
RG 85) (discussing Guyer); Brief of Appellee at 12-13, Ng Suey Hi, 21 F.2d 801 (No. 5238)
(citing Guyer); Memorandum from Theodore G. Risley, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to
Robe Carl White, Ass’t Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor 13-14 (Feb. 10, 1931) [hereinafter Risley
Memorandum] (on file with NARA, RG 85) (distinguishing Guyer). Throughout this
Article, “NARA” refers to the National Archives and Records Administration and “RG”
refers to the relevant record group.
See, e.g., Citizenship—Children Born Abroad out of Wedlock of American Fathers and Alien
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Guyer’s primary holding—the interpretive rule that nonmarital foreign-born
children of American fathers were not citizens—was regularly given its
strictest, most exclusionary application in cases involving nonwhite children,
and therefore had the tendency to exclude such children from the American
polity.69 However, the racialized origins and operation of the Guyer opinion
were omitted from accounts of the case. In the hands of administrators, judges,
and legal scholars who regularly worked with and interpreted American
nationality laws, Guyer—and the ostensibly race-neutral domestic relations law
principles for which it stood—thus provided a useful resource for those who
sought to enforce racially nativist nationality policies. As I demonstrate in the
Sections that follow, it was useful in part because its racialized operation was
frequently obscured.
A. A Primer on Racially Nativist and Gender-Based Nationality Laws
Well into the twentieth century, the Fourteenth Amendment
notwithstanding, other formal rules that governed membership in the
American polity—such as immigration and naturalization laws—were shaped
in significant ways by racial nativism. Perhaps the best known chapter in that
story is the categorical exclusion of people of Asian descent, starting with the
Chinese, from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century. On the
state level, efforts to expel and exclude people of Chinese descent began as early
as the 1850s, when the California legislature began enacting laws intended to
discourage the immigration—and encourage the emigration—of Chinese
laborers who had flocked to California in search of work during the gold
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Mothers, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162 (1920); 11 C.J. Citizens § 9, at 780 (1917) (citing Guyer);
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD § 273, at 612
(1915); LUELLA GETTYS, THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1934); FLORIEN
GIAUQUE, THE ELECTION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 59 (Cincinnati,
Robert Clarke & Co. 1880); 1 JOHN M. GOULD & GEORGE F. TUCKER, NOTES ON THE REVISED
STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSES 479 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1889); 1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1975) (1930); CATHARINE SECKLER-HUDSON,
STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES 219 (1934); FREDERICK
VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (1904); PRENTISS WEBSTER, LAW OF
NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF OTHER COUNTRIES 85 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1895); Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 99,
109 n.22 (1934).
This does not mean that race was the only factor that informed officials’ interpretation of
the jus sanguinis citizenship statute, or the application of the Guyer rule. See sources cited
infra notes 323-324.
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rush.70 Federal exclusion of Chinese people began in the late nineteenth
century, first with the Page Law of 1875 and next with the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, which suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for a period of
ten years and also declared that “no State Court or Court of the United States
shall admit Chinese to Citizenship.”71
Exclusion laws barring the entry of Chinese and other Asian people were
expanded over the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, culminating in
the National Origins Act of 1924, which both re-codified the race-based
exclusion laws and created a national origins quota system that would remain
in place for three decades.72 Through this exclusionary legislation and related
administrative regulations and judicial rulings, federal officials constructed a
body of nationality law that was premised on a firm belief in a natural racial
hierarchy: white Anglo-Saxon Protestant immigrants were welcomed,
southern and eastern Europeans were allowed to enter in limited numbers, and
Asians and most people of African descent likely to immigrate were excluded.73
The belief in a hierarchy of races also informed the federal government’s
response to questions concerning the citizenship status of indigenous residents
of America’s “insular territories”—places like Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines—which were controlled by the United States but were not given
statehood or a path to statehood.74
In addition to explicitly race-based nationality laws, gender-asymmetrical
domestic relations law principles were incorporated into U.S. nationality law in
order to resolve various conundrums created by mixed-nationality marriages,
almost always in ways that compromised American women’s citizenship status.
Starting in 1855, Congress incorporated the gender-based principle of “marital
unity”—the notion that “the husband and wife are one person in law” and the
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71.

72.

73.
74.

BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY,
1850-1990, at 20-21 (1993); MOTOMURA, supra note 5, at 16-17.
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); see Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27
Stat. 25; Act of Mar. 3, 1875 (Page Law), ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. On the Page Law, see Abrams,
supra note 12.
See, e.g., Johnson Act, ch. 190, § 1, 43 Stat. 153, 155-56 (1924); Immigration Act of 1917, ch.
29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876. For important discussions of early twentieth-century immigration
legislation, see Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A
Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST. 67, 70 (1999); and Weil, supra
note 10.
See MOTOMURA, supra note 5, at 128; NGAI, supra note 10, at 21-54; Ly & Weil, supra note 24.
See sources cited infra note 87.
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“legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage”75—into
nationality law by decreeing that when a foreign woman married an American
man, she automatically became an American citizen.76 However, the converse
was not true: an American woman who married a foreign man could not secure
citizenship for her husband. Indeed, starting with an influential federal appeals
court opinion in 1883,77 the principle of “marital unity” and women’s
subordinate and dependent status in marriage translated into laws that
stripped American women of their citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner.
Congress codified that principle in the Expatriation Act of 1907, and thereby
preserved the doctrine of coverture in federal citizenship law.78
By design, the race- and gender-based principles that informed the core
functions of American nationality law often operated together. For example,
the benefits of the 1855 citizenship law that automatically bestowed American
citizenship on the non-citizen wife of an American man were limited to foreign
women who “might lawfully be naturalized”—thus restricting naturalizationby-marriage to white women, since at that time only white people could
naturalize.79 Moreover, although all American women were expatriated upon
marriage to a foreign man under the Expatriation Act of 1907, when that law
was partially repealed by the Cable Act of 1922, lawmakers purposefully left
intact formal race-based restrictions on married women’s citizenship rights by
continuing to expatriate American women who married foreign men who were
“ineligible to citizenship.”80 In 1922, that category included men of Asian
descent, thus confirming the continued expatriation of all American women,

75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *442.
See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604.
Pequignot v. City of Detroit, 16 F. 211 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1883).
Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228. Nancy Cott makes the important point that
the 1855 act “in effect rais[ed] the doctrine of coverture to the level of national identity.”
Cott, Marriage, supra note 12, at 1457.
See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604, 604; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat.
103, 103.
Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, §§ 3, 5, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022. In 1922, only “free white persons”
and persons of “African nativity” and “African descent” were eligible to naturalize. See
Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870); 6 FED. STAT. ANN. § 2169 (1918)
(“The provisions of this Title shall apply to aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of
African nativity and to persons of African descent.”); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1922) (holding that Rev. Stat. § 2169 barred the naturalization of a person of Japanese
descent).
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whatever their individual racial identity, who married a non-citizen Asian
man.81
The principle of “marital unity” and racially exclusionary immigration
laws—operating separately and in conjunction—not only shaped the
citizenship rights of men and women who entered mixed-nationality
marriages, but also helped determine the rights of children under American
nationality law. Within marriage, until 1934, jus sanguinis citizenship followed
the male line: the foreign-born children of American fathers, but not mothers,
were recognized as citizens.82 This patrilineal rule conformed to the principle of
coverture and the related understanding that fathers determined the national
culture and political allegiance of their children, in addition to that of their
wives.83 Even after 1931, when Congress recognized American women’s right to
retain their citizenship upon marriage to a non-citizen, regardless of his race,84
women’s organizations had to fight several more years to secure citizenship for
American women’s foreign-born children. In 1934, married American mothers
could, for the first time, secure citizenship for their foreign-born children,

81.
82.

83.
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For an important discussion of the 1907 Expatriation Act that pays special attention to the
racial dimension of its repeal, see Volpp, supra note 12, at 425-42.
See Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797, 797; Collins, A Short History, supra
note 4, at 1503; Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra note 4, at 1697-98. Until 1855, the text of the
jus sanguinis citizenship statute was somewhat ambiguous as to whether citizenship
transmission was limited to children of American fathers. The citizenship statutes of 1790,
1795, and 1802 referred only to transmission of citizenship to “children of citizens” or
“persons,” but also included a proviso that “the right of citizenship” would descend only to
persons whose fathers had resided in the United States. See Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4,
2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104. Those statutes were understood to limit citizenship transmission to
children of citizen fathers. See 2 KENT, supra note 51, at 51. In the mid-nineteenth century,
Congress was presented with an opportunity to repudiate the sex bias in the early jus
sanguinis citizenship statutes. See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 827 (1848) (statement
of Sen. Webster) (announcing that he would introduce a bill that would confer citizenship
on all foreign-born children “of a father or mother being or having been a natural born
citizen of the United States”). Instead, in 1855 Congress affirmed the husband-favoring
interpretation. Rewording the statute to clarify that only children “whose fathers were or
shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed . . . citizens of
the United States,” Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604, Congress codified in
citizenship law the well-established norm of male headship of the marital family, see SMITH,
supra note 5, at 234-35 (noting that the 1855 Act was “true to the law’s pervasive
patriarchalism”).
See Collins, A Short History, supra note 4, at 1499-1501.
Act of Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 442, § 4(a), 46 Stat. 1511, 1511-12.
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although after 1940 their ability to do so was more constrained than that of
married American fathers.85
But what about children who were born outside marriage? Until 1940, this
issue was not addressed by the jus sanguinis statute. As I demonstrate in detail
below, however, their citizenship status was determined by a body of judgeand administrator-made gender-asymmetrical standards. Starting in the early
twentieth century, administrators in the Department of State and the Bureau of
Immigration recognized the nonmarital foreign-born child of an American
mother as an American citizen (before the jus sanguinis statute provided for
mother-child citizenship transmission).86 And, as a default rule, the nonmarital
foreign-born child of an American father was not a citizen—the principle that
the Maryland court established in Guyer. This rule was not race neutral,
however. Just as we miss a crucial dimension of Guyer if we fail to understand
the case as part of the larger contest over the citizenship status of black people
in the mid-nineteenth century, we miss a crucial dimension of the development
of gender-asymmetrical jus sanguinis citizenship law if we fail to account for the
important ways that restriction of father-child citizenship transmission outside
the marital family regularly operated to exclude nonwhite children from
citizenship.
In the following two Sections, I support that core assertion by drawing on
the historical records from two important periods in the history of American
nationality law. First, I demonstrate how, in the late nineteenth century,
domestic relations law served as an important tool for American officials who
sought to limit the citizenship claims of “half-caste” children of American men
living in Samoa, at that point the location of a small outpost in the fledgling
American empire. Next, I examine the Guyer rule’s role as an instrument of
exclusion in the enforcement of the infamous Chinese exclusion laws, as it
provided a means by which Bureau of Immigration officials could limit the
entry of foreign-born children of Chinese American fathers. By tracing the
Guyer rule’s long legacy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, I
demonstrate that the gender- and marriage-based regulation of jus sanguinis

85.

86.

Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797, 797; see Collins, A Short History, supra note
4, at 1504-06 (describing how Congress created statutory exceptions to the facially genderneutral child and parental residency requirements in the Nationality Act of 1940, and
showing that those exceptions were designed to relieve citizen-parents who were the “head
of the family,” a legal term of art that referred to husband-fathers, from those residency
requirements).
See Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra note 4, at 1689-90; infra Subsection III.A.3.
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citizenship was shaped by the logic of racial hierarchy and exclusion that
informed American nationality law well into the twentieth century.
B. Guyer as a Rule of Empire
In the second half of the nineteenth century, as America’s international
presence expanded, officials began to actively protect and define the contours
of American citizenship in consular offices around the world: China, Puerto
Rico, Samoa, the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, and elsewhere. American
expansion gave rise to all manner of legal puzzles, many of which were vetted
in the Insular Cases.87 Likely the best-known of these issues was whether the
indigenous residents of U.S. territories were American citizens, enjoying the
full protection of the Constitution. In other words, did the Constitution follow
the flag?88 The answer, although notoriously complicated, was generally
understood to be no.89
Another, less well-documented concern of officials charged with tending to
America’s interests abroad was the citizenship status of children born to
American parents in the insular territories and in foreign countries. The United
States’s presence abroad was not virtual; it was physical. In addition to military
personnel, the United States sent ambassadors, consuls, commercial agents,
and other civil servants and employees to foreign countries near and far to
represent American interests and to spread American values.90 In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the vast majority of those Americans

87.

88.

89.
90.

For discussions of these extremely important but often overlooked cases, see 8 OWEN M.
FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF
THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 225-56 (2006); FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO
RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke
Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinafter FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE]; BARTHOLOMEW H.
SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 3-9, 40 (2006);
Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014); and Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to
Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241,
257-59 (2000).
This was the contemporary shorthand way of asking whether the United States can possess
territory to which the Constitution does not extend. See generally Brook Thomas, A
Constitution Led by the Flag: The Insular Cases and the Metaphor of Incorporation, in FOREIGN
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 87, at 82.
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
Diplomatic Corps, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
373, 373-75 (2001).
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abroad were men,91 and some of them had relationships with local women.
Many of the children born of these unions, and their parents, were of the view
that the child of an American father and a local woman was an American
citizen. Given that the jus sanguinis citizenship statute appeared to recognize
children of American fathers as citizens regardless of the fathers’ marital status,
the children’s claims were, at the very least, grounded in the letter of the law.
Moreover, some of these children claimed that their parents were married, a
fact that would seem to guarantee the children’s status under any
interpretation of the statute.
But the citizenship claims asserted by children of American fathers and
local women were not generally given the benefit of the jus sanguinis citizenship
statute, as the case of Samoan-born children of American fathers illustrates.
Officials evaluating these children’s claims not only presumed that a child must
be legitimate in order to qualify for American citizenship but also employed a
definition of marriage that denied the legality of marriages that American men
entered into “beyond Christendom”—marriages that frequently involved
interracial unions. The children born of those unions were illegitimate and
hence not citizens.
1. Samoa and “an Institution of Our Civilization”
The first American commercial agent arrived in Samoa in 1853, joining
Calvinist, Methodist, and Catholic missionaries who had settled there in the
1830s, along with English and German traders and officials.92 For several
decades, Samoa remained a relatively sleepy way station, but in the 1870s, with
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See, e.g., KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICANS OVERSEAS IN THE
U.S. CENSUS 11 tbl.4 (1993), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/overseas
/techn62-2.pdf. Mills reproduces census data from 1900 showing that 91,219 military and
federal civilian employees and members of their families were stationed abroad or on naval
vessels that year. Although the table does not indicate how many of those family members
were women, they were counted with the 3,681 “civilian employees, etc.,” and hence at most
would have accounted for one to two percent of the 91,219 military and federal civilian
employees residing abroad that year.
See GEORGE HERBERT RYDEN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO
SAMOA 25 (1933). The first congressionally appointed commercial agent of the United States
was Virginius Chapin. Prior to Chapin’s appointment, an Englishman named John Williams
served as a representative of the United States, but his appointment was never approved by
Congress. Id. at 19-20, 25. For a discussion of the European settlers who preceded the arrival
of Americans in Samoa, see SYLVIA MASTERMAN, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY
IN SAMOA 1845-1884 (1934).
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an eye toward “increasing our commercial relations” in the South Pacific,
President Grant appointed Albert Barnes Steinberger as a special agent with
instructions “to secure more reliable information in reference” to Samoa.93
Steinberger’s report, written in the style of Victorian ethnography, catalogued
the flora and fauna of the islands and the language, religion, and customs of
the people, including their marriage rituals and practices. “Polygamy,” he
explained, “is common on the part of men, never on the part of women,
though two wives seldom live in the same house. A plurality of wives is not
common, a husband usually sending a wife to her people when he takes to
himself a new one.”94 Missionaries tried to eradicate the practice of polygamy
in Samoa. Their influence is evident in a provision in the Samoan council’s 1873
laws that—as reported by Steinberger to Congress—declared that “[p]olygamy
is strictly forbidden” and criminalized the practice with a penalty of two years’
hard labor for the guilty parties and a hundred-dollar fine for the husband.95
One suspects that the 1873 law and other bans on polygamy were directed not
only at native Samoans but also at the western men living in Samoa. One of the
first American commercial agents in Samoa, Jonas Coe, married at least six
Samoan women and fathered at least eighteen children.96 And Albert
Steinberger became intimately involved with Coe’s famously beautiful
daughter Emma Coe, who was the second child of Coe’s first wife.97
Eventually, questions concerning the citizenship of the Samoan-born
children of American fathers made their way to Washington, D.C. In 1887,
Assistant Secretary of State George Rives received an inquiry from Harold
Marsh Sewall, the American Consul General in Samoa. Soon after taking up
his post, Sewall had received an inquiry from one “A[viga] Chapin, who ha[d]
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Letter from Hamilton Fish, Sec’y of State, to President Ulysses S. Grant (May 1, 1876), in
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A REPORT FROM THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 44-161, at 1, 2
(1876).
Albert B. Steinberger, Report on Samoa or Navigator’s Islands (Apr. 21, 1874), in MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A COMMUNICATION FROM THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE REPORT BY WHICH IT IS ACCOMPANIED UPON SAMOA OR THE
NAVIGATOR’S ISLANDS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 43-45, at 1, 15 (1874).
Id. at 49. The 1873 laws also declared that marriage “is a contract between man and woman
that they shall be one till death part them” and decreed that “[t]here shall be no divorce or
separation; once married [the couple] shall live together till parted by death.” Id.
R.W. ROBSON, QUEEN EMMA: THE SAMOAN-AMERICAN GIRL WHO FOUNDED AN EMPIRE IN
19TH CENTURY NEW GUINEA 32-33 (1965).
Id. at 63-76.
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applied for protection as a citizen of the United States.”98 Aviga Chapin was
the adult son of an American man, Virginius P. Chapin, and an unnamed
“native woman.”99 The elder Chapin had served as the commercial agent of the
United States in Samoa from 1853 to 1854, and he remained in Samoa for some
time thereafter operating a private partnership.100 Sewall explained that, upon
his departure, Virginius had left Aviga in the charge of a British man, George
Pritchard, who “states that [Aviga] has always claimed American
protection.”101 Nevertheless, Sewall had “refused [the younger] Chapin’s
application” for citizenship, but was uncertain enough about the matter that he
requested “instructions not only upon [Chapin’s] case” but also “the status of
men who, like him, are the children of American fathers by Samoan
women.”102 Sewall advised his superior that his own “opinion is strongly in
favor of restricting this recognition [of the children of Samoan mothers and
American fathers] as much as possible.”103
The response from Assistant Secretary of State Rives was as telling for
what it assumed as for what it made explicit. After setting out the facts, Rives
immediately began his analysis of the law governing the enforceability of
foreign marriages in America. In so doing, he assumed that only marital
foreign-born children of American fathers could claim American citizenship,
even though the governing jus sanguinis citizenship statute said nothing about
marital status.104 As a consequence, marriage was central to his analysis, and
the important question was whether marriages between American men and
Samoan women qualified as legal marriages, which would make the children
born of those unions legitimate and citizens.
Rives’s answer was no, despite the “general principle of private
international law that a marriage celebrated according to the requirements of
the law of the place where the ceremony is performed is to be recognized as
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Letter from George Rives, Ass’t Sec’y of State, to Harold M. Sewall, U.S. Consul Gen.,
Samoa (Apr. 26, 1888), in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN SAMOA, S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 50-31, at 55, 55 (1888) [hereinafter MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT].
Id.
H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 51-81, at 2 (1891).
Letter from Harold Marsh Sewall, U.S. Consul Gen., Samoa, to George Rives, Ass’t Sec’y of
State (Mar. 17, 1888), in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 98, at 35, 35-36.
Letter from George Rives to Harold M. Sewall, supra note 98, at 55.
Letter from Harold M. Sewall to George Rives, supra note 101, at 36.
See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604.
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valid.”105 Rives explained that “this rule completely applies only to the
countries of Christendom.”106 “In Mohammedan . . . or in uncivilized lands
like Samoa . . . the privileged foreign residents carry with them their local
law.”107 “It follows,” he continued,
that the custom of Samoa in regard to the lawful cohabitation of men
and women can not be accepted as a rule by which to determine the
character of the cohabitation of an American citizen with any woman,
whether native or foreign. The character of such cohabitation must be
decided by the law of the United States.108
With that in mind, Rives concluded that, “[v]iewed as an institution of our
civilization,” a valid marriage contract “should be exclusive and for life.
Cohabitation for a term of years or at will does not constitute a matrimonial
alliance.”109
Relying on Steinberger’s 1874 report, Rives then observed that
“[p]olygamy is common on the part of [Samoan] men”110 and concluded that
“cohabitation ‘fa’a Samoa’ is neither exclusive nor for life and so fails to fulfill
the essential conditions of marriage in the United States.”111 Given this, the
children of American men and Samoan women were not American citizens. In
Rives’s assessment, this conclusion applied to the claim of Aviga Chapin,
despite the fact that Sewall had not stated with any clarity that Virginius
Chapin’s relationship with the unnamed “native woman” was, in fact,
polygamous. Indeed, in a further letter that was intended to clarify the
standards that the Department of State would use in assessing the legitimacy of
the “half-caste” children of American fathers residing in Samoa, Rives
explained that no marriage between a Samoan woman and an American father
could satisfy the American standard for legal marriage—“exclusive and for
life”—because, regardless of the intent of the parents or the nature of their
union, if Samoan law allowed the parties to separate, then such a marriage

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Letter from George Rives to Harold M. Sewall, supra note 98, at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. (quoting Steinberger, supra note 94, at 15).
Id.
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would not be recognized under American law.112 Under this interpretation, no
child of an American father and a Samoan mother could be recognized as a
citizen under the jus sanguinis citizenship statute.
2. Half-Castes, Polygamy, and the Presumption of Legitimacy
On the one hand, Rives’s analysis, and his insistence that “half-caste”
children in Samoa were not American citizens, is hardly surprising. In the
1880s, many considered racial mixing a sin that posed a danger to the purity of
the white race.113 In the United States, most of the states had laws barring
interracial marriage, and the practice was socially taboo.114 Although Rives did
not rely on such laws as the foundation of his opinion, a construction of the
law of marriage that denied the legitimacy of marriages between white
American men and Samoan women under any circumstances was consistent
with prevailing legal and social norms of the time.
Rives’s ready assumption that all American-Samoan marriages were
polygamous and his conclusion that polygamous marriages were invalid was
also predictable given the ferocious anti-polygamy sentiment of the time. By
the 1880s, the federal government had committed substantial resources to
exorcising Mormon polygamy from the nation-state.115 In that campaign,
Mormon polygamy was portrayed as a perversion of monogamous, Christian
marriage.116 And polygamy’s routine identification with African and Asian
peoples imbued the domestic anti-polygamy campaign with racial salience.117
For example, eight years before Rives rejected Chapin’s claim to citizenship,
the Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s power to criminalize
polygamy, explaining that polygamy was a practice of “Asiatic and . . . African
people” that was “odious” to European nations.118 It was feared that Mormon

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.

Letter from George Rives, Ass’t Sec’y of State, to Harold M. Sewall, U.S. Consul Gen.,
Samoa (July 19, 1888), in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 98, at 102, 102.
See Gross, supra note 58, at 177-78.
PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE
IN AMERICA 62-63 (2009).
See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
Id.
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS, supra note 12; GORDON, supra note 115, at 142; Martha M. Ertman, Race
Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 28889 (2010).
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879); see also Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray,
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polygamy was evidence of white people’s slippage into practices associated
with supposedly lower-order races, and hence their racial denigration.119
American men’s alleged predilection toward polygamy in Samoa may have
triggered a similar anxiety in officials charged with determining the citizenship
claims of foreign-born children of American men residing in Samoa. If the
government would not tolerate—or grant statehood to—a white, arguably
Christian people who practiced polygamy within the geographical bounds of
the United States, they surely would not welcome the offspring of possibly
polygamous relationships between American men and Samoan women, born
oceans away, into the American polity. In many respects, then, Rives’s analysis
and conclusion seems to have been overdetermined by contemporary cultural
and legal commitments against interracial marriage and polygamy.
But one should not overlook the relevant legal authorities and norms that
pointed in the other direction. As an initial matter, it bears repeating that the
governing jus sanguinis statute was silent regarding the father’s marital
status.120 Moreover, not everyone thought that an interpretation of this statute
that recognized nonmarital foreign-born children of American fathers as
citizens would have strained common sensibilities of the day. Significantly,
Rives’s opinion effectively overruled an earlier practice that recognized the
possibility of Samoan-American marriage and limited citizenship rights for
“half-caste” children born of such unions.121 And just a few years before Rives
penned his letter, an American diplomat stationed in China, John Russell
Young, concluded that the illegitimacy of a “negro” American father’s foreignborn child was irrelevant to the Department of State’s determination of that
child’s citizenship under the same jus sanguinis statute. Young based his
reading of the statute on the guiding principle that “the misfortune of an
illegitimate birth cannot deprive a man of his nationality. . . . He is a part of
society.”122 In short, like the judges who presided in Guyer, Rives made an

119.
120.

121.
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Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1262-63 (2010) (analyzing Reynolds).
See Ertman, supra note 117, at 312-23.
The version of the statute in force in the 1880s stated that the foreign-born children of
American fathers were American citizens, but it said nothing about the father’s marital
status. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604. Prior to 1855, all versions of the jus
sanguinis statutes referred simply to “children of persons” but were interpreted to allow for
patrilineal transmission of citizenship only. 2 KENT, supra note 51, at 45.
See Damon Salesa, Samoa’s Half-Castes and Some Frontiers of Comparison, in HAUNTED BY
EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 71, 81-82 (Ann Laura
Stoler ed., 2006).
Letter from John Russell Young to Charles Seymour, supra note 43, at 159. Young
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interpretive choice in reading the statute to limit citizenship to marital children
of American fathers, and in determining that, regardless of the nature of the
particular marriage, Samoan-American marriages did not constitute legal
marriages.
Rives’s interpretation of the jus sanguinis statute also ignored one of the
most fundamental principles of nineteenth-century marriage law. The legal
maxim semper praesumitur pro matrimonio—always presume marriage—was a
well-established and closely followed tenet of late nineteenth-century domestic
relations law.123 Its influence was considerable, and, quite intentionally, it
operated to legalize marriages and legitimize children in a whole range of
circumstances. For example, as Rives surely knew, in most parts of the United
States, common law marriage—“cohabitation for a term of years” combined
with public recognition of the couple as husband and wife—constituted a
lawful “matrimonial alliance.”124 Judges and lawyers acknowledged that a
primary purpose of common law marriage was to ensure that children born of
such a union were legitimate.125 In many states’ domestic relations laws, the
child born to a couple who married after the child’s birth was deemed
legitimate nunc pro tunc, from the day he or she was born.126 The presumption
of legitimacy was so strong that even if adultery was suspected on the part of a
married woman, any child she bore was assumed to be the child of her
husband, subject only to strong contrary proof.127 Indeed, a whole body of
evidentiary law supported the presumption in favor of marriage and
legitimacy.128 In light of these strong norms, Rives’s determination that the

123.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

disapproved of a U.S. consul’s reliance on the Dred Scott opinion to reject the son’s claim to
citizenship, but encouraged him to find alternative grounds for rejecting the son’s claim. See
id.
1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, WITH THE
EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FORMS § 457, at 374 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co.
6th ed. 1881) (1852) (“Every intendment of the law is in favor of matrimony.”). For a
discussion of the presumption of matrimony and legitimacy, see GROSSBERG, supra note 52,
at 218-28.
See GROSSBERG, supra note 52, at 73-83.
See id. at 79.
See id. at 222-23, 376 n.53.
4 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 241, at 150 (1936).
See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 970 (2000) (“A court within a common law marriage jurisdiction still had to adjudicate
in each specific case whether the particular plaintiff before it deserved recognition as a party
to a valid common law marriage. In this respect, evidence law took its place next to contract
law as a critical piece of the doctrine.”).
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marriages of American men and Samoan women were invalid—and the
children illegitimate—denied those children the presumption of legitimacy that
helped protect many children in America from the legal liabilities and profound
social stigma of illegitimacy at that time.
But in domestic relations law, as in nationality law, there were racial limits
on the operation of the presumptions of marriage and legitimacy. For example,
the children of interracial couples did not benefit from legal presumptions that
would have made them legitimate.129 One can see similar racialized
understandings of the law of marriage and legitimacy operating in the
citizenship determinations of Samoan-born children of American fathers that
resulted in those children’s exclusion from membership in the American polity.
The role that racialized domestic relations laws served in the hands of officials
charged with making citizenship determinations was by no means identical to
the ends they served in other contexts. Domestically, such laws reinforced
sociolegal racial hierarchies by limiting nonwhite children’s access to the status
and material benefits of legitimacy. In the context of interpreting the jus
sanguinis statute, the non-recognition of marriages between American men and
the “native women” of Samoa reflected anxieties of empire—the fear that
America’s imperial project at the periphery would dilute or corrupt the polity at
the center, in this case by recognizing “half-castes” as American citizens.130 But
whether deployed at home or in the furthest reaches of America’s fledgling
empire, malleable but durable domestic relations law principles aided in the
racial construction of family and nation.
3. Presumptions and the Pliability of Domestic Relations Law
Not all foreign-born children of American fathers were denied the benefit
of the presumption of legitimacy and other liberal rules of recognition that
were common in nineteenth-century domestic relations law. Presumptions
concerning marriage and legitimacy, along with a healthy dose of
administrative discretion, were incorporated into citizenship law, allowing for
selective determinations of legitimacy and citizenship status—determinations
that were shaped by considerations of the children’s ethno-racial identity.
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130.

See GROSSBERG, supra note 52, at 203, 224, 373 n.38; MANGUM, supra note 13, at 264-65.
See generally STEPHEN KANTROWITZ, BEN TILLMAN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WHITE
SUPREMACY 262-64 (2000); PAUL KRAMER, THE BLOOD OF GOVERNMENT: RACE, EMPIRE,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES 23 (2006).
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For example, contrast Rives’s insistence that, for purposes of determining
the citizenship of foreign-born children of American fathers, the children must
be born into a marriage that is “exclusive” and “for life” with the Department
of State’s treatment of Louis Rover in 1901. Louis was the son of Léon Jean
Rover, an American born in New York, and Germaine Rivère, a
Frenchwoman.131 Louis was born out of wedlock in France in 1888, and his
parents married three years later in London. Shortly afterward they legally
parted and Louis remained with his mother.132 Confronted with Louis’s claim
for citizenship, Department of State officials were uncertain how to proceed.
Louis was born out of wedlock and therefore appeared to fall outside the jus
sanguinis statute, which, as per Guyer, applied only to an American father’s
marital children. On the other hand, Léon and Germaine eventually married,
which may have “legitimated” Louis. Would such a child be counted as an
American citizen?
One possibility for Department of State officials was to adopt a strict rule
that could be applied easily by administrators charged with making citizenship
determinations: all children born out of wedlock were illegitimate and hence
could not take citizenship through their American fathers. Instead, Louis
Rover’s case provided the occasion for the crystallization of an important
exception to the Guyer rule: nonmarital foreign-born children who were
“legitimated” by their American fathers would be recognized as American
citizens. Rather than concluding that Rover was not a citizen under the jus
sanguinis citizenship statute because he was born out of wedlock, Acting
Secretary of State Alvey Adee took the initiative to write to the Attorney
General of New York, John Davies, to inquire whether, under New York law, a
child born out of wedlock was legitimized by his parents’ subsequent marriage.
Relying on Davies’s assurance that, under New York law, Louis had been
legitimized by his parents’ nuptials,133 the Department recognized Louis as a
United States citizen.134 Louis’s parents had not been married when he was
born, and it does not appear that Louis spent considerable time living in his

131.

132.
133.

134.

Letter from Charles L.E. Lardy, Swiss Chargé, to Alvey A. Adee, Ass’t Sec’y of State (July 30,
1901), in PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1901, at 511,
511 (1902).
Id.
Letter from John C. Davies, Att’y Gen. of N.Y., to Alvey A. Adee, Acting Sec’y of State (Aug.
16, 1901), in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 261,
261-62 (1902).
Letter from John Hay, Sec’y of State, to Charles L.E. Lardy, Swiss Chargé (Aug. 23, 1901), in
3 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 374, at 286 (1906).
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father’s household. Yet Louis’s claim to American citizenship was granted.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
As with the Guyer rule, the Department of State’s legitimation exception
would become a standard interpretive gloss on the jus sanguinis citizenship
statute.135 But it was often applied in a race-selective manner. For example, in
the years just after the Rover case, the Department of State did not use the
same generous interpretation of the laws of marriage and legitimacy in cases
involving the foreign-born children of American men and Chinese women.
Summarizing Department of State practice in his 1904 handbook titled
Citizenship of the United States, Assistant Solicitor Frederick Van Dyne explained
that “[i]llegitimate children born to a Chinese woman in China do not become
American citizens by the subsequent marriage of the mother to a citizen of the
United States.” Citing Guyer as the lead case, Van Dyne reasoned that
“[i]llegitimate children follow the status of the mother, and the mother being
Chinese, and not capable of being lawfully naturalized under the laws of the
United States, her marriage to a citizen of the United States did not confer
American citizenship on her.”136 Van Dyne’s account of the citizenship status of
nonmarital children born to American fathers and Chinese mothers makes no
suggestion that a child born to a Chinese mother could be legitimized by her
marriage to the American father, and thus acquire citizenship through the
father, though that rule had been followed just two years earlier in the Rover
case.
Van Dyne’s assessment of the status of the nonmarital child of a ChineseAmerican union is just one example of how the law of marriage and legitimacy
aided in the enforcement of the Chinese exclusion statutes, a subject I turn to
in the next Section. Before doing so, however, it is worth observing that

135.
136.

See infra Subsection III.A.2.
VAN DYNE, supra note 68, at 49, 49-50 (citing Letter from Herbert Peirce, Ass’t Sec’y of
State, to U.S. Consul, Shanghai, China (Mar. 27, 1903)). Similarly, in 1902, Allen Cameron,
the Vice-Consul in Charge in Hankow, China, wrote to Consul-General John Goodnow in
Shanghai, inquiring as to the citizenship status of the Japanese and Chinese wives of two
American men residing abroad. Cameron explained that both couples in question “had
children born before their marriages, and I take it that the children are of course barred from
registration [as citizens], being illegitimate.” Letter from Allen N. Cameron, Vice-Consul in
Charge, to John Goodnow, U.S. Consul Gen., Hankow, China (Nov. 3, 1902), in U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1903, at 44,
44 (1904). For a probing and important study of the experiences of interracial and mixednationality families of Chinese and white European or American heritage as they navigated
American citizenship laws, see generally EMMA JINHUA TENG, EURASIAN: MIXED IDENTITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND HONG KONG, 1842-1943 (2013).
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although the racial operation of domestic relations law principles in nationality
law was often obscured, this was not always the case. A few years after Rives
wrote his letter to the American consul in Samoa, John Bassett Moore, a
towering figure in international law—and one-time secretary to the Conference
on Samoan Affairs—reported and summarized the laws governing jus sanguinis
citizenship. In his discussion of the citizenship status of nonmarital children,
Moore cited Rives’s letter and comfortably declared that “[h]alf-castes born in
Samoa, of American fathers by Samoan women, with whom the fathers lived
‘fa’a Samoa,’ are not citizens of the United States.”137 And in 1915, when
Moore’s protégé Edwin Borchard wrote The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad, he reiterated and translated the conclusion of his mentor—“it seems
clear that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries of American
fathers and native women are not American citizens”—citing Guyer v. Smith.138
C. Guyer as a Rule of Exclusion
[T]he question of [jus sanguinis] citizenship, as it exists in Chinese cases,
rarely became the problem of any other nationality.139
–Wen-Hsien Chen (1940)
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the pressing questions of
nationality law involved the status of persons of Chinese descent and others

137.
138.
139.

MOORE, supra note 134, § 374, at 287.
BORCHARD, supra note 68, § 273, at 612 (citing Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864)).
Wen-Hsien Chen, Chinese Under Both Exclusion and Immigration Laws 284 (June 1940)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chi.) (on file with author). Chen was a Chinese
doctoral student at the University of Chicago who included a careful account of the travails
of foreign-born children of Chinese American citizen fathers in her dissertation. Chen
explained that:
Today, foreign-born citizens constitute the only significant group of the Chinese
race admissible for permanent stay. Although, in principle, their political status
had been paid down since 1855, their practical rights were not recognized until
1918 in the case of Quan Hing Sun [v. White, 254 F. 402 (9th Cir. 1918)]. Further,
the right of the second-generation children of the United States citizen, born
outside the jurisdiction and limits of the United States, was administratively and
judicially settled only in 1927 in the Chin Bow case. The question of citizenship, as
it exists in Chinese cases, rarely became the problem of any other nationality. . . .
It took thirty years, from Wong Kim Ark’s case in 1898 to Chin Bow’s case in
1927, to settle the citizenship rights of Chinese descendants.
Id.
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from the “Asiatic zone.”140 In this fiercely anti-Asian context, exclusionists
vigorously challenged the citizenship status of American-born individuals of
Chinese descent, and immigration officials attempted to use the exclusion laws
to bar the entry of American-born citizens of Chinese descent returning from
sojourns abroad.141 But for the Supreme Court’s 1898 intervention in Wong
Kim Ark, which established that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to native-born Chinese American citizens, the
exclusionists would likely have succeeded in ensuring Chinese Americans’
exclusion from the United States.142 Unable to categorically exclude nativeborn Chinese Americans from the United States, exclusionists made a
concerted effort to limit jus sanguinis as a route to citizenship for the foreignborn children of Chinese American fathers.143 These efforts were part of a
larger process by which Chinese American citizens were marked as “alien
citizens”—persons who, although “born in the United States . . . remained
alien in the eyes of the nation.”144 They were also part of an effort to maintain
the purity and predominance of the white race in the United States.145 This
Section examines how the Bureau of Immigration embraced the Guyer rule in
service of the racial exclusion laws.
1. Chinese American Fathers and Jus Sanguinis Citizenship
For a whole host of reasons—including the illegality of interracial marriage
and the severe gender imbalance in the ethnic Chinese population in America—
it was not uncommon for a Chinese American man to marry a Chinese woman
who remained in China while he traveled back to the United States.146 Those
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See supra Section II.A.
See LEE, supra note 6, at 103.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
On the Bureau of Immigration’s efforts to exclude such children generally, see SALYER, supra
note 6, at 209-11.
See NGAI, supra note 10, at 8; see also SALYER, supra note 6, at 208-09 (noting that even after
Wong Kim Ark, the Bureau of Immigration “urged that though native-born Asian Americans
might be ‘technical’ citizens, they would never become ‘real’ citizens . . . and should not be
treated in the law as genuine Americans”).
See sources cited supra note 10.
For important discussions of this practice and competing explanations for trans-Pacific
family formation among Chinese American men, see MADELINE YUAN-YIN HSU, DREAMING
OF GOLD, DREAMING OF HOME: TRANSNATIONALISM AND MIGRATION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND SOUTH CHINA, 1882-1943, at 90-123 (2000); Sucheng Chan, The Exclusion of
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couples had children, born in China, and the citizenship status of those
children was an important, and vexing, question for the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau was clearly concerned about fraud, and there is
substantial evidence that fraudulent claims to a filial relationship with a
Chinese American father had become a common way of evading the harsh
exclusion laws.147 But the Bureau’s obsessive effort to restrict the transmission
of citizenship between Chinese American fathers and their foreign-born
children was not only animated by worry about fraud; it was animated by a
racial xenophobia that characterized the exclusion laws more generally. In his
1916 annual report to the Secretary of Labor, for example, Commissioner
General of Immigration Anthony Caminetti lamented the recognition of
foreign-born children of Chinese American fathers under the jus sanguinis
citizenship statute. Caminetti objected to the fact that American-born
individuals of Chinese descent were birthright citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, and found it even more troubling that their
foreign-born children could be considered citizens as well. Contending that “a
person of the Mongolian race who is so fortunate as to be born here is vested
by the ‘accident of birth’ with American citizenship,” Caminetti thought it a
travesty that such an individual could go “to the native country of his parents
and marry[] . . . and there beget[] children . . . [who] could come to the
United States, [and] be freely admitted at our ports.”148
The jus sanguinis citizenship statute contained no racial limitations,
however; it was, as we say today, facially race neutral. But consistent with its
animosity toward jus sanguinis citizenship for children of Chinese descent, the
Bureau of Immigration implemented policies and procedures limiting its
availability for the foreign-born sons of Chinese American fathers.149 For
example, in 1915 the Bureau issued a regulation stating that foreign-born male

147.

148.
149.

Chinese Women, 1870-1943, in ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN
AMERICA, 1882-1943, at 94, 125-29 (Sucheng Chang ed., 1991); and Adam McKeown,
Transnational Chinese Families and Chinese Exclusion, 1875-1943, J. AM. ETHNIC HIST., Winter
1999, at 73.
For a discussion of the “paper sons” system that Chinese used to evade the Chinese
Exclusion laws, see ERIKA LEE & JUDY YUNG, ANGEL ISLAND: IMMIGRANT GATEWAY TO
AMERICA 84-90 (2010).
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, at xv-xvi (1916).
Lucy Salyer describes some of the Bureau’s efforts to exclude the Chinese-born children of
Chinese American citizens from entering the United States. See SALYER, supra note 6, at 210;
see also Chen, supra note 139, at 263-96.
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children of Chinese American fathers would be recognized as citizens only if
they were found to be dependent members of the father’s household—a
limitation that was not imposed on any other racial or ethnic group of
American fathers seeking citizenship for their foreign-born children.150 But
when that policy was challenged in federal court in California, where habeas
petitions challenging Bureau rulings were often heard, the court refused to
enforce the regulation, explaining that the statute did not make “race a
distinction in American citizenship.”151
As an additional or alternative strategy for restricting the availability of jus
sanguinis citizenship for the children of Chinese American fathers, the Bureau
strictly applied the Guyer rule in an effort to exclude at least some foreign-born
children of Chinese descent from citizenship. The question of legitimacy often
arose in cases involving an individual whom immigration officials suspected to
be the child of a Chinese American father’s second wife.152 The legal question
confronting immigration officials and judges was whether the children of
second wives were eligible for citizenship under a statute that provided that
children “whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the
United States, shall be deemed . . . citizens” and that was silent on the marital
status of the parents.153 Consistent with the interpretation given to the jus
sanguinis statute in Guyer and the Samoan case, in cases involving the children
of Chinese American fathers, the Bureau of Immigration insisted that the
statute applied to marital children only—a category that did not include the
children of polygamous (or allegedly polygamous) marriages.154 It also made
good use of the Guyer rule in briefs and intra-office memoranda, relying on it
to reject the possibility that the Department of State’s legitimation exception—
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Rules Governing the Admission of Chinese, in U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
TREATY, LAWS, AND RULES GOVERNING THE ADMISSION OF CHINESE 24, 30 (1915).
Quan Hing Sun v. White, 254 F. 402, 405 (9th Cir. 1918).
For a general discussion of polygamy as a Chinese practice, see Abrams, supra note 12, at
656-57. For a discussion that focuses on polygamy and transnational family formation, see
McKeown, supra note 146, at 98-99.
Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604.
This understanding of the term “legitimation” to exclude the children of second or
subsequent wives of polygamous marriages did not endure with respect to immigration
preferences. In 1969, the Board of Immigration Appeals altered its interpretation of the
definition of “child” in the INA to include children of polygamous marriages. See Matter of
Kwan, 13 I. & N. Dec. 302 (B.I.A. 1969). Not incidentally, Kwan was decided four years after
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 repealed the national origins quota laws. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
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established in the Rover case and formally ratified by the Department of Justice
in 1920—could apply to the children of Chinese American fathers.
2. The Legitimation Exception and Polygamous “Stock-Farms”
Dismissing the legitimation exception to the Guyer rule was no small
matter. Starting as early as 1901, the Department of State consistently
recognized the legitimation exception, and in 1920 the Attorney General’s
Office issued a lengthy formal opinion analyzing and approving it.155
Confronted with citizenship claims of three nonmarital sons of three different
American fathers, Acting Attorney General Charles Bismarck Ames explained
that “[t]he State Department has for many years held that a child born out of
wedlock which, by the laws of its father’s domicile has been legitimated, is a
citizen of the United States within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section
1993.”156 Expressly departing from the rigid rule announced in Guyer v. Smith,
Ames endorsed the Department of State’s “legitimation exception” because
“the recognition of the relationship of an illegitimate child to a father whose
identity has been established . . . is no longer against public policy.”157
Underscoring that central point—and likely to the dismay of immigration
officials—Ames added that “[t]here appear to be no considerations of public
policy which require a different decision.”158 Notably, all of the three cases at
issue in the Attorney General’s 1920 opinion involved children who were not
racially excludable: Jacques Robert Smith, William Alonzo Oppenheimer, and
Gustav Feuerbach.159
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See Citizenship—Children Born Abroad out of Wedlock of American Fathers and Alien
Mothers, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162 (1920); see also supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text
(discussing the Department of State’s 1901 determination of Léon Rover’s claim to
citizenship).
32 Op. Att’y Gen. at 164-65.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
See Letter from Alvey A. Adee, Ass’t Sec’y of State, to Charles B. Ames, Acting U.S. Att’y
Gen. (Feb. 27, 1920) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130). Throughout this Article, “CDF”
refers to the central decimal file contained in Record Group 59 of the National Archives and
Records Administration. In a 1931 memorandum prepared by the Solicitor of Labor, in
which both the 1920 Attorney General opinion and the three court of appeals cases involving
children of Chinese American fathers were analyzed, the author makes clear that the
children under consideration in the Attorney General’s opinion were not racially excludable.
See Risley Memorandum, supra note 67, at 20-23.

2174

illegitimate borders

In the 1920s, Bureau of Immigration officials, charged with excluding all
persons from the “Asiatic zone,” disagreed with the Attorney General’s
assessment of the Department of State’s “legitimation exception.” In three
cases brought during that decade, the children of Chinese American fathers
sought the benefit of the Attorney General’s opinion.160 In each case, Bureau
officials denied citizenship—and entry—to these Chinese-born children of
Chinese American fathers because the officials found that the applicants were
children of second wives, and therefore illegitimate and unable to claim
citizenship through their fathers. In each case, the federal court of appeals
affirmed.
Given the fever pitch of opposition to Asian immigration in the 1920s, it is
unsurprising that the department charged with enforcing Chinese exclusion
laws fully embraced the Guyer rule, repudiated the legitimation exception, and
rejected these children’s claims to citizenship. Nevertheless, a closer
examination of these cases helps underscore that, in the hands of
administrative officials charged with gatekeeping for the American polity,
domestic relations laws could be, and were, used to further the racially nativist
policies of contemporary nationality law. They did so by enlisting a rigid
understanding of marriage law that precluded any possibility of patrilineal
status transmission outside marriage.
Take the case of Ng Suey Hi, who arrived in Seattle in 1926. She sought
entry as an American citizen as the daughter of Ng Ock, whom Bureau lawyers
described as a “native-born citizen of this country, of the Chinese race.”161 The
precise basis for the Bureau’s initial refusal to recognize Ng Suey Hi’s claim to
citizenship, and her right to enter the country, is not entirely clear from the
record—it appears that the Bureau challenged almost every factual assertion
underlying her claim to citizenship, with no success. But by the time the case
was on appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the pivotal question had emerged: Was Ng
Suey Hi “illegitimate,” and, if so, did that status defeat her claim to citizenship
under the jus sanguinis citizenship statute?
Ng Suey Hi’s attorneys first insisted on a plain-text reading of the jus
sanguinis citizenship statute; it did not matter whether their client was
considered “illegitimate.” By the “express statement of the National Congress,”
they argued, “the question of legitimacy or illegitimacy would seem to be

160.
161.

Louie Wah You v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1928); Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast,
26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1927).
Brief of Appellee at 2, Ng Suey Hi, 21 F.2d 801 (No. 5238).
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entirely removed.”162 However, they would have been foolish to rest on that
argument given the default rule that nonmarital children of American fathers
were not citizens—a default rule that went unaltered by the 1920 Attorney
General Opinion. Citing that opinion, Ng Suey Hi’s attorneys next argued that
“a child born out of wedlock, in a foreign country, of an American father and
an alien mother, and subsequently legitimated by acknowledgment by the
father is a citizen of the United States within [the statute].”163 Noting that
claims of legitimacy enjoy “the strongest presumptions known to law,” they
observed that Ng Ock’s first wife had died, and hence Ng Suey Hi had been
legitimated by her father’s continued marriage to her mother.164 “[T]he Federal
Courts recognize common law marriage,” they explained, “and certainly in
view of the death of the first wife a common law marriage to the second wife
has been completely established.”165 Calling on Corpus Juris for support, they
urged that “for the purpose of sustaining legitimacy, a marriage may be
inferred from cohabitation, reputation, and other circumstances.”166 Even “the
issues of null and void marriages have nevertheless been deemed to be
legitimate,” they maintained, and “[t]he fact that a former subsisting marriage
of one of the parties is the cause of its invalidity does not affect the operation of
the rule.”167
The arguments made by Ng Suey Hi’s attorneys were not spurious given
the strong presumption of legitimacy in American domestic relations law, and
a growing trend to provide for and recognize paternal legitimation of
nonmarital children.168 Even attorneys for the Bureau conceded that “the
general rule is that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the
place where it is contracted,”169 and acknowledged that the term “children”
“may include natural and illegitimate children.”170 Indeed, as is discussed
below, the Bureau was willing to apply those general principles in an important
citizenship case concerning the white foreign-born child of a polygamous
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Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Ng Suey Hi, 21 F.2d 801 (No. 5238).
Id. at 8 (quoting Citizenship—Children Born Abroad out of Wedlock of American Fathers
and Alien Mothers, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162 (1920)).
Id. at 4-7.
Id. at 6.
Id. (quoting 7 C.J. Bastards § 15, at 945, 947 (1916)).
Id. (quoting 7 C.J. Bastards § 19, at 948 (1916)).
See GROSSBERG, supra note 52, at 203; supra Subsection II.B.2.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 161, at 11 (quoting 38 C.J. Marriage § 3, at 1276 (1925)).
Id. (quoting 11 C.J. Child or Children § 2, at 752 (1917)).
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marriage.171 However, in cases involving the children of Chinese American
fathers, such as Ng Suey Hi, the Bureau leaned heavily on the Guyer rule and
its rigid insistence on marriage as central to the determination of foreign-born
children’s claims to citizenship through the father. Citing and paraphrasing
Guyer, the Bureau insisted that “[i]llegitimate children, born abroad, of
citizens, being nullius filii are not within the contemplation of [the statute].”172
But attorneys for the Bureau did not rest on doctrinal formalisms alone.
Likely sensing that their reading of the law governing the status of nonmarital
children was in tension with important strands of contemporary domestic
relations law, and was definitely inconsistent with the Attorney General’s
interpretation, they made very clear to the court what they believed was at
stake in the case of Ng Suey Hi: the threat of mass reproduction of American
citizens of Chinese descent. If the construction of the jus sanguinis statute
proffered by the petitioner were correct, they warned, “there would be nothing
to prevent American citizens of the Chinese race from going to China and
establishing stock-farms, peopled with any desired number of polygamous
wives, or concubines, for the intensive propagation of American citizens, and
later bringing all the offspring of these various women to this country under
that status.”173
The image of a “stock-farm” drew on multiple anxieties that animated the
Chinese exclusion laws. Concern that Chinese women would become
“breeders” for a new generation of Chinese Americans had helped give rise to
exclusion laws and regulations that targeted Chinese women starting with the
Page Act of 1875,174 as well as state anti-miscegenation laws that explicitly
prohibited Asian-white marriages.175 By excluding Chinese women from the
United States and attempting to limit the creation of mixed-race families,
exclusionists tried to limit the number of American-born children of Chinese
descent who would be citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause.176 In addition, the practice of polygamy was held up by
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See infra Subsection II.C.3.
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Brief of Appellee, supra note 161, at 12-13 (citing Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864)).
Id. at 10-11.
Act of Mar. 3, 1875 (Page Act), ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Abrams, supra note 12, at 662, 690-715.
On the Page Law, see GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON’T BRING THEIR WOMEN
HERE: CHINESE FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION (1999); and George Anthony
Peffer, Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women Under the Page Law,
1875-1882, 6 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 28 (1986).
See Abrams, supra note 12, at 662-63.
See id. at 661-63.
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exclusionists as a key reason for the complete exclusion of the Chinese from
America, in part because polygamy was evidence of the Chinese women’s
“slave-like mentality” and moral inferiority as a race, and hence their
unsuitability for citizenship in a republic.177 The government’s reference to
“stock-farms peopled with any number of wives, or concubines” drew on these
powerful images—the fecundity of the Chinese and the polygamist wife as
slave—to underscore the importance of the strict application of the Guyer rule
in Ng Suey Hi’s case.
The judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not overtly betray the
same racial anxieties that animated the Bureau’s interpretation of the jus
sanguinis statute and relevant domestic relations law. Rather, reasoning in a
formalist, common law juridical mode, the Ng Suey Hi court adopted the Guyer
rule, rejected the Department of State’s legitimation exception, and—in the
alternative—embraced a constrained definition of legitimation. Paraphrasing
the Guyer opinion, the court announced that “[i]llegitimate children, born
abroad of citizens, being nullius filii, are not within the contemplation of
section 1993 of the United States Revised Statutes, and hence are not
themselves citizens,”178 thus rejecting the Department of State’s legitimation
exception out of hand. Abandoning any and all of the presumptions of
legitimacy that were part of the fabric of American domestic relations law, the
court also reasoned that “at common law an illegitimate child could only be
made legitimate by act of Parliament,” adding—incorrectly—that “such is the
law in this country.”179 Thus, the court concluded, “there is no evidence of such
legitimation in this case.”180
This pattern was repeated in two other precedent-setting cases that reached
the federal courts of appeals in the late 1920s: Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v.
Tillinghast181 and Louie Wah You v. Nagle.182 In both cases, attorneys for
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See id. at 657-59. In 1891, Congress added polygamists to the list of persons “ineligible to
citizenship.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084. For a probing discussion of
the analogy that was drawn between American chattel slavery and Mormon polygamy, see
GORDON, supra note 115, at 51-58.
Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927) (quoting 11 C.J. Citizens § 9, at 780
(1917)). The section of Corpus Juris quoted by the Ng Suey Hi court cites directly to Guyer v.
Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864).
Ng Suey Hi, 21 F.2d at 802.
Id.
26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928).
27 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1928).
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Chinese-born children of American citizen fathers drew on the long-standing
presumption in domestic relations law that jurists were to presume marriage
and legitimacy, as well as the liberalization of laws governing legitimation. But
in both cases, as in Ng Suey Hi, the courts followed the Bureau’s lead, turning
to a restrictive, explicitly Guyer-based interpretation of the citizenship statute
and a narrow definition of marriage and legitimacy in order to deny the
petitioners’ citizenship claims. On the statutory interpretation question, for
example, in Chin Suey the First Circuit explicitly rejected the Department of
State’s legitimation exception and instead ruled that “[t]he statute applies to
legitimate children only, and no provision is made in it in regard to the
citizenship of illegitimate children who may be thereafter legitimated by
marriage,” citing Guyer v. Smith.183 The court also concluded, without
elaboration, that “children of secondary wives are not legitimate, and therefore
could not be born citizens of the United States, if born abroad, although the
father was an American citizen.”184 This would be so, the court insisted, “even
if the father and the secondary wife married after the death of the first wife,”185
a conclusion that ran counter to the law of many states, including
Massachusetts (where the case arose), and was contrary to the presumption of
legitimacy that was well established in American domestic relations law.186
In Louie Wah You, after the Bureau once again warned the court about
polygamous “stock-farms,” the Ninth Circuit drew on a definition of
legitimation that was impossible for the appellant to satisfy because of the racebased exclusion laws. Not only must the father publicly acknowledge his child,
but he must also receive him into his household—“a settled place of habitation
of which he is the head.”187 But, of course, Louie Wah You could not reside
with his American citizen father unless he was permitted to enter the country,
which he could not do as a person of Chinese descent.
In all three cases, the courts of appeals used the law of domestic relations,
as it had been incorporated into citizenship law in the Guyer opinion, as a basis
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Chin Suey, 26 F.2d at 589 (citing Guyer).
Id.
Id.
Attorneys for Chin Suey argued that “in a large majority of the States of the Union statutes
have been passed expressly enacting that the subsequent inter-marriage of the parents,
followed by co-habitation and accompanied by an acknowledgment of paternity on the part
of the father, legitimizes previous issue; and such is the law of Massachusetts.” Brief for
Appellant at 5-6, Chin Suey, 26 F.2d 588 (No. 2175) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 7).
Louie Wah You, 27 F.2d at 574 (quoting In re Gird’s Estate, 108 P. 499, 504 (Cal. 1910)).
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for denying the benefit of the jus sanguinis citizenship statute to the child of a
Chinese American father. Of course, what was at issue in these three cases was
not the niceties of the law of legitimation or the continued vitality of the
presumption of legitimacy, but the race-based exclusion laws that the Bureau
was charged with enforcing. Confronted with the citizenship claim of a
foreign-born child of a Chinese American father, the Bureau rejected, resisted,
and narrowed the legitimation exception that had been crafted to accommodate
cases involving white nonmarital children. It did so using a malleable, racesalient understanding of marriage and legitimation. What Ng Suey Hi, Chin
Suey, and Louie Wah You show in hindsight is how the Guyer rule—adopted by
the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed in three court of appeals cases—was
insinuated in the logic of the Asian exclusion laws that by the late 1920s had
been a part of America’s immigration laws for over forty years.
3. Race, Polygamy, and Legitimacy
Now, one might resist this assertion on the ground that these cases provide
less evidence of racial bias than of a moral objection to polygamy that would
have determined their outcome regardless of the race of the would-be citizen.
In light of the harsh efforts to exclude Mormon polygamists from the American
polity,188 it is possible to read these three cases concerning the Chinese-born
children of Chinese American fathers as evidence of an official policy of
polygamist exclusion rather than racial exclusion. The records of the Bureau
suggest, however, that immigration officials were far less rigid in their
conception of “legitimacy” in cases involving foreign-born children of white
American Mormons than in cases involving foreign-born children of Chinese
Americans.189
Take, for example, the case of Leah Skousen O’Donnell. She was the
daughter of a white Mormon father, Donald Skousen, who had emigrated
from Utah to Colonia Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, as part of a mass exodus of
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See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; GORDON, supra note 115; Ertman,
supra note 117.
In making this argument, I do not wish to minimize the extreme and punitive steps taken by
the federal government to eradicate Mormon polygamy. Moreover, I recognize that it is
futile to try to disentangle the different biases and beliefs that animated the Asian exclusion
policy, in part because exclusionists articulated their anti-Chinese views through the
language of religion, culture, and an emerging discourse of biological race difference.
Mormon polygamists were regularly compared to the Chinese in an effort to racially
denigrate the practice of polygamy. See GORDON, supra note 115, at 142.
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Utah Mormons to Mexico to escape federal bans on, and criminalization of,
polygamy.190 Donald was born in Utah and had been an American citizen until
he voluntarily expatriated and naturalized as a Mexican citizen in the 1890s,
several years before Leah was born.191 Leah’s mother, Sarah, also an Americanborn Mormon, was Donald’s “second wife.”192 By the time Leah’s citizenship
was called into question by Bureau officials, Donald’s first wife was dead, and,
immigration officials explained, “he is now living with the mother of [Leah,]
with whom he went through a religious ceremony of marriage in the Mormon
Church prior to his first wife’s death.”193 The Board of Review of the Bureau of
Immigration concluded that Leah had been “legitimated” by the death of
Donald’s first wife, and conceded that, as a legitimated child of an American
father, Leah could have acquired citizenship from her father had he remained a
U.S. citizen at the time of her birth. Because Donald had expatriated, the Board
observed that she could “take nothing by reason of her alleged father’s
citizenship because he is a citizen of Mexico.”194 But the assumption underlying
the Board’s analysis is important: consistent with the law of many states, the
death of a first wife served to legitimate the children of a bigamous or
polygamous marriage, if the father and the mother continued to live together
as husband and wife.195
That was, of course, precisely the argument that the Bureau and the federal
appeals courts had rejected in Chin Suey’s and Ng Suey Hi’s cases, suggesting
that antipathy for polygamy was not all that was at stake when Bureau officials
interpreted the jus sanguinis citizenship statute in cases involving foreign-born
children of Chinese American fathers.196 In the early twentieth century,
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See B. Carmon Hardy, The Trek South: How the Mormons Went to Mexico, 73 SW. HIST. Q. 1,
1-2 (1969).
In re Leah Skousen O’Donnell, at 2 (Bd. of Review, Bureau of Immigration, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Sept. 2, 1938) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
Record of Hearing at 2, In re Leah Skousen O’Donnell (Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
Bd. of Special Inquiry, June 4, 1937) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
In re Leah Skousen O’Donnell, at 4 (Bd. of Review, Bureau of Immigration, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Sept. 2, 1938) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
Id.
See JAMES SCHOULER & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
§ 1129 (6th ed. 1921); M.C. Dransfield, Inference or Presumption of Marriage from Continued
Cohabitation Following Removal of Impediment, 104 A.L.R. 6 (1936).
The Bureau’s treatment of Leah O’Donnell—in contrast to its treatment of Ng Suey Hi,
Chin Suey, and Louie Wah You—is also telling. Leah O’Donnell was permitted to enter the
United States and remain there on her own recognizance, while the three Chinese-born
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polygamy’s salience as a threat to American identity continued to haunt
questions of racial exclusion in immigration and citizenship law, not only
because of Americans’ idealization of monogamous marriage, but also because
polygamy stood as a central marker of the Chinese people’s racial identity and
inferiority, and their ineligibility for citizenship. In the hands of Bureau of
Immigration officials, the rigid enforcement of jus sanguinis citizenship
principles, and the domestic relations law principles that had become part of
American nationality law, provided a means of furthering the racial
exclusionary policies that were at the core of the Bureau’s mission.
D. The Practice of Jus Sanguinis Citizenship
By the late 1920s, the basic contours of father-child derivative citizenship
had been established in judicial and administrative interpretations of the
federal jus sanguinis statute. In 1940, those interpretations were by and large
codified in the Nationality Act—a statute that was drafted by administrators
from the Bureau of Immigration, the Department of State, and the Department
of Justice.197 Because the practices of early twentieth-century administrators
became the basis of the first major nationality statute—and continue to provide
the basic architecture for the modern parent-child derivative citizenship
statute—it is worth briefly taking stock of the critical features of those
interpretations.
With respect to the ability of fathers to secure citizenship for their foreignborn children, the core interpretive commitment of the Guyer opinion—that is,
the common law inspired holding that only the marital children of American
fathers were contemplated by the jus sanguinis citizenship statute—remained a
vital and racially exclusionary principle from the late nineteenth century into
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children of American-citizen fathers were held in squalid detention centers and, upon final
resolution of their cases, immediately deported. Compare Letter from N.D. Collaer,
Inspector in Charge, INS, El Paso, Tex., to M.C. O’Donnal [sic] (Oct. 5, 1938) (on file with
NARA, RG 85, Case File of Leah Skousen O’Donnell, File No. 55950/184) (informing
husband of Leah O’Donnell that the Department “regrets very much the difficulty” caused
by the Department’s determination that she is not a U.S. citizen, and allowing her to remain
in the United States pending further administrative steps in “order that Mrs. O’Donnal [sic]
will be inconvenienced as little as possible”), with Brief for the Appellee at 2, Mason ex rel.
Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928) (No. 2175), Opening Brief on Behalf of
the Appellant, at 2, Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1927) (No. 5238), and
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, In re Louie Wah You, No. 19411 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
1927) (on file with NARA, RG 21).
See infra Part III.
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the early twentieth century. The marriage requirement was racially
exclusionary because marriage was not a race-neutral institution. Interracial
marriage was illegal in many American states and was generally socially taboo.
The marriage requirement was also racially exclusionary because
administrators, who were given significant discretion in interpreting the jus
sanguinis statute, tended to use what were, for that time, constrained
definitions of marriage and legitimacy in cases involving citizenship claims of
nonwhite children. In the early twentieth century, resistance to citizenship
transmission from fathers to nonmarital children had begun to loosen from its
strict common law origins, as evidenced by the Department of State’s
development of an exception for “legitimated” children that was adopted and
affirmed by the Attorney General in a formal opinion in 1920. However, in the
hands of Bureau officials and federal judges, that exception was narrowly
construed and even outright rejected in cases involving Chinese-born children
who, unless they could claim citizenship through their American fathers,
would be subject to the exclusion laws.
The story of the development of racialized jus sanguinis citizenship law also
reveals a complex dialogue among jurists, administrators, and legislators. For
example, the differing interpretations of Guyer offered by the Department and
the Bureau appears to have tracked subtle but important institutional
differences between the two agencies that routinely administered the jus
sanguinis citizenship laws. The Department of State was the primary agency
that dealt with the citizenship claims of foreign-born children of American
citizens, as it was responsible for issuing passports for citizens, providing
protection for citizens residing abroad, and registering foreign-born children of
American citizens.198 But the foreign-born children of American citizens who
were of an excludable racial-ethnic group, such as Chinese citizens and their
children, were treated as foreigners, and hence were also subject to rigorous
screening and, often, detention by the Bureau of Immigration, which oversaw
and administered the Chinese exclusion laws.199 The fact that the Bureau
remained especially committed to a strict enforcement of the Guyer rule was
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See Gaillard Hunt, The History of the Department of State (pt. 6): Subdivisions of the Department
of State, 5 AM. J. INT’L. L. 118, 140-41 (1911) (describing the evolution and responsibilities of
the Citizenship Bureau of the Department of State, including issuance of passports to
citizens and their protection and registration while residing abroad).
SALYER, supra note 6, at 38 (describing the consolidation of the Bureau’s power over the
Chinese exclusion laws starting in 1903).
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thus consistent with its central institutional mission of enforcing the racial
exclusion laws.200
Courts also played an important role in the development of racialized jus
sanguinis citizenship laws, often in dialogue with administrators. In Guyer, a
Civil War-era case involving the citizenship status of two children of African
descent, the Maryland Court of Appeals interpreted the jus sanguinis citizenship
statute by including only marital children as citizens.201 Administrators in the
Bureau of Immigration followed the same rule, often citing Guyer for authority.
Gradually, administrators in the Department of State crafted a legitimation
exception to the judge-made Guyer rule—an administrator-made exception to a
judge-made exception—which the Bureau of Immigration and the circuit
courts subsequently construed narrowly or rejected entirely in Ng Suey Hi,
Chin Suey, and Louie Wah You. Through these interpretive processes, the
exclusion of children on the basis of race-salient illegitimacy laws was
engrained in judicial and administrative practice.
Why did administrators, government attorneys, and judges rely on
domestic relations law to achieve nativist policy goals, rather than simply
relying on racial classifications? This question is especially significant in light
of the Supreme Court’s 1889 opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (also
known as the Chinese Exclusion Case), in which the Court proclaimed the
political branches’ plenary power over immigration law.202 Someone intent on
excluding the foreign-born children of Chinese American fathers could have
argued that the political branches had the authority to exclude any person or
any group—including the children of American citizens—for any reason,
including race. At the time, however, there were doubts as to the legality and
wisdom of explicit race-based restrictions on jus sanguinis citizenship. For
example, the lower federal courts did not permit the Bureau of Immigration to
read racial limitations into the jus sanguinis citizenship statute.203 Similarly,
Congress did not alter the jus sanguinis statute to exclude children of citizens
who were otherwise racially “ineligible to citizenship,” and there is evidence to
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This point should not be overstated. Officials in the Department of State were also charged
with enforcing the exclusion laws and many were vocal defenders of those laws. See, e.g.,
infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text. The point is, rather, that with respect to the
Guyer rule, variation in the two departments’ interpretations may have been due to
differences in their clientele and their core institutional missions.
See supra Section I.A.
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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suggest that many legislators had doubts about Congress’s authority to do so.
For example, in the 1930s, legislators considered several bills that would have
provided American women the right to transmit citizenship to their foreignborn children.204 Responding to concerns that such equalization of parental
citizenship rights would result in the admission of children who were racially
excludable, a proviso was introduced that would have eliminated parent-child
citizenship transmission when the alien parent was “ineligible to
citizenship.”205 Some legislators argued that the exclusion of such children was
intolerable race discrimination206—an argument that appears to have had some
effect, as the racial restriction was eliminated from the final version of the 1934
act that recognized American mothers’ foreign-born children as citizens.207
Thus, even though legislators had the power to exclude non-citizens on the
basis of race, and although the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to states,
within Congress there was significant uncertainty concerning legislative power
to use overt racial restrictions to exclude the children of citizen parents because
such restrictions implicated those citizens’ rights.208 The Guyer rule provided
officials who enforced the racial exclusion laws with an alternative means of
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For a discussion of these bills and a detailed account of the debates leading up to the May 24,
1934 Act, see BREDBENNER, supra note 12, at 227-42.
See 78 CONG. REC. 7330 (1934) (statement of Rep. Dickstein). In explaining the purpose of
the racial restriction, Representative Dickstein described how Chinese American men tended
to “go over [to China], get married, and raise a family. . . . On the birth of that child it
receives derivative citizenship from the father. . . . This puts a stop to this practice upon the
basis of elimination.” Id.
See, e.g., id. at 7337 (statement of Rep. O’Connor) (objecting to the bill on the ground that
“[i]t is grossly unfair to single out any race and take away from it what the male members of
that race now possess, their right to devolve citizenship upon their children”); id. (“I think
any race should resent the extreme principle of discrimination in this bill.”); id. at 7342
(statement of Rep. Martin) (urging that the racial restriction “has no place in a bill, the
ostensible purpose of which is to equalize the rights of mothers and fathers”); id. at 7349
(arguing that the racial restriction “is a direct stab at the orientals,” and referring to the
provision as a “play on prejudice”).
See Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, sec. 1, 48 Stat. 797. Although the final act was facially race
neutral, a race-salient child residency requirement on jus sanguinis citizenship was included.
See id.; infra notes 237-242 and accompanying text.
Congress did not always stay its hand in limiting jus sanguinis citizenship using explicit racebased restrictions. When Congress enacted the War Brides Acts, it explicitly excluded
racially ineligible war brides and their children from the special preferences provided to
soldiers’ “war brides” and their children. See infra Section III.B.

2185

the yale law journal

123:2134

2014

limiting the reach of jus sanguinis citizenship in a manner that helped insure the
integrity and efficacy of those laws.209
Domestic relations law, and particularly the law of marriage and
illegitimacy, was particularly well suited to this task for several reasons. First,
the Guyer rule was consistent with the long-standing notion that the husband,
as head of the family, would determine the political and cultural character of
the marital family.210 It was also consistent with the principle that illegitimate
children were excluded from the father’s family, and that fathers had no rights
with respect to children born outside of marriage—and, as a default matter,
had no responsibilities.211 By the early twentieth century, these aging notions of
the political and legal significance of marriage, gender, and legitimacy were
incrementally waning. But the male-headed marital family remained a central
sociolegal institution, and the Guyer rule helped sustain, and was sustained by,
its continued authority.
Second, racially nativist nationality laws were well served by domestic
relations laws because the practice of using gender-based domestic relations
law as an instrument of racial designation, and often as a means of preserving
racial hierarchies within American society, was entrenched in the practices of
American jurists, lawyers, and administrators. Long before the Guyer brothers
tried to secure their ownership of Yamland in war-torn Maryland, genderbased laws governing birth status had been woven into American law—both
laws governing the rights and status of individuals in the United States, and
laws determining their citizenship. Thus, the law of slavery incorporated the
maternal line rule to determine the status—slave or free—of individuals born to
at least one enslaved parent.212 In the context of citizenship law, gender- and
marriage-based laws governing birth status had been incorporated into racebased American citizenship laws, as reflected in the Dred Scott opinion.213 Laws
prohibiting interracial sex and marriage were written to preserve and protect
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As historian Mae Ngai has observed of other nationality policies, after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment lawmakers were left to search for a “racial logic capable of
circumventing the imperative of equality [that Amendment] established.” NGAI, supra note
10, at 9. Ariela Gross makes a similar point, noting that after the Fourteenth Amendment
“insisted that every citizen had the right to equal protection under the law, regardless of
race[,] . . . efforts to discriminate on the basis of race would have to be carried out in a
different spirit.” GROSS, supra note 10, at 214.
See supra Section II.A.
See Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra note 4, at 1689-90.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
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white purity and supremacy, and hence it followed that the generous domestic
relations law principles that worked to bring children within a marital family,
such as legitimation laws, often did not apply to children of interracial
unions.214 In short, to reason about foreign-born children’s citizenship status
using racialized gender-asymmetrical principles of descent and status was a
familiar exercise, and one that was easily incorporated into the interpretation of
the jus sanguinis citizenship statute.
A third reason that the Guyer rule—in its common law and modernized
formulations—functioned as an effective resource for various officials is the
pliability of the domestic relations law principles it incorporated into
citizenship determinations. One might reason that by using marriage and
legitimacy as bases for allocating citizenship, officials simply selected preexisting statuses as eligibility criteria. But in the context of nationality laws,
government officials—judges, administrators, lawyers—did not simply employ
pre-existing, singular notions of “marriage” and “legitimacy” as bases for
making citizenship determinations of foreign-born children of American
citizens. Rather, they sometimes borrowed, sometimes ignored, and often
adapted domestic relations law principles from state law or general law sources,
shaping the metes and bounds of marriage and the family in part in response to
the pressure created by particular policy objectives of nationality law. In one
case, administrators could recognize “legitimation” as a valid means by which
some American fathers could secure citizenship for their nonmarital children,
affirming those men’s prerogatives: fathers like Léon Rover, Edgar Smith, and
Edward Oppenheimer could secure citizenship for their white nonmarital
children.
In other cases, by employing a more rigid version of the Guyer rule, or by
using a constrained definition of marriage, officials limited the reach of jus
sanguinis citizenship. Such limitations on the transmission of citizenship from
fathers to nonmarital children may have been experienced by some fathers as
protecting their prerogatives (as was possibly the case for Virginius Chapin)
and by others as violating their rights as fathers and as citizens (as was almost
certainly the understanding of the Chinese American fathers whose children
were refused entry in Ng Suey Hi, Chin Suey, and Louie Wah You).215 And,
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See sources cited supra note 129.
It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence of the actual felt experience of the fathers involved in
these cases, so we are left to interpret the available evidence. Virginius Chapin likely left
Samoa by 1859 and there is no evidence that he ever saw Aviga again, though it is also
significant that he left Aviga in the care of a British associate, suggesting that he felt some
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undoubtedly, officials made determinations regarding the father-child
relationship in different cases for different reasons, but the very pliability of the
definitions of marriage and legitimacy made them useful in the enforcement of
various policy goals, including the nativist aspirations of American nationality
laws of the time.
iii. the guyer rule in the modern era of nationality law
One might anticipate the Guyer rule’s demise along with the gradual end of
explicit race- and gender-based regulation of nationality during the middle
decades of the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 1930s, American women’s
organizations successfully lobbied Congress for repeal of many overt
limitations on women’s citizenship rights.216 And, starting with the removal of
Chinese from the long list of racially excludable peoples in 1943, Congress
gradually purged immigration law of racial and national origins restrictions,217
ending outright racial bars to immigration in 1952 and abolishing the quota
system in 1965.218
But sociolegal change rarely conforms to neat and tidy progress
narratives,219 and it would be misguided to presume that the repudiation of
many of the formal race- and gender-based classifications from nationality law
signaled a complete departure from the concept of “marital unity” or racially
nativist principles that by the mid-twentieth century had shaped American
nationality law for over 150 years. In this Part, I show how the jus sanguinis
provisions in the Nationality Act of 1940 codified many of the gendered and
racialized practices of early twentieth-century administrators, including
restrictions on citizenship transmission from fathers to their nonmarital
children. I then turn to the application of the Nationality Act’s jus sanguinis

216.
217.
218.

219.

responsibility for his child’s well-being. See Letter from Harold M. Sewall to George Rives,
supra note 101, at 36. The Chinese American fathers in the three significant federal appeals
court cases were all involved in the legal efforts to secure their children’s release from
immigration detention and entry into the United States.
See supra Section II.A.
Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 600, 601.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (eliminating explicit racial limitations on immigration); Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (ending the national origins quota
system).
See Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023
(1997).
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citizenship provisions, demonstrating how the law continued to limit fatherchild citizenship transmission in a racialized manner into the late twentieth
century, especially in theaters of war.
A. Modernizing and Codifying Guyer: The Drafting of the Nationality Act of
1940
The Nationality Act of 1940 was the first omnibus codification of American
nationality law, providing the template for many of our current laws, but it has
received surprisingly little attention from historians and legal scholars.220 To
understand the jus sanguinis citizenship provision of the Act, one cannot rely
solely on the normal sources of legislative history, such as committee reports,
hearings, and floor debates. The Nationality Act was drafted by an
interdepartmental committee of officials appointed from the Department of
State, the Department of Labor (which then housed the Bureau of
Immigration), and the Department of Justice, and it is the archival records of
those departments that shed the most helpful light on the system created by
the Act.221

220.

221.

An important and excellent exception is PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN:
DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2013), which provides a
searching examination of the Nationality Act’s central role in the history of denaturalization.
Denaturalization, Weil’s focus, and derivative citizenship, my focus, were two of the
primary concerns of the law reform movement that led to the Nationality Act of 1940. See
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 27 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1677 (“The 1940
act combined all substantive and procedural requirements for naturalization.”); George S.
Knight, Nationality Act of 1940, 26 A.B.A. J. 938, 938 (1940).
The fact that the Nationality Act of 1940 was drafted by administrative officials underscores
the importance of attending to the role and powers of the executive branch in the
development of American nationality law. Cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009). The drafting of legislation by
agency officials was not unusual in the New Deal period. As Nicholas Parrillo has
demonstrated in searching detail, New Deal agency officials routinely drafted legislation for
Congress, in part because legislators were understaffed. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan
and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative
History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 337-40 (2013). I thank Bruce Ackerman for
highlighting that point. A distinctive feature of the Nationality Act of 1940 is that it was
drafted by an interdepartmental committee formally appointed by the President. In the
decade prior to the creation of the Presidential interdepartmental committee, various
officials in the Department of State pushed for revision of the nationality laws. In 1928,
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg created a three-person committee to propose revisions to
the nationality laws. That Department of State committee issued a report in 1929. In 1933,
two members of the Department of State committee were appointed to the President’s
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What forces led to this reform? The archives reveal three primary sources
of pressure. First, efforts to convene the interdepartmental committee that
drafted the Nationality Act appear to have been initiated by lawyers in the
Department of State who worked daily with the patchwork of nationality laws
and who believed that wholesale codification and revision would achieve
greater clarity and consistency within the corpus of American nationality
law.222 Second, nationality law was also front and center within the
international law community as a subject that needed to be addressed through
multi-national treaties that would help countries minimize conflicts between
their different systems of nationality law.223
The third and possibly most substantively influential source of pressure for
the reform of the nationality laws that regulated family-based immigration,
naturalization, and jus sanguinis citizenship was women’s organizations’
sustained campaign for gender equality during the 1920s and 1930s. Following
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, American women’s
organizations, and especially the National Woman’s Party, turned their
attention to the nationality laws and equal citizenship rights for women.224 In
so doing, they made a set of demands that had far-reaching implications for the
administration of American nationality law, including race-based exclusion
laws and national origins quotas. As a consequence, women’s demands
triggered considerable debate and resistance within the agencies charged with
enforcing those laws. In 1933, it was those very agencies—the Department of
State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice—that President
Franklin Roosevelt directed to “designate a committee . . . to review the

222.

223.

224.

interdepartmental committee, which was composed of six officials from the Department of
State (Wilbur J. Carr, Green H. Hackworth, Richard W. Flournoy, Ruth B. Shipley, John J.
Scanlan, and Benedict M. English), six officials from the Department of Labor, which
housed the Bureau of Immigration (Daniel W. MacCormack, Charles E. Wyzanski, Edward
J. Shaughnessy, Henry B. Hazard, Thomas N. Eliot, and Howard D. Ebey), and one
representative from the Department of Justice (Albert Levitt). See Knight, supra note 220, at
938.
See Knight, supra note 220, at 938; Letter from Richard W. Flournoy, Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Dep’t of State, to Alvey Adee, Ass’t Sec’y of State (Dec. 28, 1922) (on file with NARA,
RG 59, CDF 130); Memorandum from Raymond F. Crist, Comm’r of Naturalization, to
Alvey Adee, Ass’t Sec’y of State (Jan. 2, 1923) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130).
Nationality law was a primary subject of consideration at the First Conference for the
Codification of International Law at The Hague in 1930. See Manley O. Hudson, The First
Conference for the Codification of International Law, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 452-53 (1930).
For an extraordinarily thorough and insightful discussion of women’s campaign for equal
citizenship rights in the United States, see BREDBENNER, supra note 12.
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nationality laws of the United States, to recommend revisions . . . and to codify
those laws into one comprehensive nationality law.”225 Five years later, that
committee produced the Proposed Code that, with a few relatively minor
changes by legislators, would become the Nationality Act of 1940.226 In this
Section, I demonstrate that the racialist concerns of administrators shaped not
only their implementation of the laws, but also their work drafting the first
modern jus sanguinis citizenship statute.
1. Women’s Claims to Equal Citizenship Rights as a Threat to the Exclusion
Laws, 1922-1940
Although Roosevelt charged the interdepartmental committee with
revising American nationality laws “particularly with reference to the removal
of certain existing discriminations,” the committee was staffed by officials from
the three key departments that had long implemented the gender- and racebased nationality laws. The reaction of some committee members to women’s
claims to gender equality reveals a strong commitment to those traditional
modes of regulating nationality. For example, in 1922, Richard Flournoy—then
an assistant solicitor in the Department of State and later a member of the
interdepartmental committee—found the idea that a married woman would
maintain her American citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner “very
objectionable” on the ground that it was “obviously a direct blow at the
principle of family unity”227—a reference to the principles of coverture that
resulted in women’s loss of independent civil identity upon marriage. When
women’s organizations went one step further and proposed that Congress
amend the nationality laws to allow married American women to transmit

225.
226.

227.

Exec. Order No. 6115, Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United
States (Apr. 25, 1933) (on file with author).
See H.R. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 76TH CONG., REPORT PROPOSING A
REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART ONE:
PROPOSED CODE WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENTS (Comm. Print 1939) [hereinafter
PROPOSED CODE]; Knight, supra note 220, at 938.
Letter from Richard W. Flournoy, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Fred
Nielsen, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State 1 (May 31, 1922) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF
130); see also Letter from Richard W. Flournoy, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to
Green Hackworth, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State 10 (Feb. 16, 1932) (on file with NARA, RG
59, CDF 130) (noting that women’s organizations pushing for women’s independent
citizenship rights dislike “the principle of the unity of the family”).
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citizenship to their foreign-born children, Flournoy wrote a lengthy memo
dismissing the proposition as “so ridiculous that it is hard to discuss it.”228
Resistance to gender equality in the nationality code was inextricably linked
to the prevailing commitment to racial exclusion and national origins quotas.
For example, one reason why gender equality in jus sanguinis citizenship was
seen as “ridiculous” was that liberalization of those laws in the name of gender
equality would frustrate enforcement of the race-based exclusion laws. Thus,
Flournoy worried that recognizing married American mothers’ right to secure
citizenship for their children “would . . . open the doors of the United States to
the free and unrestricted entry” of “thousands” of children of American
mothers, including “Orientals.”229 In the 1930s, another Department of State
official worried that allowing American mothers to transmit citizenship to their
foreign-born children would have “far reaching effects” on immigration,
extending citizenship in “thousands of cases . . . involving persons in various
countries, including Oriental countries,” thus “letting down the immigration
barriers established by the Immigration Act of 1924.”230
Concerns about the racial implications of jus sanguinis citizenship were
voiced not only in the intra-office memos of administrators; they were also
prevalent in legislative debates over sundry nationality bills proposed by
women’s organizations in the decade prior to the enactment of the Nationality
Act. In the early 1930s, when Congress considered a bill that would have
allowed both mothers and fathers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born
children, several witnesses and legislators were alarmed. Testifying at a
committee hearing, the president of the International Seamen’s Union
explained that the expansion of jus sanguinis citizenship would “leave[] the
door open so that you can largely destroy your Chinese exclusion act.”231

228.

229.

230.
231.

Letter from Richard W. Flournoy to Alvey Adee, supra note 222, at 3. As I explain infra
Subsection III.A.3, by the early twentieth century, administrators had begun recognizing the
nonmarital children of American mothers as citizens without statutory authorization to do
so. For that reason, among others, the driving goal behind the proposed legislation was to
secure the right of married American women to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born
children, although that was usually implicit rather than explicit in the legislative hearings
and departmental memoranda.
Memorandum from Richard W. Flournoy, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to
Wilbur J. Carr, Ass’t Sec’y of State 2 (Feb. 9, 1933) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130).
Both Flournoy and Carr were appointed to the interdepartmental committee.
Letter from A. Dana Hodgdon, Dep’t of State, Visa Div., to Wilbur J. Carr, Ass’t Sec’y of
State 1-2 (Jan. 19, 1933) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130).
Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of the
United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain Inequalities in Matters of Nationality:
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Legislators’ questions directed at Burnita Shelton Matthews of the National
Woman’s Party, which sponsored the bill, betrayed similar anxieties:
Representative Charles Kramer of California asked, “Don’t you feel that we are
increasing the probability of bringing in more of the Chinese and Japanese, and
‘what have you’, from these nations over there, by reason of this bill?”232
Personalizing—and sexualizing—the issue, Kramer pressed the matter further:
“How would you feel if you had a daughter, and she was sitting alongside
Chinese and Japanese boys in school every day . . . ?”233
Representative William Traeger, also of California, similarly worried that
gender equality in jus sanguinis citizenship would lead to a dramatic increase in
Chinese and Japanese American citizens.234 He was also concerned about
another group which had more recently become the target of immigration
restrictions:
I am wondering whether the ladies who are sponsoring this bill have
studied the situation in California in the past year or two . . . . Our
country began to deport Mexicans [but] . . . [t]hose nationals remained
in Los Angeles County long enough to produce children. Those
children naturally . . . became citizens of the United States.235
Although the children had been deported along with their parents, Traeger
worried that, under the pending bill, the female children would, years later, be
entitled to bring their children to the United States as citizens.236 In light of
these concerns, Traeger drew a clear line: “If the law can be amended to
preclude that sort of thing, I am for it; otherwise I am against it.”237

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Hearings on H.R. 3673 and H.R. 77 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization,
73d Cong. 23 (1933) [hereinafter H.R. 3673 Hearings].
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42. For additional debates in which legislators, confronted with claims to gender
equality in the regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship, became fixated on the doctrine’s
implications for racial exclusion, see Amendment to the Women’s Citizenship Act of 1922, and
for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 14684, H.R. 14685, and H.R. 16303 Before the H. Comm.
on Immigration and Naturalization, 71st Cong. 9-11 (1930); Amendment to the Women’s
Citizenship Act of 1922: Hearings on H.R. 10208 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 71st Cong. 15 (1930) (statement of attorney Margaret Lambie); id. at 21
(statement of Edward McGrady, American Federation of Labor); and 74 CONG. REC. 6507,
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Worried that the bill would be defeated, the Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization added a provision whereby, in the words of one of the bill’s
sponsors, all children born abroad to a mixed-nationality couple of whom the
“alien parent is an alien ineligible to citizenship by naturalization, would not
derive citizenship from their citizen parent, either mother or father,”238 thus
proposing to exclude virtually all Asian foreign-born children of American
citizen parents. That effort failed in the House of Representatives after
considerable debate,239 and in 1934 Congress passed a statute that gave
American women the ability to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born
children with no explicit racial limitations.240 It would be wrong, however, to
conclude that the 1934 statute did not respond to concerns that the gender
equalization of jus sanguinis citizenship would lead to evasion of the exclusion
laws and quotas. The final version of the bill required children of mixednationality marriages to fulfill a five-year U.S. residency requirement241—a
requirement was intended by some legislators to exclude children of citizens
who were otherwise racially excludable. When Senator William King of Utah
expressed concern that the foreign-born children of “a Japanese or a Chinese
[woman] or a woman from India . . . [married to] a man who is a citizen of the
United States” would be considered citizens, his colleague Senator Royal
Copeland assured him, “[T]hat is all fixed by necessity of the term of
residence.”242

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

7154-55 (1931) (statement of Rep. Green).
78 CONG. REC. 7330 (1934) (statement of Rep. Dickstein).
For legislators’ objection to the proposed racial restriction, see sources cited supra note 206.
Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797.
Id.
78 CONG. REC. 8471 (1934). The Chinese American Citizens Alliance immediately voiced
their concern that the foreign-born children of Chinese American parents would be excluded
from citizenship entirely by operation of the residency requirement, as Senator King
suggested. Because people of Chinese descent could not enter the United States unless they
were citizens (or eligible for an exception to the exclusion laws), the children of Chinese
American parents would not be able to fulfill the residency requirement and would be
excluded. See Telegram from Walter U. Lum, President of the Chinese American Citizens
Alliance, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 12, 1934) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
However, in an opinion issued in 1934, Attorney General Homer Cummins opined that the
five-year residency requirement in the 1934 Act should be interpreted as a condition
subsequent, rather than a condition precedent, so as not to exclude the foreign-born
children of American citizens of excluded races from citizenship. See Citizenship of Child
Born Abroad of an American and an Alien Parent, 38 Op. Att’y Gen. 10 (1937). It is
extremely difficult to tell whether Bureau of Immigration administrators followed that
opinion in their administration of the 1934 Act. Writing in 1940, six years after the statute
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Concern about the racial implications of gender equality in nationality law
also shaped the code that the interdepartmental committee drafted and
submitted to Congress in 1938, and that eventually became the Nationality Act
of 1940. In addition to the five-year child residency requirement introduced in
1934, the interdepartmental committee proposed a ten-year parental residency
requirement.243 Although the parental residency requirement was race neutral
by design, the committee defended it in terms that would appeal to nativist
sensibilities. Testifying before Congress on behalf of the interdepartmental
committee, Richard Flournoy explained that the Nationality Act’s jus sanguinis
provision “improved” the 1934 Act by introducing a significant parental
residency requirement. One worry was that American citizens of Chinese or
Mexican descent would leave the United States, return to China or Mexico, and
have children who “are born citizens of the United States”244—not only
spreading citizenship too thin, but giving it to the wrong sort of people. The
Nationality Act’s provision, he explained, “is not so loose as that because it
requires that a citizen must have resided 10 years in the United States in order
that he or she may transmit citizenship to the children born abroad.”245
In sum, in the decades prior to the enactment of the Nationality Act of
1940, efforts to secure gender equality in jus sanguinis citizenship law triggered
concern that such equalization would lead to the recognition and admission of
racially excludable children as citizens. This was not the only concern voiced by
administrators, who also worried that departure from the patrilineal norm that
had long characterized jus sanguinis citizenship would lead to more cases of
dual citizenship, and ran contrary to the fundamental principle that the
husband determined the political allegiance of his dependents.246 But concern

243.
244.

245.
246.

was enacted, University of Chicago doctoral student Wen-Hsien Chen expressed doubt that
they would. Chen, supra note 139, at 295. But the 1940 Nationality Act’s jus sanguinis
provisions replaced the 1934 Act six years later, and was made retroactive to those children
whose citizenship would have been determined under the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Matter of V—
V—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 122 (B.I.A. 1956). Hence, the law’s lifespan was very short.
See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 226, at 13-14.
To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States into a Comprehensive Nationality
Code: Hearings on H.R. 6127 & H.R. 9980 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 76th Cong. 40-41 (1940) (statement of Richard W. Flournoy, Ass’t Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State).
Id. at 41.
See Letter from John J. Scanlan to Ruth Shipley, Chief, Passport Div., U.S. Dep’t of State 1
(Mar. 7, 1936) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130) (observing that “the Act of May 24,
1934, will increase tremendously the number of cases involving dual nationality”); see also
Letter from Wilbur J. Carr, Ass’t Sec’y of State, to Rep. Samuel Dickstein, Chair, H. Comm.
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about the breakdown of the carefully crafted ethno-racial limitations on
immigration and naturalization was prevalent among administrators and
legislators who resisted gender equality in American jus sanguinis citizenship
law. In short, as women’s organizations and their allies in Congress pressed for
gender equality in nationality law, it became apparent that gender- and
marriage-based restrictions on parent-child citizenship transmission were
serving racially exclusionary ends.
2. Nonmarital Children of American Fathers and the Proposed Code
If the felt need to protect nativist immigration policies helps explain
resistance to extension of jus sanguinis citizenship to the children of married
American mothers, it also helps explain officials’ particular resistance to
recognizing the nonmarital foreign-born children of American fathers as
citizens. In the 1920s and 1930s, questions regarding the citizenship status of
mixed-race and non-white nonmarital children of American fathers was a
source of confusion and consternation among officials residing abroad and
administrators in Washington, D.C. The Department of State frequently
received inquiries from members of the Foreign Service concerning the
citizenship status of foreign-born mixed-race children of American fathers. In
1928, the Department received a letter from the consul in Calcutta concerning
“the illegitimate child of an American father and Burmese mother.”247 In 1933, a
dispatch from an American official in Tahiti inquired as to the citizenship of an
“illegitimate child born at Tahiti of [an] American father . . . and [a] Tahitian
girl . . . who has an admixture of about one-eighth white blood.”248 In 1935, the
Department received an application for citizenship from a child born out of
wedlock to an American citizen father and a Haitian mother.249 And, as detailed

247.
248.
249.

on Immigration and Naturalization, reprinted in H.R. 3673 Hearings, supra note 231, at 9, 9
(“It is hardly necessary to say that, when a woman having American nationality marries a
man having the nationality of a foreign country, and establishes her home with him in his
country, the national character of that country is likely to be stamped upon the children, so
that from the standpoint of the United States they are essentially alien in character.”).
Letter from R.Y. Jarvis, Am. Consulate, Calcutta, India, to the Sec’y of State (Sept. 4, 1928)
(on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130).
Document File Note, Pomare Hitu Aitu Stevenson (June 5, 1933) (on file with NARA, RG
59, CDF 131).
Document File Note, Maybelle Harris (July 17, 1935) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131).
These examples are representative. See Document File Note, William James (Dec. 18, 1936)
(child of American father and Chinese mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131);
Document File Note, Melvin Louis Marr (Dec. 11, 1935) (American father and Japanese
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above, concern that jus sanguinis citizenship was being used to evade the racebased exclusion laws had been voiced by the Bureau of Immigration in
multiple contexts, including Ng Suey Hi, Louie Wah You, and Chin Suey.250
The rule that only marital foreign-born children of American fathers would
be recognized as citizens had provided an easy answer to some of those
inquiries. For example, regarding the suggestion that the nonmarital child of
an American father and a Burmese mother had a claim to American citizenship,
the Department of State official noted tersely that “it is clear the child referred
to in the despatch cannot claim American citizenship.”251 Similarly, the
daughter of the American father and the Haitian mother was not a citizen
because, even though acknowledged by her father, “it is evident that Miss
Harris has not been legitimated.”252 And, as shown above, limitations on
father-child citizenship transmission outside the legally recognized marital
family had served Bureau of Immigration officials well in their effort to enforce
the exclusion laws against foreign-born children of Chinese American
fathers.253

250.
251.
252.
253.

mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131); Document File Note, Kow Vaughan Read
(Sept. 5, 1935) (American father and Chinese mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF
131); Document File Note, Opal Ione Ogden (July 19, 1935) (American father and Tibetan
mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131); Document File Note, Helen Johnson (Dec.
18, 1934) (American father and Filipino mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131);
Document File Note, Masaki Sato Burt (Oct. 16, 1934) (American father and Japanese
mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131); Document File Note, Frank Henry Moss, Jr.
(Oct. 2, 1934) (American father and Japanese mother) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF
131).
See supra Section II.B.
Memorandum from Passport Div. to Visa Office, U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 26, 1928) (on
file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130).
Document File Note, Maybelle Harris, supra note 249.
See supra Section II.C. In certain circumstances the Department of State allowed the
“legitimation exception,” discussed above in Subsection II.C.2, to apply in cases involving
children who were otherwise racially excludable. See Document File Note, Alice Radomski
(May 14, 1916) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131) (noting that children legitimated
“under the state law of father’s domicile by the subsequent marriage of their parents are
regarded as United States citizens . . . even though mothers are Asiatic”). But this practice
was not uniformly embraced within the Department, as indicated by a memo in which one
Department official objected to the recognition of legitimized children “who possess such a
degree of Asiatic blood as would prevent them from being naturalized.” Memorandum from
Richard Hill, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Lester Woolsey, Solicitor, U.S.
Dep’t of State 3 (Jan. 3, 1918) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 130). The official also urged
that the Department should require legitimation-by-marriage “even where by the law of the
state of his domicile such recognition would have the effect of legitimizing his children . . .
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In 1938 the interdepartmental committee proposed codifying the
modernized version of the Guyer rule: nonmarital foreign-born children of
American fathers would not be recognized as citizens unless and until they had
been legitimated by the father.254 Modeled after the Department of State’s
legitimation exception—which the report cited—this provision liberalized the
absolute prohibition of citizenship transmission by fathers outside marriage
that the Bureau of Immigration had favored in litigation over the citizenship
claims of children of Chinese American fathers. But adopting the Department
of State’s legitimation exception marked a departure from the Guyer rule, not
its complete repudiation, as the exception largely maintained marriage as a
requirement of father-child citizenship transmission. In 1938, as in the 1920s,
in the majority of states the only way a father could fully legitimate his child
was to marry the mother.255 Accordingly, by requiring legitimation, the
Proposed Code—and the Nationality Act that transformed the Code into law—
maintained marriage as the key to father-child citizenship transmission in most
instances.256 The legitimation requirement was race neutral on its face, but

254.
255.

256.

especially in cases where they are born of an Asiatic mother.” Id. at 3-4.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 226, at 17.
4 VERNIER, supra note 127, § 242, at 154 (“The prevailing type of statute, found in forty-eight
jurisdictions, permits the child to become legitimate if the parents subsequently intermarry
. . . .”). By the late 1930s, many states allowed legitimation-by-acknowledgment, but these
alternative methods of legitimation were often of limited legal significance. See id. § 244, at
178-80 (noting that most legitimation-by-acknowledgment procedures served the limited
purpose of allowing the child to inherit from the father). Courts were wary of this new
method of legitimation, and interpreted these statutes narrowly. See GROSSBERG, supra note
52, at 376 n.53. Most important, officials in the Department of State rejected the notion that
legitimation-by-acknowledgment satisfied the Nationality Act’s legitimation requirement.
See infra note 256.
See, e.g., Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of State to Am. Consulate Gen., Austl. 2 (Aug. 18,
1944) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131) (“The Department has never taken the view
that mere acknowledgment or recognition of an illegitimate foreign-born child by the
putative American father was sufficient to make the child an American citizen under [pre1940 law] or under the . . . Nationality Act of 1940 . . . .”). The Nationality Act of 1940 also
provided that the American father’s nonmarital foreign-born child would be recognized as a
citizen if paternity was established by “adjudication of a competent court.” Nationality Act
of 1940, ch. 876, § 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1139-40. The “adjudication” provision was rarely used
successfully to secure citizenship for a foreign-born child, as it was narrowly construed by
officials in the Department of State. Correspondence between Department officials,
American foreign-service officers, and foreign officials make clear that the Department of
State insisted on a formal, adversarial style adjudication of paternity, even in foreign
jurisdictions where voluntary acknowledgment before an official or a judge was sufficient to
formally legitimize the child under that country’s law and where no process of adjudication
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administrators incorporated state law restrictions on marriage into federal
nationality law,257 including bans on interracial marriage, as well as the racesalient non-recognition practices of the sort developed by the Department of
State in the case of Aviga Chapin and the Bureau of Immigration in the
exclusion law cases. As I discuss below, those limitations on marriage would
play a significant role in the exclusion of Amerasian children from citizenship
in the mid and late twentieth centuries, as the United States deployed
hundreds of thousands of soldiers to Asia.258
3. The Maternalist Exception: Nonmarital Children of American Mothers
Before turning to the wartime operation of jus sanguinis citizenship laws, it
is important to consider the dramatic gender asymmetry in the Nationality
Act’s regulation of citizenship of nonmarital foreign-born children. Although
the Act restricted father-child citizenship transmission for nonmarital children,
it provided for automatic transmission of citizenship between American
mothers and their nonmarital foreign-born children, contingent on a very
liberal maternal residency requirement.259 Why the special solicitude for the
nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers?
As is true of the limitations imposed on citizenship transmission between
American fathers and their nonmarital foreign-born children, the generous
recognition of nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers found in
the Nationality Act originated in the prior practices of administrators.
Administrative recognition of nonmarital foreign-born children of American
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was available. See Airgram from Acheson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Am. Consul, Bremen, Ger.
(Sept. 3, 1946) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131) (noting that an action to establish
paternity must be brought in a “competent court” in the state or country of the child’s or
father’s domicile that “has full authority to hear and pass judgement in actions to determine
paternity”); Telegram from Acheson, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Am. Consul, Nouméa, New
Caledonia (Oct. 25, 1946) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131) (“Mere recognition by
American father child born out wedlock alien mother not sufficient establish paternity of
child . . . .”); Airgram from Marshall, U.S. Dep’t of State, to U.S. Embassy, Brussels, Belg.
(May 5, 1947) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131) (describing the “[f]act that Belgian
authorities regard voluntary acknowledgment by the father as having same legal value as a
judgement inducing forced acknowledgment” as “not material”).
At the end of World War II, thirty states had laws that banned at least some forms of
interracial marriage. See PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE,
MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 253 (2002).
See infra Section III.B.
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140.
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mothers as citizens began before 1934, the year that Congress first granted
women the right to transmit citizenship to their children. Hence, the
recognition of such children as citizens represented a departure from the pre1934 statute.260 The interdepartmental committee that drafted the 1938
Proposed Code was aware of the practice, explaining to Congress that the
Department of State had “uniformly held that an illegitimate child born abroad
of an American mother acquires at birth the nationality of the mother.”261 The
Proposed Code suggested codifying this practice: “[I]f the mother had the
nationality of the United States at the time of the child’s birth, and had
previously resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, [the
child] shall be held to have acquired at birth her nationality status.”262 When
Congress passed the Nationality Act, it adopted the language of the Proposed
Code verbatim.263
One way to understand the solicitude shown for the nonmarital foreignborn children of American mothers is as a product of the gender-asymmetrical
common law principles that also shaped (and restricted) citizenship
transmission between a father and his nonmarital child.264 If the default rule
that nonmarital children of American fathers were not citizens found support
in the common law rules that refused recognition of the father-child
relationship outside marriage for status determinations, the corollary that
outside marriage the child’s citizenship status followed that of the mother also
found support in American common law.265 There is certainly evidence that
administrators who endorsed the practice drew on such principles. For
example, the drafters of the Proposed Code explained the recognition of unwed
mothers’ foreign-born children as citizens using the formalized (and genderbased) logic of the common law: it was premised on the longstanding domestic
relations law principle that “the mother in such a case stands in the place of the
father.”266

260.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (“[Only children] whose fathers were or
shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed . . . citizens of
the United States.”).
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 226, at 18.
Id. at 17.
Nationality Act §§ 201-205.
See generally Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra note 4.
Id. at 1693.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 226, at 18.
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But fidelity to common law principles provides only a partial explanation
for the administrators’ behavior. Although the maternal line rule had a long
pedigree in American law for purposes of determining other forms of status—
such as domicile, slave status, and racial status—its application in the context
of jus sanguinis citizenship appears to have originated in the early twentieth
century. Why then? The historical sources suggest that administrators’
recognition of mother-child citizenship transmission outside marriage was
animated by the powerful maternalist norms that shaped early twentiethcentury American social policy. At their core, maternalist social policies were
committed to supporting women as mothers, as reflected in a wave of state law
Mothers’ Aid statutes in the 1910s and, at the federal level, the creation of the
Children’s Bureau in 1912, the enactment of the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921,
and the creation of Aid to Dependent Children in the Social Security Act of
1935.267 As such, many of the laws and policies that maternalist activists and
reformers instituted were also deeply gendered, as they were premised on the
view that mothers were the natural caregivers of children.268
In the particular context of jus sanguinis citizenship law, the maternalist
turn largely originated in the practices of front-line administrators in the
Bureau of Immigration. Although questions concerning the citizenship status
of nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers arose in several
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For a discussion of the Mothers’ Aid statutes of the 1910s, see LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT
NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 37-64
(1994); see also Maternity and Infancy (Sheppard-Towner) Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921);
Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 402, 49 Stat. 620, 627-28 (1935) (aid to dependent children);
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. The legacy of maternalist
programs is mixed, as such programs were often woefully underfunded and led to unwanted
government involvement in the lives of the mothers they tried to help. See MIMI
ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 202 (1988); GORDON, supra; MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK:
WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE, 1890-1930, at 148-66 (1994); SUZANNE METTLER,
DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998); THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1992). Although many early twentieth-century maternalist
programs and institutions focused their efforts on abandoned and widowed mothers—
worthy mothers—maternalist policy makers were also intent on addressing the plight of
unwed mothers and their children. At the federal level, that initiative was led by the
Children’s Bureau, which commissioned important studies on the economic and legal status
of nonmarital children and supported legislation intended to improve their well-being. See
GROSSBERG, supra note 52, at 196-233; LADD-TAYLOR, supra, at 74-103; SUSAN TIFFIN, IN
WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 166-86 (1982).
See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 267, at 3.
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contexts, the issue was especially pressing at crossings along the U.S.-Canadian
border. In the 1920s, if not earlier, immigration officials on both sides of that
border began recognizing the nonmarital foreign-born children of American
and Canadian mothers as citizens of the mother’s country. Despite the lack of
authorizing legislation in either country, this practice was memorialized in a
cross-border reciprocal agreement in which officials of both countries agreed
that the minor foreign-born child of an American or Canadian unwed mother
would be recognized as a citizen by the mother’s country—and allowed to cross
the border.269
Because recognition of nonmarital foreign-born children of American
mothers as citizens marked a departure from the jus sanguinis citizenship
statute, immigration administrators were frequently pressed to defend the
policy, especially as some of the children would have been denied entry under
the race-based exclusion laws or national origins quotas. In fact, in the late
1920s, that very issue arose in a series of cases involving Canadian and
American mothers seeking to return home with a nonmarital child in tow.270
The cross-border agreement almost fell apart when American border officials
questioned whether such children should be recognized as citizens if they were
of a race “ineligible to citizenship.”271
In the case of nonmarital children of American mothers, the practical
problem of who would take responsibility for those children, and concern
about the costs and public relations embarrassment that could result if border
officials separated children from their mothers, appear to have trumped
concerns about the evasion of race-based exclusion laws and national origins
quotas. Memo after memo explaining and defending the cross-border
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Numerous memoranda refer to this cross-border agreement between Canadian and
American officials. See, e.g., Letter from A.L. Jolliffee, Comm’r, Canadian Dep’t. of
Immigration and Colonization, to H.R. Landis, U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal,
Can. (Jan. 3, 1928) (on file with NARA, RG 85); Letter from H.R. Landis, U.S. Comm’r of
Immigration, Montreal, Can., to Harry E. Hull, Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration
(Oct. 9, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85); see also Memorandum from Harry E. Hull,
Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to All Comm’rs & Dist. Dirs. of Immigration
(Nov. 8, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
See sources cited supra note 269.
See, e.g., Memorandum from C.A. Palmer, Dist. Dir., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, Spokane,
Wash., to Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration (Mar. 28, 1929) (on file with NARA,
RG 85) (noting that “the so-called reciprocal agreement, insofar as it relates to Chinese
persons, will cease to be operative”); Memorandum from John L. Zurbrick, Dist. Dir., U.S.
Bureau of Immigration, Detroit, Mich., to Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration (Apr.
1, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85) (reaching the same conclusion).
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agreement reveals U.S. officials’ nearly uniform view that it was only practical
to keep mothers and their nonmarital children together, as mothers were the
presumed caretakers of such children. In 1929, the Commissioner General of
the Bureau of Immigration explained that “the only purpose [for the rule] . . .
is to provide against the separation of mothers and children.”272 “It can well be
foreseen,” explained one Bureau official, “that much distress and possible
criticism would result if enforced separations of mothers and children were
occasioned by the attitude which has been assumed by the Canadian
Government and our own in dealing with the question.”273 No such distress
and criticism attended the rule that recognized only marital or legitimated
children of American fathers as citizens, for, as all agreed, “as a practical matter,
it is well known that almost invariably it is the mother who concerns herself
with [the illegitimate] child.”274
How are we to understand administrators’ willingness to recognize
foreign-born children of American mothers as citizens? The fact that such
recognition allowed some children who would have been subject to the
exclusion laws to enter the United States—and to be recognized as citizens—
certainly gave rise to concern among some officials. But the documents
recording the back and forth between Canadian and American officials do not
register anxiety that such practices would significantly compromise the system
of racial exclusion laws. One very likely reason is that, given the reciprocal
nature of the cross-border agreement, American officials were faced with the
possibility that, unless they allowed American mothers to bring their children
into the United States—even if the child was racially excludable—the Canadian
border officials would refuse to allow Canadian mothers and their children to
cross the border into Canada.275 As one Canadian official reminded his
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Letter from Harry E. Hull, Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to T.M. Ross,
Acting U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can. (Nov. 8, 1929) (on file with NARA,
RG 85).
Letter from Irving F. Wixon, Acting Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to T.M.
Ross, Acting U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can. (Sept. 21, 1929) (on file with
NARA, RG 85). The affirmative reply by the Canadian Department of Immigration and
Colonization echoed the concern that the failure to allow nonmarital children to cross the
border with their mothers would “result in much distress and possible criticism.” Letter
from A.L. Jolliffe, Canadian Dep’t of Immigration & Colonization, to T.M. Ross, Acting
U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can. (Oct. 12, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
Memorandum from John J. Scanlan to Ruth Shipley, supra note 246, at 6.
This concern was not hypothetical. Someone in the Bureau of Immigration saw fit to save a
newspaper clipping from the Toronto Star that reported the refusal of Canadian border
officials to allow an (apparently unwed) Canadian mother to bring her baby over the border
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counterpart in the Bureau of Immigration, some of those mothers and children
would have been ineligible to enter Canada, which also had racial exclusion
laws and other immigration restrictions.276 Given this, denying entry to
otherwise excludable children of American mothers may not have effectively
served the ends of America’s restrictions on immigration. In addition, in the
early twentieth century, single women likely traveled and resided
internationally with much less frequency than men or married women.277 With
that in mind, it is understandable that recognition of the foreign-born
nonmarital children of American mothers as citizens generated little concern
about massive evasion of the exclusionary laws, in contrast to other proposals
to introduce gender equality into jus sanguinis citizenship.278 Given these
circumstances, the relatively low-level officials faced with an unwed American
mother attempting to return to the United States with her child reasoned
comfortably from the maternalist premises that characterized early twentiethcentury social policy more generally, lamenting the fact that compliance with
the jus sanguinis statute would result in “separation of mothers and
children.”279
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after giving birth to the baby in New York. See Treatment of Aliens, TORONTO STAR, n.d. (on
file with NARA, RG 85).
See Letter from A.L. Jolliffe, Canadian Dep’t of Immigration & Colonization, to N.R.
Landis, U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can. (Jan. 3, 1928) (on file with NARA,
RG 85) (“[I]t must be kept in mind that American illegitimate children would not be any
more admissible to Canada under Canadian law than would Canadian-born illegitimate
children be admissible to the United States under United States law.”); Letter from A.L.
Jolliffe, Canadian Dep’t of Immigration & Colonization, to N.R. Landis, U.S. Comm’r of
Immigration, Montreal, Can. 1 (June 24, 1929) (“[I]t is most likely that in a number of cases
illegitimate children could not fully comply with the provisions of the [Canadian]
Immigration Act . . . .”); see also Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1923, c. 38, §§ 5-9 (Can.);
PETER S. LI, THE CHINESE IN CANADA (2d ed. 1998).
Although estimating the numbers of Americans residing abroad is fraught with difficulties,
it is fair to assume that one of the largest groups of Americans residing abroad in the early
twentieth century was servicemen. See supra note 91. During the same period, records
compiled by the Bureau of Immigration show that in the early 1900s, two times as many
men as women left the United States by ship. See 1 WALTER F. WILLCOX, INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATIONS: STATISTICS 471 tbl.XIV (1929). To my knowledge, no reliable data has been
compiled that divides travelers or residents abroad by marital status, but the available data
suggests that unmarried women were unlikely to have made up a substantial portion of
Americans traveling and residing abroad.
On the concern that recognition of married American mothers’ ability to transmit
citizenship would lead to a breakdown of the racial exclusion laws, see supra Subsection
III.A.1.
Letter from Harry E. Hull, Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to T.M. Ross,
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With a general consensus among administrators that nonmarital foreignborn children should remain with their American mothers, the
interdepartmental committee incorporated the longstanding practice of
recognizing those children as citizens in the Proposed Code. In 1939, when the
issue came to the attention of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins—herself a
dedicated maternalist—she agreed, opining that “steps should be taken to
avoid subjecting these unfortunate individuals to unnecessary hardships.”280
Attorney General Frank Murphy concurred, noting that “exclusion of [such]
children is not only harsh, but largely impracticable.”281 Both agreed that the
pending nationality bill should codify the administrative practice of
recognizing the nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers as
citizens.282 In short, the historical record reveals that the pronounced gender
asymmetry of the Nationality Act’s treatment of nonmarital foreign-born
children of American mothers and fathers was shaped by contemporary
maternalist norms regarding the mother’s relationship with her nonmarital
child—and the father’s lack of such a relationship.283
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Acting U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can. (Nov. 8, 1929) (on file with NARA,
RG 85).
Letter Regarding Leah Skousen O’Donnell from Frances Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, to Cordell
Hull, Sec’y of State 3 (Mar. 15, 1939) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
Letter Regarding Leah Skousen O’Donnell from Frank Murphy, Att’y Gen., to Cordell Hull,
Sec’y of State 2 (May 10, 1939) (on file with NARA, RG 85).
Id.; Letter from Frances Perkins, to Cordell Hull, supra note 280, at 3.
Although the archival sources demonstrate the maternalist inclinations of administrators’
recognition of nonmarital children of American mothers as citizens, the sources say little
about officials’ concern about the risk of statelessness for such children—an explanation
that, today, government lawyers have offered in their defense of the constitutionality of the
modern parent-child derivative citizenship statute. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 2324, Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (No. 09-5801) (arguing that § 1409
was enacted to prevent the potential statelessness of foreign-born nonmarital children of
U.S citizen mothers caused by the interplay of the American jus soli rule and the jus sanguinis
rules of many other nations). A full exposition of this subject is well beyond the scope of this
Article, but it bears noting that in the many hundreds of pre-1940 administrative memos I
have read that defend or explain recognition of the nonmarital foreign-born children of
American mothers as citizens, I have identified exactly one memo by a U.S. official that
mentions the risk of statelessness for the foreign-born nonmarital children of American
mothers as a concern. See Memorandum from Green Hackworth, Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Dep’t of State, to Richard Flournoy, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug.
14, 1928) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131). This does not mean that statelessness did
not become a concern for administrators; that is an issue meriting further attention. It does
mean that the archival sources providing the best insight into why administrators initially
recognized foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers as citizens—and why
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The fact that administrators were willing to allow mother-child citizenship
transmission for children born out of wedlock, even when the child was racially
excludable, does not mean that the gender-asymmetrical regulation of jus
sanguinis citizenship was not a racially nativist practice.284 Administrators’
willingness to accommodate the foreign-born children of unwed American
mothers stands out as an exception in the historical record. That record reveals
officials’ commitment to the concept of gender-based “family unity” in
nationality law and their commitment to maintaining the racially nativist
policies that had been a core component of American nationality law for over a
century and a half. In the minds of many administrators, those gender- and
race-based policies were interconnected. Introducing gender equality in jus
sanguinis citizenship by allowing married American mothers and unwed fathers
to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children would defeat the core
purpose of the exclusionary and quota-based regulations: the exclusion or
limited admittance of ethno-racial groups that had been deemed inferior or
inassimilable. The significantly expanded parent and child residency
requirements found in the Nationality Act were added in part to ensure the
integrity of the racial bars and national origins quotas that, in the minds of
some administrators, had been compromised by granting married mothers the
right to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. Most important for
present purposes, as with pre-1940 practice, the Nationality Act of 1940 largely
maintained marriage as a key to citizenship for foreign-born children of
American fathers and, in so doing, the Act incorporated state laws barring
interracial marriage and race-salient non-recognition rules into federal
nationality law. For the foreign-born children of American fathers, the racially
exclusionary operation of this constellation of domestic relations and
nationality laws assumed new importance—and took on new dimensions—as
the United States went to war.

284.

those practices were codified in the Nationality Act of 1940—do not support the contention
that concerns about statelessness significantly motivated the initial development of the rule.
The use of gender- and marriage-based regulations to determine children’s status, such as
slave status, always had a Janus-faced quality. Under the maternal line rule, children of free
mothers and enslaved fathers were free, while children of free fathers and slave women were
not. However, it would be absurd to suggest that the law of slavery as practiced in the
United States was not a system of racial servitude simply because some children of African
descent were born free. Notably, the analogy with the maternal line rule as it operated in
slave law to determine children’s status as slave or free was occasionally used by
immigration officials wrestling with the citizenship status of nonmarital foreign-born
children of American mothers. See Risley Memorandum, supra note 67, at 7.
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B. The Guyer Rule at War: War Brides, War Babies, and “Bui Doi”
The Nationality Act of 1940 was not a war measure in the traditional sense,
as it was not drafted in anticipation of the United States’s entry into World
War II.285 However, shortly after the statute’s enactment, the wartime
deployment of American soldiers to battlefields—both within and beyond
“Christendom”—led to the births of inestimable numbers of foreign-born
children to American fathers. In this Section, I demonstrate how the
modernized Guyer rule—the default rule that nonmarital foreign-born children
of American fathers were not citizens—operated in combination with the racebased citizenship laws and the marriage and fraternization policies of the
United States military during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam
War.286 Under the Nationality Act of 1940, state marriage laws were important
in determining the legitimacy of the foreign-born child of an American father,
and hence the child’s citizenship status, as the statute directed that the laws of
the father’s “domicile” would be used to determine the child’s legitimacy.287
But for the men who were stationed abroad as soldiers, and the children they
fathered while there, the military policies that governed the marital and sexual
practices of soldiers were just as significant and, as I explain below, further
amplified the impact of state law bans on interracial marriage. Even a brief
analysis of the United States’s welcoming treatment of children born to
American soldiers and their European “war brides” during World War II—and
its resistance to marriages between American soldiers and their Asian
girlfriends during that war, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War—
demonstrates an essential point: the limitations on father-child jus sanguinis
citizenship for nonmarital children continued to be used to exclude nonwhite
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See The Urgent Need of Adopting the Nationality Code 7 (Aug. 30, 1940) (on file with
NARA, RG 46, SEN 76A-E5) (noting that officials had “for many years been convinced that
there is a great need of revising the nationality laws”).
A handful of historians have recently turned their attention to military marriage and
fraternization policies as important sites of the legal regulation of race, sexuality, and
gender. See KATHARINE H.S. MOON, SEX AMONG ALLIES: MILITARY PROSTITUTION IN U.S.KOREA RELATIONS (1997); SUSAN ZEIGER, ENTANGLING ALLIANCES: FOREIGN WAR BRIDES
AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2010). Until recently, few legal
scholars had given race-based military marriage policies the attention they deserve, but that
has begun to change with the important contributions of Nancy Ota and Rose Cuison
Villazor. See Nancy K. Ota, Flying Buttresses, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 693 (2000); Villazor, supra
note 6. The historian Linda Kerber has examined the phenomenon of the “boi dui” in
relation to citizenship law in Kerber, Birthright Citizenship, supra note 6, at 261-63.
See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201-205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40.
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children from citizenship and thus served a racially nativist nation-building
project.
Take the much-celebrated European “war brides” and “war babies” of
World War II. During and following World War II, the military often
encouraged soldiers to wed their European girlfriends with whom they had
fathered children, and Congress provided the soldiers’ non-excludable war
brides and children with special immigration status through the War Brides
Acts.288 Congress funded a massive initiative to bring the European war
brides—and their many babies—“home” to the United States,289 and the Red
Cross established “war brides’ schools” to help ease these women’s transition
into American society and prepare them to raise a new generation of citizens.
But, as Susan Zeiger has chronicled in great detail, neither the military nor
Congress was welcoming to all overseas girlfriends, fiancées, and wives of
American soldiers—or the children they fathered with those women. The War
Brides Acts specifically excluded women who were “ineligible to citizenship”
because of their race, and the promise of preferential immigration status was
denied those women.290
The racial prohibitions incorporated into the War Brides Acts meant not
only that a soldier could not bring his racially excludable wife home, but also—
pursuant to explicit military policy—that the soldier would not likely be given

288.

289.
290.

See War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945) (providing non-quota immigrant status to
non-excludable alien spouses and minor children of members of the armed forces serving
during World War II); G.I. Fiancées Act, ch. 520, 60 Stat. 339 (1946) (providing special
immigration status to the non-excludable fiancées and fiancés of World War II armed
services members). Although British war brides were the most celebrated, immigration
preferences and support networks were also extended to other non-excludable war brides.
See ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 90-94.
ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 131-40.
War Brides Act § 1 (excluding brides inadmissible under immigration laws from preferences
provided in Act); see also Villazor, supra note 6, at 1405-07 (describing the “racialized and
gendered limitations” of the War Brides Act). In 1943, in light of the fact that China had
become an ally, Congress amended the exclusion laws so that individuals of Chinese descent
were no longer “ineligible to citizenship.” See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 600,
601 (repealing Chinese Exclusion Acts). Accordingly, Chinese women married to American
citizens were not excluded from the War Brides Acts, as were Japanese and most other Asian
women. But for Chinese women married to American men who were not soldiers, entrance
to the United States remained very difficult because of the extremely low quota for Chinese
immigration (105 per year). Accordingly, Chinese Americans had to lobby Congress for
special legislation to allow the Chinese spouses of American citizens to enter the country on
a non-quota basis. See Act of Aug. 9, 1946, ch. 945, 60 Stat. 975.
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permission to marry his racially excludable girlfriend in the first place.291
Starting in 1939, every member of the military stationed abroad was required
to obtain permission from his superiors to marry.292 The work of Nancy Ota
and Rose Cuison Villazor shows that, as a general matter, permission to marry
was to be given liberally, but official military policy counseled against giving
permission in cases where the soldier sought to marry outside his race.293
Because of racially restrictive immigration law and state law restrictions on
interracial marriage, the military contended, marriage to a racially excludable
woman was likely to fail because the soldier would be unable to take his bride
home to the United States.294 Given the Nationality Act’s requirement that
only legitimate or legitimated foreign-born children of American fathers were
recognized as citizens—and that legitimation generally required marriage—the
military’s restrictions on interracial marriage amplified the reach of state laws
banning interracial marriage. In turn, the military ban on interracial marriage
had obvious implications for the many children born out of wedlock to
American soldiers and Asian women: under the rules governing father-child
citizenship transmission, they were excluded from citizenship.
In 1947, Congress provided a brief amnesty from the racially restrictive
policy on the immigration of Asian war brides that allowed them to enter the
United States under the permissive terms of the War Brides Act if they were
married within thirty days.295 But the 1947 Act was a temporary concession and

291.

292.

293.
294.
295.

See Villazor, supra note 6, at 1401 (discussing the implementation of World War II military
regulations requiring soldiers stationed abroad to obtain permission to marry); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF ARMY & AIR FORCE SPEC. REG. NO. 600-240-5, C-1, PERSONNEL—MARRIAGE IN
OVERSEA COMMANDS (Jan. 17, 1951) (“In cases of marriage between citizens of the United
States in the Territories and insular possessions of the United States . . . the regulations
governing granting permission to marry, may, in the discretion of the commanders
concerned, be declared inapplicable.”); U.S. WAR DEP’T, CIRCULAR NO. 179, § 1 (June 8,
1942) (“No military personnel on duty in any foreign country or possession may marry
without the approval of the commanding officer of the United States Army forces stationed
in such foreign country or possession.”).
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. NO. 600-750, PERSONNEL—RECRUITING FOR THE ARMY AND
THE REGULAR RESERVE 7 (Apr. 10, 1939). See generally Ross W. Branstetter, Military
Constraints upon Marriages of Service Members Overseas, or If the Army Had Wanted You to
Have a Wife . . . , 102 MIL. L. REV. 5 (1983) (discussing the development of the Army’s
regulation of marriage by enlisted soldiers).
See Ota, supra note 286, at 721-22; Villazor, supra note 6, at 1407-11.
See ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 181; Villazor, supra note 6, at 1407-11.
See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1947, ch. 289, 61 Stat. 401 (“The alien spouse of an American citizen
by a marriage occurring before thirty days after the enactment of this Act, shall not be
considered as inadmissible because of race, if otherwise admissible under this Act.”); see also
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did not overcome the military’s policy against interracial marriages between
American soldiers and Asian women.296 Moreover, the 1947 Act did not clarify
the status of the many children born abroad to American soldiers and their
Asian wives prior to marriage. In an urgent telegram sent to the Department of
State several months after the 1947 Act was passed, the American Consul in
Yokohama asked for guidance concerning the citizenship status of the
“[c]onsiderable numbers of children born to service personnel prior to
marriage of American citizen husbands to Japanese wives.”297 Although the
soldiers’ “alien wives” were admissible under the 1947 Act, “apparently alien
children ineligible [to] citizenship [are] not admissible under those acts,” the
consul explained, and it was “[t]hus essential [to] determine whether [a] child
[was] legitimated by subsequent marriage and therefore [was an] American
citizen prior to departure.”298
In a responding airgram, intended to help American officials in Japan with
this process, Department of State officials noted the states in which
legitimation was effected by the marriage of the parents, but cautioned that
“certain States forbid marriage between certain races.”299 If the husband’s
home state would not recognize his marriage, the marriage could not provide
the basis for a child’s legitimation under the Nationality Act, which explicitly
required that the child be legitimated under the laws of the father’s domicile.300
Moreover, when the temporary exemption from race-based exclusion laws
expired, it left in place a military policy that effectively banned interracial
marriage in many countries where American soldiers were stationed, which
thwarted the marriage plans of many couples. The children born to such
unions, along with the thousands of other children born out of wedlock to
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297.
298.
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ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 181-82 (noting the act).
In a telegram to the American officials in Japan written six months after the 1947 statute was
enacted, the Department of State queried whether the “military authorities [could be]
persuaded to withdraw for humanitarian reasons objection to certification of these
marriages” between American soldiers and Japanese women. Telegram from Marshall, U.S.
Dep’t of State, to Yokohama Branch, Office of the U.S. Political Adviser, Yokohama, Jap.
(Nov. 12, 1947) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131).
Telegram from Johnson, Yokohama Branch, Office of U.S. Political Adviser, Yokohama,
Jap., to U.S. Sec’y of State (Nov. 12, 1947) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131).
Id.
Letter from Lovett, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Yokohama Branch, Office of U.S. Political
Adviser, Yokohama, Jap. (Dec. 8, 1947) (on file with NARA, RG 59, CDF 131).
See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201-205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40.
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American soldiers and Asian women during World War II and its aftermath,
were excluded from citizenship.301
In 1952 Congress eliminated all explicit race-based exclusions from
American nationality law, and thirteen years later, it removed all national
origins quotas, thus lifting a significant barrier to the immigration of Asian
wives of American servicemen.302 In 1967 the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional all laws banning interracial marriage.303 But the marriage and
legitimation requirements in the jus sanguinis citizenship statute—by then
recodified in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act304—continued to serve
as a race-salient limitation on the recognition of American soldiers’ foreignborn children as citizens. Soldiers’ interracial marriages were no longer illegal
(or presumed illegal) under state law, but military officials continued to
discourage soldiers from marrying local women in many of the Asian countries
where American troops were stationed. For example, as Zeiger demonstrates,
during the Vietnam War the military “vigorously and systematically
discouraged marriage for American service personnel in Vietnam, placing a
wide array of bureaucratic and financial obstacles in front of marriage
aspirants.”305 Instead, drawing on a set of conventions and practices that had
emerged during the Korean War, the military encouraged nonmarital sexual
liaisons between American soldiers and local women, including long-term
“contract” arrangements.306 The children born to such relationships were
illegitimate and hence not American citizens. Unlike in World War II Europe,
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On the experiences of mixed-race children of American soldiers in Japan, see YUKIKO
KOSHIRO, TRANS-PACIFIC RACISMS AND THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 156-58 (1999); and
William R. Burkhardt, Institutional Barriers, Marginality, and Adaptation Among the
American-Japanese Mixed Bloods in Japan, 42 J. ASIAN STUD. 519 (1983).
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(eliminating race as a bar to immigration); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (ending the national origins quota system).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 301(a)(7), 309.
ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 222. Zeiger describes official military policies that thwarted
marriage between U.S. soldiers and Vietnamese women. See id. at 222-24.
See Bruce Cumings, Silent but Deadly: Sexual Subordination in the U.S.-Korean Relationship,
in LET THE GOOD TIMES ROLL: PROSTITUTION AND THE U.S. MILITARY IN ASIA 169 (Saundra
Pollock Sturdevant & Brenda Stoltzfus eds., 1992). During the Vietnam War a culture of
prostitution—often facilitated by the U.S. military through the “R & R” program—often set
the stage for intimate encounters between U.S. servicemen and local women. See ZEIGER,
supra note 286, at 220-21. On “contract” arrangements between American soldiers and
Vietnamese women, see id. at 218-19.
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where military officials had frequently encouraged soldiers to marry their
pregnant English girlfriends, no pressure was used to encourage American
soldiers to marry the Vietnamese mothers of their children; no special ships
were commissioned to bring the soldiers’ new families “home,” and no “war
brides’ schools” were established to help these women adjust to American
life—or to raise a new generation of citizens.307
It is impossible to know how many children were born out of wedlock to
American soldiers stationed in Asia or elsewhere during the late twentieth
century.308 It is also impossible, of course, to determine the extent to which
legal and military policy barriers to marriage shaped the decisions of individual
soldiers and the women with whom they had relationships. For example,
despite these policies, many American soldiers did marry their Korean and
Vietnamese girlfriends—and legitimized their children in so doing.309 And even
when a child was born, presumably many couples would have opted out of
marriage regardless of the policies discouraging or prohibiting the
solemnization of their relationships.310
Nonetheless, the differences between the legitimacy and citizenship status
of children fathered by American soldiers in England circa 1945, Japan circa
1947, and Vietnam circa 1968 lay not just in the private choices of individuals
entangled by war, but also—and significantly—in the official race-based

307.
308.

309.

310.
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ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 85-87, 223-30.
Estimates vary significantly, from 20,000 to more than 200,000. See JOHN SHADE,
AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: THE AMERASIANS 15 (1981) (cataloguing estimates of the
number of Amerasian children born in Vietnam at between 20,000 and 100,000); Amerasian
Immigration Proposals: Hearing on S. 1698 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee
Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 63 (1982) (statement of Alfred Keane, Dir.,
Americans for International Aid) (estimating that there were between 30,000 and 80,000
Amerasian children in Southeast Asia) [hereinafter Amerasian Immigration Proposals]. John
Shade suggests that by 1952, over 200,000 children had been born in Japan to American
servicemen. SHADE, supra, at 24. If that is true, the number of children born to servicemen in
Asia in the second half of the twentieth century could be closer to 300,000.
ZEIGER, supra note 286, at 222 (noting that many Vietnamese-American couples managed to
marry during and after the war, despite determined efforts on the part of the military to
prevent such unions).
Although it is difficult to collect reliable data regarding the personal decision-making
processes of trans-national couples, social and financial pressures on an Asian woman to
marry the father of her child may have been significant, suggesting that in many instances
the choice not to marry would have been his, not hers. For examples of such scenarios
provided as testimony in Congress, see generally Amerasian Immigration Proposals, supra
note 308, at 45-63 (documents submitted by Alfred Keane, Dir., Americans for International
Aid).
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marriage and fraternization policies of the United States military and jus
sanguinis citizenship laws enacted by Congress.311 The combined operation of
those laws and policies undoubtedly shaped the marriage practices of American
soldiers stationed abroad and, on aggregate, helped determine the citizenship
status of children fathered by those soldiers: the predominantly white babies of
World War II soldiers became citizens and “baby boomers,” while a very
significant population of nonmarital Amerasian babies were excluded and
became “bui doi”—children of the dust.312
The plight of the “bui doi”—Amerasian children born to American soldiers
stationed in Asia—became a regular news item in the 1970s.313 And in the
1980s, under pressure from civil rights organizations, the racial operation of jus
sanguinis citizenship and its impact on the citizenship status of foreign-born
Amerasian children was eventually raised in Congress.314 In 1981,
Representatives Barney Frank and Patricia Schroeder introduced a bill that
would have provided an immigration preference and a fast track to citizenship
for Amerasian children born during periods of American military presence in
certain Asian countries.315 Testifying in support of the measure, Representative
Stewart McKinney explained:
Since 1950 the United States has sent hundreds of thousands of military
personnel to the Asian area with ramifications that are well known
around the world. However, little has been said or done concerning the
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One strategy for denying the state’s role in gender-discriminatory social practices is to
characterize those practices as a matter of “choice” or “custom,” rather than as the product of
state action. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078, 1113-18 (1994) (noting that
antebellum women’s rights activists contended that women’s economic dependence on their
husbands was a situation constructed and therefore remediable by state law).
On the connection between “bui doi” and the jus sanguinis provisions in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, see Kerber, Birthright Citizenship, supra note 6, at 255-66.
See, e.g., Leon Daniel, Mixed-Race Children: Legacies of War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1976, at C1;
Michael Kernan, Children with No Country: A Champion in Pearl Buck, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
1971, at B1; Ronald Yates, GIs Left Legacy of Tears in Asia, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1979, at B1;
4,000 Children Left by Americans Being Stripped of Thai Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1977,
at 22.
See LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 151-53, 156-58 (2012).
H.R. 808, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981); Immigration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 870
(1981) [hereinafter Immigration Reform]. The bill was initially introduced by Representative
Stewart McKinney in 1979, but it failed to pass. H.R. 3439, 96th Cong. (1st Sess. 1979).
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plight of the thousands of mixed-race children left behind in inhuman
social and political conditions by their U.S. fathers.316
Encountering significant resistance from Department of State officials,
Representative Schroeder quarreled with the notion that “the military can go
into foreign countries and do whatever they want, and they won’t be
responsible.”317 During the hearings on the bill, the committee demanded
documentary evidence of the military’s fraternization policies during the
Vietnam War, drawing a direct link between those policies and the creation of
an underclass of Amerasian children who, because of the requirements of the
jus sanguinis citizenship statute, were not recognized as American citizens.318
The bill initially failed, but when it was introduced again in 1982,
testimony offered at congressional hearings also drew the connection between
the limits on jus sanguinis citizenship and officials’ resistance to approving or
recognizing marriages between American soldiers and Asian women. An
immigration lawyer who testified at the hearings noted that resistance to such
marriages had tainted the bureaucratic procedures of Department of State
officials responsible for processing passport applications submitted by foreignborn children of American soldiers. She explained that many Amerasian
children left behind were, in fact, legitimate or legitimated by their parents’
marriages and were therefore “already entitled, under current law, to full U.S.
citizenship.”319 Recounting practices that bear a resemblance to the Bureau of
Immigration officials’ efforts to deny entry to the children of Chinese American
fathers based on inadequate evidence of their status, the attorney explained
that the Department of State had “refused in many cases to issue passports to
such Amerasian children,” placing the burden on the children to prove that the
documentary evidence of their parents’ marriage was not fraudulent.320 “This
heavy burden of proof is not required in cases arising out of Canada or Europe,
where the applicants are usually white,” she noted; “[r]ather, this
insurmountable burden of proof is applied solely in cases involving nonwhites,
and especially Asians.”321
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Immigration Reform, supra note 315, at 903 (testimony of Rep. Stewart B. McKinney).
Id. at 876 (statement of Rep. Patricia Schroeder); see also id. at 877 (“[Y]ou communicate to
the military people abroad that they can do whatever they want abroad and they pay
nothing for it.”).
See id. at 870-83, 890-902.
Amerasian Immigration Proposals, supra note 308, at 80 (testimony of attorney Judith Foster).
Id.
Id.
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Although efforts to secure citizenship for Amerasian children foundered in
Congress, legislators did enact an immigration preference for Amerasian
children from certain countries.322 As remarkable as even the partial recognition
of Amerasian children in American immigration law, however, was the fact that
the congressional debates leading up to that legislation contained explicit
acknowledgment of the racial operation of America’s gender-based jus sanguinis
citizenship principles and the government’s role in enacting policies that led to
the exclusion of Amerasian children from citizenship. Historically, recognition
of the racial operation of jus sanguinis citizenship has been selective at best.
Although the racial dimension of the “war baby” problem has long been
acknowledged in popular culture, the role of jus sanguinis citizenship laws in
the exclusion of those children from citizenship is rarely recognized, especially
by military officials, executive branch officials, and legislators. The racialized
operation of jus sanguinis citizenship laws has also been obscured in modern
debates concerning the continued gender-based regulation of jus sanguinis
citizenship—a point that I return to in Part IV.
C. On Nation Building, Nationality, and Family Law
The racially nativist commitments that animated American nationality law
for well over a century and a half are a well-studied phenomenon.323 What has
been largely overlooked, however, are the significant ways that domestic
relations laws were deployed in the service of those commitments to determine
the citizenship of children. Malleable but durable gender-based domestic
relations law principles used to determine children’s birth status were deployed
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See Act of Oct. 22, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-359, 96 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1154(f) (2012)) (extending “preferential treatment” in immigrant visa allocation to children
fathered by U.S. citizens and born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand after
1950 and before October 22, 1982). In 1987, Congress passed what is commonly called the
Amerasian Resettlement Act or the Amerasian Homecoming Act, which provided that all
Amerasians born in Vietnam between January 1, 1962, and January 1, 1976, could immigrate
to the United States along with their immediate family, guardians, or spouse. See
Indochinese Refugee Resettlement and Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 584,
101 Stat. 1329, 1329-183. In 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2012, Congress considered bills that would
have granted automatic citizenship to Vietnamese Amerasians who were residing legally in
the United States, but the bills did not pass. See Amerasian Paternity Recognition Act of
2012, H.R. 5156, 112th Cong.; Amerasian Paternity Recognition Act, H.R. 4007, 110th Cong.
(2007); Amerasian Naturalization Act, H.R. 2687, 109th Cong. (2005); Amerasian
Naturalization Act of 2003, H.R. 3360, 108th Cong.
See supra Section II.A.
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by administrators, judges, and legislators in different ways at different times,
often in support of a broader racially nativist nationality policy. Of course,
marriage and legitimacy requirements served multiple purposes in the hands of
officials who designed and implemented jus sanguinis citizenship law as it
applied to the foreign-born children of American fathers. Officials voiced
concern about fraudulent paternity claims.324 Administrative convenience
played a significant part.325 But the historical sources reveal a much deeper
resistance to recognizing the nonmarital children of American fathers as
citizens—resistance that was born of a long-standing social and legal
commitment to the male-headed marital family as the proper source of
citizenship, and the related felt need to enforce racially nativist nationality laws.
In short, racial nativism was one of several factors that informed the way
administrators and legislators reasoned about the citizenship rights of foreignborn nonmarital children, and it was an important factor.
Attention to the processes by which domestic relations law principles were
enlisted in the service of nationality laws’ racially nativist objectives deepens
and expands our understanding of the history of American citizenship in
important ways. First, careful attention to the memos, case files, briefs,
opinions, and notes of early twentieth-century administrators, lawyers, judges,
and legislators reveals the complex entanglement of domestic relations law,
racialized conceptions of citizenship, and gender in developing the
fundamental structure of our jus sanguinis citizenship law. In some instances,
administrators incorporated explicitly race-based domestic relations laws and
policies into federal jus sanguinis citizenship law. This process was especially
apparent in the military’s ban on interracial marriage326 and the Department of
State’s interpretation of the 1940 Nationality Act’s requirement that only
legitimated nonmarital children of American fathers would be recognized as
citizens, subject to the restriction of anti-miscegenation laws of the father’s
state of domicile. Similarly, legislators overtly excluded certain races from the
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See, e.g., Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain Children of Mothers Who
Are Citizens of the United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain Distinctions in Matters of
Nationality: Hearings on H.R. 5489 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization,
72d Cong. 3-5 (1931); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
Letter from Raymond F. Crist, U.S. Comm’r of Naturalization 1 (Dec. 31, 1931) (on file with
NARA, RG 85) (expressing disapproval of a bill that would confer American citizenship on
foreign-born children, regardless of legitimacy, where one parent was at the time of the
child’s birth an American citizen, based on “the difficulty which would arise in determining
the status of the individuals concerned”).
See supra Section III.B.
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benefits of family-based citizenship laws, as demonstrated by the exclusion of
women who were racially “ineligible to citizenship,” and their children, from
the War Brides Acts.327
In other instances, officials shaped domestic relations law in order to limit
the reach of jus sanguinis citizenship in ways that were not explicitly race based,
but were purposefully race salient. For example, officials charged with
enforcing the nationality laws tended toward a narrower construction of laws
governing marriage and legitimacy in an effort to limit the recognition of
citizenship claims asserted by or on behalf of nonwhite children. This practice
was at work in the Department of State’s refusal to recognize any SamoanAmerican marriages for purposes of determining the citizenship of Samoanborn children of American fathers.328 It was also at work in the Bureau of
Immigration’s insistence that the presumption of legitimacy—a staple of early
twentieth-century domestic relations law—did not apply when determining the
citizenship claims of children of Chinese American fathers.329 Finally, such
race-salient practices were evident in the military’s efforts to thwart soldiers’
marriages to Asian women, even after explicit race-based and national origins
quotas were abandoned.330 Regardless of whether they took the form of
explicitly race-based domestic relations laws that were incorporated into
citizenship laws, or facially race-neutral but operationally race-salient
interpretations of domestic relations laws, what is clear from the historical
sources is that, at significant and formative moments, the laws governing
marriage and birth status provided an alternative means of policing the racial
bounds of the polity.
Second, what is also clear from the historical sources is that, as a method of
shaping the racial composition of the polity, reliance on domestic relations law
principles tended to obscure the racialist ambitions of decision makers and
policy makers. The Guyer court could rely on the legal principle nullius filii
rather than engage with the explosive question of the citizenship status of
persons of African descent—a question that was being contested on the
battlefield as the judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals deliberated.331
Confronted with claims to citizenship by Samoan-born children of American
fathers, the Department of State could rely on a constrained definition of
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See supra notes 288-301 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section I.A.
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marriage to determine those children’s claims, helping to secure the unstable
distinctions between center and periphery, citizen and noncitizen, in America’s
fledgling empire.332 In deciding the citizenship status of foreign-born children
of Chinese American fathers, the Bureau of Immigration could turn to the laws
governing birth status and marriage when purely race-based regulation was
politically infeasible.333 And after the race-based and national origins
restrictions were finally eliminated from American nationality law in the mid1960s, military officials could enlist marriage and legitimacy laws to restrict the
availability of citizenship to the thousands of foreign-born children of
American soldiers stationed in Asia.334 At key moments, then, domestic
relations law principles were used by officials to prevent significant numbers of
nonwhite children from securing citizenship through their fathers, without
relying on transparently racialist reasoning.
Third, and related, by focusing on the role of domestic relations law
principles in the administration and development of jus sanguinis citizenship
law, one can better describe how race-salient gender-asymmetrical
understandings of marriage and family became entrenched, normalized, and
naturalized in the law governing parent-child citizenship transmission.
Building on the insights of law and society theorists who emphasize the
constitutive effects of the everyday practice of law,335 one can track how genderand marriage-based domestic relations law became ingrained in the everyday
legal practices of federal and state judges and federal administrators, and was
eventually codified in statute. To identify this process of entrenchment and
naturalization is to resist the suggestion that such practices are transhistorical,
while also acknowledging their hold on American law. Like all sociolegal
phenomena, the racialization of jus sanguinis citizenship was the product of
specific social, cultural, and political circumstances that shaped Americans’
understanding of what it meant to be a member of the nation-state: who was
in, who was not, and the justifications that were offered for those
determinations. But as much as the history of jus sanguinis citizenship
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See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section III.B.
See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal
Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 50-52 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1993); Barbara Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court,
and the Construction of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409, 410
(1988) (examining how “exchanges between [court] clerk and citizens produce legal and
moral frameworks”).
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demonstrates that American nationality law developed in response to particular
historical conditions, one would be remiss to ignore the common thread that
runs through the regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship: the way that the
gender-based domestic relations laws that structure parent-child relationships
frequently operated in nationality law as instruments of racial exclusion.
Indeed, a risk of doing so is to participate inadvertently in a practice of elision
that has frequently characterized racially nativist discourse and strategies in the
field of nationality law.
iv. reflections on the practice and politics of modern
derivative citizenship
For some students of American nationality law, the importance of the
history of jus sanguinis citizenship—now called derivative citizenship—lies not
in its significance for our understanding of the past, but in what it may mean
for how we reason about modern citizenship law. The historical account
provided here bears on a wide range of important issues concerning the
regulation of formal membership in the American polity, including the role of
bureaucracy in the development of substantive principles of nationality law,
and vice versa;336 the allocation of power between the executive branch and
Congress in the regulation of nationality law;337 nationality law’s modern role
as a nation-building tool;338 the complex interrelationship of family-based
immigration preferences and derivative citizenship law; and how the norms
and processes of administrative decision making shape the contours of the
legally recognized family.339 A full exploration of these topics would extend far
beyond the scope of this Article. In closing, I focus on the ways that the history
of jus sanguinis citizenship sheds critical light on modern citizenship dilemmas
concerning the role of family, and family law, in the rules and processes used to
determine citizenship today. Standing alone, history cannot resolve such
dilemmas. It cannot tell us how to craft an optimal system of citizenship
designation.340 However, this granular history of jus sanguinis citizenship can
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See sources cited supra note 26.
Cf. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 221.
See ZOLBERG, supra note 10.
Cf. Collins, supra note 25.
By suggesting that the history of jus sanguinis citizenship should prompt reconsideration of
the role that gender and marriage continue to play in American nationality law, I do not
mean to imply that a more generous practice of citizenship would remedy all wrongs, or
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alert us to the ways that the complex constellation of ideas concerning family,
gender, race, and political membership traced here may continue to shape both
individuals’ lived experience of gender-based derivative citizenship law and the
politics of citizenship law today. In addition, turning to recent contests over the
constitutionality of modern gender-based citizenship laws, the history of jus
sanguinis citizenship can illuminate past and present practices in ways that can
productively reframe the current debate, and prompt modern jurists, lawyers,
legislators, and administrators to ask different questions about the wisdom and
constitutional moorings of those laws today.
A. Re-reading the Present
Lest one think that gender-based family law principles no longer play a
race-salient role in the practice of American citizenship, more recent chapters in
the development and implementation of jus sanguinis citizenship principles
suggest that the lines drawn by our predecessors continue to inform the
operation of the rules that govern membership in the American polity, as well
as proposals to fundamentally alter those rules. Most obvious in this regard is
the fact that past citizenship determinations premised on racialized family law
policies and administrative practices continue to determine the citizenship
status of individuals living today and will have intergenerational effects into

redress the massive global misallocation of resources that citizenship theorists have
identified as a significant moral failure of modern birthright citizenship regimes, jus
sanguinis and jus soli. See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009). Ayelet Shachar and other critics of birthright citizenship have
suggested that a thicker model of citizenship would provide a sounder basis for citizenship
and a more just allocation of the social goods, protections, and entitlements that most
nation-states attach to citizenship today. Id. at 123-28. Shachar develops a theory of “jus
nexi,” the principle that political membership should be based on, and distributed according
to, center-of-life connections. See id. at 166-70; see also PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M.
SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 9-41,
116-40 (1985) (describing alternative conceptions of citizenship and arguing for a
“consensualist” framework). My granular account of the history of jus sanguinis citizenship
in American law does demonstrate, however, that we live in a world in which proxies for
consent, affiliation, and allegiance—including, perhaps especially, family membership—
regularly have been used to exclude individuals and groups from the American polity along
lines that are illiberal in nature: ethno-racial identity, gender, and birth status. For other
histories of American citizenship law that confirm this view, see GARDNER, supra note 12;
MOTOMURA, supra note 5; NGAI, supra note 10; SMITH, supra note 5; and Cott, Marriage,
supra note 12.
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the future.341 The appeals of organizations to Congress seeking recognition of
Amerasian children as citizens are concrete reminders of this fact, and of
current efforts to ameliorate the racial operation of derivative citizenship law in
a particular context.342
There is also evidence to suggest that gender- and marriage-based
derivative citizenship laws continue to function in a race-salient manner in the
modern administration of those laws. The experience of Sigifredo Saldana
Iracheta is instructive in this regard. Saldana Iracheta was born in 1964 in
Tamaulipas, Mexico, to a Mexican mother and a Mexican American father,
Sigifredo Saldana.343 Over the course of two decades, from 1992 to 2012, the
son entered and was deported from the United States several times.
Immigration officials repeatedly rejected Saldana Iracheta’s claim that he was
an American citizen, concluding that Sigifredo Sr. could not have transmitted
citizenship to him because Saldana Iracheta was illegitimate.344 His father had
acknowledged him on his birth certificate, and Saldana Iracheta was raised by
both parents along with seven siblings. But according to immigration officials,
these undisputed facts were insufficient to legitimate Saldana Iracheta under
Mexican law.345 They maintained that under the Mexican Constitution,
Saldana Iracheta’s parents were required to marry in order to legitimate him.
As they had not done so, Saldana Iracheta was not an American citizen under
the derivative citizenship statute.346
The problem with the immigration officials’ position, however, was that
one of the provisions of the Mexican Constitution they had relied on simply
does not exist, and never did, and the other provision they relied on was
inapposite.347 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Sigifredo Sr.’s

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

346.
347.

For an important and detailed discussion of the intergenerational effects of jus sanguinis
citizenship, see SHACHAR, supra note 340.
See sources cited supra note 322.
See Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 2013).
See Appendix of Decisions for Review at 4, 9, 13-17, Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d 419 (No. 1260087).
See Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d at 421, 424. Because Saldana Iracheta was over eighteen years
old when the 1986 amendments came into effect, his citizenship status was determined
under a pre-1986 version of the statute, which required him to prove that he was legitimated
under the laws of his father’s domicile. See id. at 423; 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1964).
Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d at 423-24.
Id. In 2008, the Administrative Appeals Office of the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services
(AAO) denied Saldana Iracheta’s citizenship claim based on a finding that Article 314 of the
Mexican Constitution required his parents to marry in order to legitimate him. The AAO
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acknowledgment had legitimated Saldana Irachetta under the relevant body of
law, the law of the state of Tamaulipas, and that consequently Saldana Iracheta
had been a U.S. citizen since birth. The court also found that Saldana Iracheta’s
case was not unusual: At least since 1978, immigration officials had relied on
the very same non-existent and misinterpreted provisions of Mexican
constitutional law in ruling on the derivative citizenship claims of children of
Mexican American fathers.348
How are we to understand Saldana Iracheta’s case and those of the
unknown number of Mexican-born individuals who, like him, were
denationalized and deported based on immigration officials’ erroneous
construction of Mexican law? One possibility, as the Department of Justice
lawyers suggested in court, is that it was the result of “a mere ‘typo.’”349 That
could certainly be true. Without ready access to immigration records and
internal agency memoranda of the last three decades, we lack the sources that
would enable a full assessment of this proposed explanation.350 But it is
undoubtedly true that immigration officials labor under excessive caseloads
that easily lead to errors; those errors are then compounded once they are
enshrined in precedential opinions.
At the same time, reading Saldana Iracheta against the history of jus
sanguinis citizenship raises the possibility that ingrained interpretive practices,
along with institutional and political pressure to restrict immigration across the
U.S.-Mexican border today, may also help explain the government’s multi-

348.
349.
350.

cited Matter of Reyes, a 1978 BIA case, to substantiate this claim. See Appendix of Decisions
for Review, supra note 344, at 4; Matter of Reyes, 16 I. & N. Dec. 436, 436 (B.I.A. 1978). The
Fifth Circuit concluded—and the Department of Justice attorneys representing USCIS
conceded—that there is not, and never has been, an Article 314 in the Mexican constitution.
See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). The Fifth Circuit found three other
recent cases where agencies relied on this nonexistent provision, Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d at
423, but there are undoubtedly many more. In a separate misreading of the Mexican
Constitution, a 2004 AAO decision cited Article 130 of the Mexican Constitution to show
that Saldana Iracheta’s father could legitimize him only by marrying his mother. Appendix
of Decisions for Review, supra note 344, at 14. Article 130 declares that marriage is a “civil
contract,” thus distinguishing marriages recognized by the state from religious marriages; it
does not mention birth status. C.P. art. 130.
Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d at 424 n.3.
Id.
For example, immigration files of individuals admitted to the United States after 1951 are
not publicly available. See Researching Individuals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV.,
http://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/research/individuals/researching-individuals
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014).

2222

illegitimate borders

decade reliance on a mistaken understanding of Mexican law governing birth
status.351 The point is not that Saldana Iracheta’s case demonstrates that
immigration officials reason about derivative citizenship in a race-selective
manner. Rather, as the history of the administration of jus sanguinis citizenship
law demonstrates, political pressure to rigorously enforce immigration laws
with respect to a particular group or along a particular border can lead frontline administrators to employ more restrictive practices in assessing individual
claims to derivative citizenship. Because derivative citizenship claims are based
on family status relationships, the status in question–and in particular
“legitimacy”–tends to be interpreted restrictively in such contexts. It follows
that when the border being policed is marked by an ethno-racial divide–as is
the case with the U.S.-Mexican border today352–restrictive interpretation of
family status will function in a race-salient manner.353

351.

352.
353.

It is also notable that even after Department of Justice lawyers conceded that USCIS relied
on a complete misapprehension of Mexican constitutional law, they continued to offer a
very narrow construction of Tamaulipas’s law of legitimacy—an interpretation that the
court of appeals rejected. See Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d at 424-26. Up to the point of reversal
by the court of appeals, Saldana Iracheta’s case appears to have been a classic instance of
“bureaucratic disentitlement,” a phrase that is used in social welfare literature to describe
“programmatic retrenchment” in which “obligations to [program] beneficiaries are reduced
. . . through largely obscure ‘bureaucratic’ actions and inactions of public authorities.”
Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3,
3 (1984).
See RACHEL ST. JOHN, LINE IN THE SAND: A HISTORY OF THE WESTERN U.S.-MEXICO
BORDER (2011).
Other legal scholars have observed a racial pattern in litigation over limitations placed on
father-child citizenship transmission for children born out of wedlock. See Dowd, supra note
4, at 1290 n.123; Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 24 n.92. Obtaining data that would
enable one to test the statistical salience of such observations is extremely difficult given the
general limitations on access to late twentieth-century records of individual immigration
and citizenship determinations. See supra note 350. But data produced by the Department of
State in 1976, although dated, suggests that the more recent observations are representative
of larger, predictable patterns. That year, Congress held hearings on a bill that would have
liberalized gender-based limits on immigration preferences for the nonmarital children of
naturalized American fathers, and for the noncitizen fathers of nonmarital citizen children.
Department of State officials testifying in Congress against the bill presented data showing
that the vast majority of requests for an immigration preference based on the relationship of
a nonmarital child and father were handled by consular offices in the Caribbean and Latin
America. See Review of Immigration Problems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 133, 146-47 (1976)
[hereinafter Review of Immigration Problems] (statement of Hon. Leonard F. Walentynowicz,
Adm’r, Bureau of Sec. & Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State). The consular offices were:
Haiti; Tijuana, Mexico; Jamaica; Trinidad; Honduras; Ecuador; Guyana; Dominican
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“Birthright citizenship bills”—proposals to restrict jus soli birthright
citizenship for children born within the United States—reveal that the complex
entanglement of gender, birth status, and race also continues in political battles
over immigration and citizenship. These proposals, calculated to exclude the
children of undocumented noncitizen mothers from citizenship, have also
taken shape in the course of contestation over the citizenship status of
individuals of Hispanic descent, and would deny citizenship to American-born
children of undocumented mothers, the so-called anchor babies. Although
these bills are race neutral, congressional testimony of proponents of such
measures makes clear that the primary problem, as they formulate it, is
recognizing as citizens the children of undocumented mothers from south of
the U.S.-Mexican border.354
The birthright citizenship bills are non-starters politically, but their
structure nevertheless reveals the durability of gender-asymmetrical jus
sanguinis citizenship principles as a resource for those who seek to restrict
American citizenship to certain ethno-racial groups. Virtually all such bills
would limit jus soli citizenship using jus sanguinis principles: for a U.S.-born
individual to qualify for jus soli citizenship, at least one parent must be a citizen
(or, in some proposals, a lawful permanent resident).355 Some of these
proposals would also use gender- and marriage-based limitations to regulate
jus soli birthright citizenship, to the exclusion of nonmarital children of

354.

355.

Republic; and El Salvador. Although it is unclear whether the data produced included
requests for derivative citizenship (as well as immigration preferences), the pattern would
presumably hold. Kerry Abrams and R. Kent Piacenti suggest another way that the
administration of derivative citizenship can function in a race-salient manner. Derivative
citizenship for nonmarital children of American fathers requires demonstration of a “blood
relationship,” a statutory requirement that does not apply to marital children. Because
children from developing countries or countries where nonmarital births are more common
also often have a more difficult time producing documentary evidence of their relationship
with their American parent, they must produce DNA evidence. Marital children from
countries where vital records are well maintained may not be the biological child of the
citizen parent, but they would not be required to submit evidence of their blood relationship
with their American parent. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 12 (manuscript at 49-53).
See, e.g., Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal Alien
Parents: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims and the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21-22, 24, 35, 91-94, 119-126 (1995)
[hereinafter Societal and Legal Issues].
See, e.g., H.R. 126, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 46, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 6294,
109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 698, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 7, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.
2162, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1363, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 705, 104th Cong. (1995);
H.R.J. Res. 357, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 3605, 102d Cong. (1991).
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American fathers. For example, a bill proposed in 2005 would have denied
citizenship to any nonmarital child born within the United States unless the
mother was a citizen or lawful permanent resident. Thus, the nonmarital child
of an American father and a noncitizen mother residing in the United States
without official permission would be an alien.356 For good measure, the bill
explicitly noted that the parents “are not considered to be married if such
marriage is only a common law marriage.”357 Never presume marriage.358 A
2007 bill was slightly more generous to the nonmarital native-born child of an
American father and an undocumented mother. Under that proposal, the child
would be recognized as a citizen as long as the father satisfied several
conditions drawn directly from the current derivative citizenship statute that
applies to foreign-born children: proof of paternity by clear and convincing
evidence, an agreement by the father to pay child support, and paternal
acknowledgment of the child prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday.359 In
short, several of the birthright citizenship bills would revive the maternal line
principle—the nonmarital child’s citizenship status follows that of the
mother—in the law governing citizenship of children born in the United
States.360 As critics of such proposals have noted, when applied to the children

356.
357.
358.

359.

360.

H.R. 698, 109th Cong. (2005).
Id. § 3(a).
Cf. supra Subsection II.B.2 (describing the presumption of marriage and legitimacy that
generally characterized nineteenth- and early twentieth-century domestic relations law and
the race-salient interpretation of the presumption by officials construing jus sanguinis
citizenship law).
Compare H.R. 133, 110th Cong. (2007), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2012). Possibly because of the
similar structure of § 1409 and some of the birthright citizenship bills, one of the leading
organizations in the movement to alter the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause through
legislation, the Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR), intervened as an
amicus in Flores-Villar v. United States, the most recent equal protection challenge to genderbased derivative citizenship laws heard by the Supreme Court. See Birthright Citizenship,
FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/birthright-citizenship (last
visited Dec. 9, 2013) (“The logical first step for correcting the [birthright citizenship]
problem is for Congress to adopt legislation clarifying the meaning of the 14th
amendment.”); Brief for Immigration Reform Law Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (No. 09-5801). Given
FAIR’s support for limitation of the constitutional guaranty of jus soli birthright citizenship,
and given that most of the birthright citizenship bills use parental gender as a basis for
regulating transmission of citizenship to children born in the United States, it is
unsurprising that FAIR would defend the constitutionality of the current gender-based
derivative citizenship statute that governs the citizenship of foreign-born nonmarital children
of American parents.
For example, under the 2005 bill, H.R 698, 109th Cong., a child born in the United States
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of undocumented mothers the birthright citizenship bills would create a
hereditary caste of non-citizens within the United States.361 What has gone
unnoted, however, is that some of those bills would do so using the very same
family law principles that were long used to effect, or enhance the efficacy of,
racially exclusionary nationality laws.362
By observing the formal and functional parallels between the role that birth
status determinations play in the context of citizenship determinations, past
and present, I do not mean to diminish the significant transformation that has
taken place in American nationality law. For all of the inertia and overt hostility
to both gender and racial equality in laws governing citizenship transmission
and nationality law more generally, in the mid-twentieth century pressure to
repeal inegalitarian nationality laws gradually yielded significant changes.363
More recently, Congress prospectively altered the rules governing father-child
citizenship transmission to foreign-born nonmarital children, simultaneously
liberalizing and placing new requirements on recognition of the father-child
relationship.364 Thus, the lines drawn by previous administrators, judges, and

361.

362.

363.
364.

to an unmarried, undocumented non-citizen mother would not be an American citizen. In
addition, a child born in the United States to an undocumented non-citizen mother married
to a non-citizen also would not be an American citizen. Reading the plain language of the
bill, it would seem that the only child born in the United States of an undocumented noncitizen mother who would be an American citizen is the child of an undocumented mother
formally married to the child’s American citizen father. Such a situation would be rare given
that marriage to an American citizen would generally make the mother eligible for lawful
permanent resident status.
See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 9, at 30; Gerald Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 485, 491 (1987) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 340); see also Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The Citizenship Clause, Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1363, 1367 (2009). Notably, Professor Peter
Schuck, who has argued in favor of limitation of birthright citizenship, testified against the
birthright citizenship bills for this reason. See Societal and Legal Issues, supra note 354, at 96
(statement of Professor Peter H. Schuck, Yale Law School).
Critics of the birthright citizenship bills have observed that the bills would rely on genderdiscriminatory measures to effect the exclusion of certain children from citizenship. See, e.g.,
HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 9, at 30; Societal and Legal Issues, supra note 354, at 112 (statement
of Prof. Gerald L. Neuman, Columbia University Law School).
See supra notes 217-218.
In 1986, Congress prospectively amended the parent-child derivative statute by providing
for recognition of the nonmarital foreign-born child of an American father as a citizen even
if the father did not marry the child’s mother (still required for formal legitimation in many
jurisdictions), but only if the father promised in writing to support the child until age
eighteen, and, prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday, (1) he formally legitimated the child;
(2) he acknowledged paternity of the child in writing under oath; or (3) paternity was
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lawmakers dividing marital from nonmarital children, citizens from noncitizens, have transformed over time, taking varied forms in different
institutional settings and at different moments. Nevertheless, despite such
changes, these examples suggest that the complex entanglement of genderbased jus sanguinis citizenship principles, concepts of birth status, and race
continues to inform the practice and politics of citizenship law in America.
Although these practices episodically come into public view, as in the past,
the racial operation of gender- and marriage-based derivative citizenship laws
is often obscured. It is obscured, I suggest, because the normalizing discourses
of family law have been reaffirmed and entrenched in the practice of American
citizenship, eliding and neutralizing the gendered and racialist operation of jus
sanguinis citizenship law. Saldana Iracheta was repeatedly found not to be a
citizen because he was “illegitimate”—a basis that, when contested, courts and
executive branch officials have found to be justified because the unwed father
“normally” does not have a substantive relationship with his child.365 The racesalient operation of restrictions on father-child citizenship transmission are
also obscured because, as in the past, such laws are most often implemented by
immigration officials whose work is significantly shielded from judicial and
public scrutiny.366 In the everyday, inconspicuous practices of immigration
officials, the boundaries of the nation and the family are affirmed and
reaffirmed (sometimes erroneously), sometimes redrawn, and sometimes
contested.

365.

366.

adjudicated. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99653, § 12, 100 Stat. 3655, 3657. The 1986 amendments also added the requirement that the
father of nonmarital foreign-born children must establish a blood relationship by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.
See, e.g., Review of Immigration Problems, supra note 353, at 134 (statement of Hon. Leonard F.
Walentynowicz) (“[I]n the case of a child born out of wedlock, a family unity is normally
maintained between the child and its natural mother but not necessarily between the child
and its natural father.”); cf. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (observing that mothers,
but not fathers, necessarily have an “opportunity to bond” with their nonmarital children).
Although the question of whether the plenary power doctrine applies to derivative
citizenship determinations is undecided, see Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 72-73, judicial deference to
the political branches in matters relating to naturalization and immigration is well
established, if contested. See generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984
SUP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
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B. “Biological Inevitability” and Constitutional Choices
Occasionally, however, the gender-based derivative citizenship laws
become the focus of legal contests in the highest profile adjudicative forum in
the American system: the Supreme Court. Over the last fifteen years, the Court
has heard three challenges to those laws, and in each of those cases the
citizenship claim of a foreign-born nonmarital child of an American father was
denied.367 The juridical records produced in these cases mention the
petitioners’ country of birth only in passing, and the histories of America’s
exclusionary immigration policies toward their birth countries—the
Philippines, Vietnam, and Mexico368—are absent. Instead, framed by the
concerns highlighted in the Court’s gender equal protection jurisprudence,
debates among the Justices, lower court judges, and attorneys have focused in
significant part on whether the statutes reflect and reinforce stereotypical
assumptions about men’s and women’s roles as parents, or if they reflect “real
differences” between the sexes.369 This is understandable, as American equal

367.

368.
369.

In Miller v. Albright and Nguyen v. INS, nonmarital foreign-born children of American
fathers challenged the father-only legitimation and proof of paternity requirements of the
current law, while in Flores-Villar v. United States, the petitioner challenged the disparate
parental residency requirements that apply to fathers and to mothers of nonmarital foreignborn children. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam), aff’g by
an equally divided court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001);
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409(a), 1401(a)(7) (1970),
with id. § 1409(c). Similar cases have been brought in lower federal courts. See, e.g., Pierre v.
Holder, 738 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting gender and illegitimacy equal protection
challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3)); Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 127 (4th Cir. 2011)
(same), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1005 (2012); see also Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that § 1409(a) violates citizen fathers’ rights under the Equal Protection
Clause), vacated sub nom. Ashcroft v. Lake, 533 U.S. 913 (2001); United States v. AhumadaAguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1409(a)(3) and (a)(4) violate a
father’s equal protection rights), vacated, 533 U.S. 913 (2001); O’Donovan-Conlin v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1079-81 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding, in light of Nguyen,
that § 1409(a) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Lamas-Macias v. INS, No. EP00-CA-10-DB, 2000 WL 33348221, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2000) (discussing petitioner’s
claim that the citizenship conferral provisions of §§ 1401 and 1409 unconstitutionally
discriminate on the basis of gender).
RICK BALDOZ, THE THIRD ASIATIC INVASION: MIGRATION AND EMPIRE IN FILIPINO AMERICA,
1898-1946 (2011); HING, supra note 70, at 121-38; ST. JOHN, supra note 352.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 367. Note, however, that several of the lower court
challenges have asserted claims based on illegitimacy discrimination. Thus far, however,
those claims have not received the same level of attention from legal scholars and the
Supreme Court has not articulated a view on an equal protection challenge based on
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protection jurisprudence focuses on formal “suspect classifications” such as
race, gender, and illegitimacy, and treats such classifications as discrete sources
of injury.370 But a brief examination of the arguments that have been developed
by jurists and government lawyers in defense of gender- and marriage-based
regulation of derivative citizenship—interventions that have largely rejected the
relevance of historical accounts of jus sanguinis citizenship, and yet are now an
important part of that history—suggests that the analytic frame offered by
modern gender equality jurisprudence can generate naturalizing accounts of
derivative citizenship law that obscure illiberal practices of citizenship, both
past and present.371
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Nguyen v. INS—the only one of
the three cases that has resulted in a majority opinion—demonstrates this
point. A core assertion in Nguyen is that differential regulation of citizen
mothers and fathers in the current parent-child derivative citizenship statute
passes constitutional muster because of “a biological difference between

370.

371.

illegitimacy. See, e.g., Pierre, 738 F.3d 39; Johnson, 647 F.3d 120.
The category-based mode of reasoning about constitutional equality norms—and the
practice of understanding race and sex discrimination as analogical but not intersectional—is
not essential to how one might interpret the phrase “equal protection of the laws,” nor is
that category-based interpretation transhistorical. Rather, it is a product of historical
contestation, politics, and legal process. For a rich account of the development of analogies
between race and sex discrimination, and the abandonment of what today would be called
intersectional theories of both constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination law, see
SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2011). For classic treatments of intersectionality, both theoretical and
historiographical, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Davis, supra note
59; and Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men:
Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 261 (1995).
The point is not, of course, that gender equal protection jurisprudence necessarily generates
such accounts. For example, consider Justice O’Connor’s dissenting assessment of §
1409(a)(4) in Nguyen as “paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with
responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.” Nguyen, 533
U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 462 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra note 4, at 1704-05. Rather, faced with such
historically based characterizations, a jurist writing an opinion upholding the law as
constitutional will logically seek to portray the gender-based distinction involved as
something other than a vestige of antiquated stereotypes. See, e.g., Miller, 523 U.S. at 422
(plurality opinion) (concluding that the current gender-asymmetrical regulation of jus
sanguinis citizenship cannot “be fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of a
traditional way of thinking about members of either sex”).
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parents.”372 For mothers, the Court reasons, “the opportunity for a meaningful
relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an
event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of
citizenship,” while that “opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as
a matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father.”373 The
contention that gender-asymmetrical citizenship laws mark biological
difference draws on a significant, if contested, line of jurisprudence that has
situated “real” difference as a permissible basis for gender-based regulation.374
However, when the Court reasons that maternal preferences and paternal
restrictions embedded in derivative citizenship law are a “biological[ly]
inevitab[le]” consequence of differences between men’s and women’s
procreative roles,375 it portrays the regulatory scheme as fixed and
transhistorical.
The historical sources suggest, to the contrary, that gender-based
regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship is not fixed or inevitable, but is the
product of choices—choices made by officials acting under historically and
institutionally contingent pressures and imperatives. Two examples, of the
many that could be drawn from the historical sources, illustrate this point.
First, the protracted effort of American women to secure the right to transmit
citizenship to their children—a right denied married women entirely until
1934—demonstrates that “the event of birth” has not served as an inevitable
basis for citizenship transmission in American law. During the century and a
half that married women were unable to transmit citizenship to their foreignborn children, the birthing process was decidedly not a salient event in the
regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship. Rather, it was understood that the

372.
373.
374.

375.

See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64-65.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (reasoning that, for unwed fathers,
“the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection”
giving the father the right to contest an adoption); Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464,
471 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding a statutory rape law that held men over eighteen
criminally liable for engaging in sexual intercourse with females under eighteen on the
ground that the “physical, emotional, and psychological consequences” of teenage
pregnancies lie with women, rather than men); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97
n.20 (1974) (upholding an exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a state disability
insurance program on the ground that “[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics” and that “lawmakers are constitutionally free
to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any
reasonable basis”).
See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
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husband-father was the head of the household, that his citizenship would
determine that of his marital children, and that married women (as dependents
themselves) had no such power.376 In order to change this law, women’s
organizations engaged in a sustained multi-decade campaign in order to secure
the right of married mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born
children. In the course of that campaign, they had to overcome fierce resistance
that recognition of women’s equal citizenship would seriously compromise the
efficacy of the racial exclusion laws and national origins quotas that
characterized American nationality law at the time.377 But they eventually
prevailed. They prevailed not because legislators came to understand the “event
of birth” as having particular importance in the law of citizenship—nor because
a majority of legislators abandoned their commitment to exclusion laws and
quotas378—but because women’s organizations convinced legislators of the
merits of recognizing women’s equal citizenship rights, or at least convinced
them that it was politically expedient to do so.379
The historical sources also do not support the view that generous
recognition of mother-child citizenship transmission for children born out of
wedlock was animated by administrators’ or lawmakers’ belief in a connection
between “the event of birth” and citizenship. Rather, the administrators who
developed the rule, later adopted by Congress, largely reasoned in the vein of
pragmatic maternalism, acknowledging that, “as a practical matter, it is well
known that almost invariably it is the mother who concerns herself with [the
illegitimate] child.”380 Sociolegal norms concerning the roles and
responsibilities of mothers for children born outside marriage, not theories of
“biological inevitability,” provide the best explanation for the recognition of

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Subsection III.A.1.
See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
See BREDBENNER, supra note 12, at 195-242.
Letter from John J. Scanlan to Ruth Shipley, supra note 246, at 6. By observing that early
twentieth-century administrators did not articulate the view that the mother’s procreative
role was germane to the question of jus sanguinis citizenship, I do not mean to imply that
early twentieth-century policymakers did not sometimes reason in terms that, today, we
might understand as deriving from physiologically-based understandings of sex difference.
However, the historical sources that I reviewed do not support the view that officials
administering the nationality laws reasoned in such terms. Moreover, such physiologicallybased reasoning would have been strained given that the law as written prior to 1934, and as
applied to married mothers, did not reflect that view.
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American mothers’ ability to transmit citizenship to their nonmarital foreignborn children.
A second example drawn from the historical record speaks to the other half
of the Nguyen Court’s assertion: That in the case of the unwed father, the
opportunity to develop ties with his child “does not result from the event of
birth, as a matter of biological inevitability.”381 This, the Court urges, was a
special concern in the case of servicemen stationed abroad, thus demonstrating
“the critical importance of the Government’s interest in ensuring some
opportunity for a tie between citizen father and foreign-born child which is a
reasonable substitute for the opportunity manifest between mother and child at
the time of birth.”382 What the Court’s formulation elides—and what the
historical record illuminates—is that during key moments in the development
of jus sanguinis citizenship law, government officials facilitated some men’s
“opportunity to bond” with their nonmarital foreign-born children, while
thwarting others’ opportunity to do the same. The disparate treatment of
nonwhite children of servicemen renders the Court’s formulation especially
troubling. Congress and the military marshaled extraordinary political and
material resources in order to bring the non-Asian brides and babies of World
War II soldiers home to the United States. Meanwhile, military policies that
prohibited and limited interracial marriage between U.S. soldiers stationed in
Asia and local women frustrated the efforts of those servicemen who sought
recognition of, and American citizenship for, their children.383 This sorry
history calls into question the suggestion that a father’s lack of an opportunity
to bond with his child at birth can reasonably be understood as a “biological
inevitability.” Instead, it reveals the limitation of citizenship transmission
between the American father and his nonmarital foreign-born child as the
product of choices of officials charged with enforcing and developing the rules
that governed membership in the polity—rules that were constructed and
construed in ways that tended to exclude nonwhite children from
citizenship.384

381.
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383.
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Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).
Id. at 64.
See supra Section III.B.
This is not a case where the notion of recognizing citizenship transmission between a father
and his nonmarital child was completely unimaginable by contemporaries. As I have shown
elsewhere, in the 1930s, women’s organizations pressed for recognition of father-child
citizenship transmission for children born out of wedlock. See Collins, Fathers’ Rights, supra
note 4, at 1695-97. And as early as the 1880s, at least one Department of State official
reasoned that “the misfortune of an illegitimate birth cannot deprive a man of his
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These examples also demonstrate a crucial point that, while obvious from
the history provided here, is easily overlooked if one focuses exclusively on how
jus sanguinis citizenship is regulated according to the gender and marital status
of the citizen parent without attending to the fact that the laws were designed
to determine the child’s citizenship. The officials who implemented and
developed American jus sanguinis citizenship law were not agnostic as to the
child’s birth status, and they also were not agnostic as to the child’s race.
Instead, at key junctures, judges, administrators, and legislators enlisted
gender- and marriage-based citizenship laws in an effort to limit recognition of
nonwhite children as citizens: The “illegitimate half-castes born . . . of
American fathers and native women”; the children of Chinese American fathers
born, it was feared, on polygamous “stock-farms”; the children of the dust. In
so doing, officials charged with policing the bounds of the polity helped create
racial sociolegal hierarchies using birth status designations that had been used
for similar purposes in American domestic law.385 In the context of nationality
law, these designations were formulated and enforced through the blunt
instrument of exclusion from membership in the polity.
My purpose in offering these observations is not to provide an ultimate
resolution to questions concerning the constitutionality of current genderbased citizenship laws—questions that would take different forms in different
cases. Nor do I propose an alternative system of citizenship designation.
Rather, my purpose is to urge that a historical account attentive to the origins
and operation of the jus sanguinis statutes calls for open acknowledgment of the
ideological and political commitments that have informed the development
and continued vitality of the gendered construction of the parent-child
relationship in American nationality law.386 However we might parse the
history of gender-based and racialized regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship

385.
386.

nationality. . . . He is a part of society.” Letter from John Russell Young to Charles
Seymour, supra note 43.
For discussions of the race-salient use of illegitimacy laws in American domestic relations
law, see sources cited supra note 13.
Such a candid evaluation of the facts may not lead everyone to the same conclusion. For
example, Ninth Circuit Judge Andrew Kleinfeld was forthright in his assessment that
Congress was well within its constitutional authority to pass a statute that would minimize
the burdens created by “paternity and citizenship claims” asserted by “the women the [U.S.]
soldiers left behind and their children.” United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121,
1129 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). “This may not be pretty,” he noted, “but it is
a rational basis for a sex distinction.” Id. Linda Kerber provides a careful and contextualized
discussion of Judge Kleinfeld’s reasoning in Kerber, The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other, supra
note 6, at 6.
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law, by portraying the gender-asymmetrical regime we have in place today as
an “inevitable” consequence of physiological differences between mothers and
fathers, the analysis offered by modern jurists and advocates defending those
laws—and now memorialized in the United States Reports—risks eclipsing the
different ways those laws have been, and may continue to be, shaped and
informed by premises that are no longer accepted as reasonable and legal bases
for citizenship determinations.387 Those commitments have been animated not
only by gender-traditional modes of reasoning about parental roles, but also by
racially nativist understandings of citizenship.
conclusion
It is possible that the Supreme Court will revisit the questions surrounding
the constitutionality of gender-asymmetrical derivative citizenship laws in the
future. It is even possible that the Court will constrain the choices of modern
legislators and administrators by finding certain aspects of our current genderand marriage-based nationality laws unconstitutional.388 But even if it does
so—and in the more probable event that it does not—officials in the political
branches will continue to grapple with how to regulate derivative citizenship
and immigration preferences that are premised on the parent-child
relationship.389 Legislators will be confronted with proposals to grant
citizenship to Amerasian children of American soldiers and to expand the
geographical reach of immigration preferences currently given to some
Amerasian children.390 In their everyday work, administrators will exercise
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Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) (arguing that “reason[ing]
about reproductive regulation in physiological paradigms . . . obscures the possibility that
such regulation may be animated by constitutionally illicit judgments about women”).
Although Nguyen seemed to provide the definitive word on the constitutionality of genderbased regulation of derivative citizenship, the Justices tied in their most recent effort to
resolve the constitutionality of modern gender-based citizenship laws, Flores-Villar v. United
States. In that case, the Court considered a challenge to the disparate parental residency
requirements that apply to fathers and mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children. See
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally divided
court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nina Pillard and Alexander Aleinikoff argue that Congress has a special responsibility to
ensure that derivative citizenship laws conform to constitutional equality principles precisely
because the plenary power doctrine limits judicial oversight. See Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra
note 6.
See sources cited supra note 322.
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discretion in interpreting parent-child derivative citizenship statutes and other
laws that recognize the parent-child relationship for immigration and
naturalization preferences. Federal judges will sit in review of those
determinations and will be confronted with a host of statutes that make birth
status a factor in determining an individual’s membership in the polity.
Government attorneys will be called on to defend those laws against challenges
alleging interpretive errors and constitutional violations. Whatever the
institutional context, and whatever the particular issue, the history provided
here suggests that officials charged with these tasks would do well to
reconsider the commonplace—but oversimplified—understanding that
derivative citizenship laws operate to ensure “family unity.” Such laws, and the
principles and processes used to implement them, do not simply incorporate
pre-existing notions of “family” in drawing lines between citizen and
noncitizen. Rather, officials borrow, adapt, and reformulate family law
principles to determine what relationships count for membership in the polity.
In that process, officials’ conceptions of what counts as a family have been
shaped by gender-traditional conceptions of the parent-child relationship that,
in turn, have been—and may continue to be—used to shape the ethno-racial
composition of the polity. Like their predecessors, modern jurists,
administrators, and judges are engaged in an ongoing nation-building project
of the most fundamental sort. How they enlist the family in the furtherance of
that project need not be determined by the choices of their predecessors.
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